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INTRODUCTION
The central theme of this study is the subject of time
in Descartes.

Two considerations provoke this undertaking.

Despite the wealth of literature on Des~artes, there has
been no one single volume work that has offered an incisive
and comprehensive examination of Descart~s• theory of time.
What has been attempted in the way of studies, for the most
part, has treated time in a modified way as a tangential
issue in Descartes' philosophy; or the studies have assumed
a narrower vision and focused on a single aspect of the
Cartesian theory of time.

Secondly, and more importantly,

is the consideration that time presents itself as a convoluted concept in Descartes' philosophical works.

Descartes

never treated time in any systematic fashion as a special
subject of examination.

What he says about time is dis-

persed throughout the corpus of his works.

Hence, we find

misinterpretations and objections by critics that may arise
from a failure to view time within its immediate context,
and, more importantly, within the broader context of
Descartes' overall philosophical concerns.

Because of these

considerations, our intent is to provide an in-depth study
that will examine the myriad aspects of Descartes' theory
of time and will give a clear understanding of the role
time plays in the Cartesian philosophy.
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Four goals will distinguish our study from others.
First of all, this study will view time as an integral and
important component in Descartes' philosophy, a system of
interrelated issues understood in terms of one another.
The point of departure and yet the ultimate point of reference for our analysis is Descartes' fundamental and primary
goal to establish a universal science.

Descartes was com-

mitted to the belief that this universal science, which is
most accurately described as a mathematical kind of physics,
could provide the solutions to all the questions of nature.
Without equivocation, Descartes made known that his
metaphysics was meant solely to serve as a foundation for
his physics.

Distinguished by its radical dualism,

Descartes' metaphysics polarizes the finite order into two
separate and independent kinds of substances.

There is the

material substance having the sole attribute of extension
and there is the thinking substance having the sole attribute of thought.

Common to both kinds of substances are

existence, unity, substance, and duration, yet these substances remain essentially heterogeneous.

Although time

is a feature of both kinds of substances insofar as these
substances share a common duration, their radical disparity
cannot be overcome.

Hence, an account of a Cartesian theory

of time has to explain how time as such is to be a property
of each kind of substance.
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Time cannot be interpreted as a univocal predicate
applicable to both kinds of substances.

Descartes' meta-

physical dualism makes it necessary to examine time as an
analogical concept.

Such an approach provides us with a

perspective of time that is in accordance with the exigencies of Descartes' metaphysics and with his philosophy
taken as a systematic whole.

It is our intent to validate

our approach by providing a developmental argument.

It

starts out with the genesis of Descartes' project, and
proceeds on to various aspects of time and then relates
time to his metaphysical dualism.
The second goal of this study is to address ourselves
to the questions raised about the apparent paradoxical
nature of Descartes' theory of time.

We will consider the

standard thesis that the doctrine of continuous creation
entails the discontinuity of time as well as the indivisibility of the moment of time.

As a result of our analysis,

we will be able to resolve these questions so as to leave
little doubt regarding the coherency of Descartes' theory
of time.
The third goal of the study will be to pursue the
mathematical dimensions of time.

This is prompted by

Descartes' belief that the questions which arise in any
science are essentially mathematical questions since their
common consideration is the various relationships or proportions between objects.

Ultimately, these questions give
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rise to problems about order and measure, the concerns of
mathematics.

Appropriately, we will consider time from a

mathematical dimension because time, too, is directly
related to the questions of order and measure.
Descartes presents us with a description of time that
has mathematical implications.

For Descartes time is the

"number of movement" and a "measure of duration," and in
accordance with Descartes' view that number expresses both
order and measure, time as a number can validly be applied
to duration.

The justification for this is the fact that

all substances share a common successive kind of duration,
the parts of which are ordered one to another as 'before'
and 'after'.

As such, each part as a unit falls under the

category of discrete numerable quantity.

The duration of

substances is also continuous, and for that reason can be
conceived as measurable quantity analogous to extension.
Hence, time as a number can express both the order and
measure that characterizes the duration of substances.
This study will spell out the dynamics of time when it
functions as a number.

Our analysis will provide analogies

using concepts and elements found in the sciences of
arithmetic and geometry.

When appropriate, we will use

graphic mathematical illustrations as Descartes himself
does in the Rules when he wishes to make clear his meaning.
Finally, we will offer a comparative analysis between
Descartes' theory of time and Aristotle's theory of time and

5

also St. Augustine's theory of time.

Descartes' descrip-

tions of time as a "number" and "measure" are clearly
similar to elements found in Aristotle's treatment of time.
Descartes' definition of time as a "mode of thought" introduces a psychological aspect of time that is reminiscent of
st. Augustine's theory of time.

For these reasons, there

is merit in considering both Aristotle's and Augustine's
theories of time to trace the roots of Descartes' theory of
time.

The knowledge of these theories will contribute to

our understanding of Descartes' theory.

In addition, the

comparative analysis will illumine some of the points made
in previous chapters.
These four goals will be developed in the following
manner:

Chapter I will establish that our dual perspective

approach is warranted for an accurate understanding of the
Cartesian theory of time.

The justification for this is

grounded in the inextricable, but definitive relationship
between three constitutive elements in the Cartesian philosophy, namely, his scienfific concerns, his metaphysical
dualism, and time.

The first and ultimate point of refer-

ence for the latter two is Descartes' conviction that his
mission in life was to found a mathematical kind of physics
characterized by its self-evidency and certitude.

With

this committed vision Descartes formulated a metaphysics
as a foundation for his physics.

Epistemological considera-

tions prompted Descartes to propose that the created order
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was comprised of two heterogeneous kinds of substances:
the material substance, defined solely in terms of extension
and the thinking substance, defined solely in terms of
thought.
Under the rubric of science, such simple dualism
translates into a relationship between the inanimate,
material substance as the object known, and the dynamic,
thinking substance as the knowing subject.

Since Cartesian

matter is essentially extension, the universe is geometrical.

Further, nature is fundamentally knowable because

it operates in accordance with the principles and laws of
mathematics.

Since the thinking substance is essentially

endowed with a faculty for knowing truth, the mind need
only act in accordance with a method of prescribed rules
to accurately know nature.

Given the essential constitution

of both the known and the knower, a mathematical kind of
universal physics is theoretically possible.
Bound up with Descartes' scientific concerns and his
metaphysical dualism is the subject of our study, time.
Time, for Descartes, has objective reality.

It is a

property of all existing things insofar as they have a
successive duration.

However, the temporality of the two

kinds of substances cannot be, and is not, manifested in
the same way.

The material substance as an extended body

is a geometrical inanimate entity.

The thinking substance

as a soul is a dynamic subject of cognitive activities.
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Both kinds of substances share a common duration.

In light

of Descartes' primary scientific concerns, the mutual coexistence of two radically distinct kinds of substances
means that the thinking substance can relate to material
substances as knower to the known.

Hence, the temporality

of the thinking substance is significant in terms of the
latter's distinction as an agent of knowing, and the temporality of the material substance is significant solely in
terms of its distinction as an object that is known.

This

dual perspective must condition our understanding of time
and the role it plays in Descartes' philosophy.
Descartes describes time as a "measure of duration"
and the "number of movement," stipulating that the latter
description is applicable to both kinds of substances
insofar as they are characterized by a successive duration.
As we proceed in the study, the manner in which these
descriptions of time are uniquely applied to the material
substance and its local motion, and to the thinking substance and its cognitive activites will become evident.
Time is a "number" and a "measure".

If something is

numbered and measured there must be a soul to do the
numbering and measuring.

Thus, we find Descartes intro-

ducing a psychological aspect of time by calling it a "mode
of thought".

It is the way in which we think about the

duration of things.

In the remaining chapters it will

become clear what Descartes thinks about the duration of
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each kind of substance and how it is temporally manifested
in accordance with each one's respective essential attribute.
Prior to examining time as it relates to both the
material substance and to the thinking substance, Chapter II
will consider the genesis of a time-paradox that evolves
within the context of Descartes' doctrine of continuous
creation.

The primary concern of this doctrine is to

establish the existence of God.
an important issue.

Time, nevertheless, becomes

The creature in itself is nothing and

has no power of conservation whereby it can continue to
exist from one moment to the next.

Hence, God's continuous

creative activity must renew the creature in existence at
each and every moment or else the creature would cease to
exist and fall into nothingness.

As regards time, each of

these moments is independent and can be separated from the
the moment before and the moment after.

Since there is no

necessary connection between any two moments, it would
appear that these units cannot be conceived as contiguous
units which form a true continuity, an unbroken unity.
Is Descartes, then, guilty of a real contradiction or simply
an apparent contradiction?

Does Descartes, as some critics

claim, draw continuous time from discontinuous moments?
What is at issue here in this chapter is whether
Descartes' doctrine of continuous creation, upon which the
critics base their thesis, does, in fact, establish the
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discontinuity of time.

One of the main points we will

consider is the argument that, for Descartes, contiguity is
identified with continuity.

If this is true, what follows

is that discontiguity is identified with discontinuity.
Hence, since the moments are not necessarily connected,
that is, they can be separated, they are discontiguous, and
thus discontinuous.

An examination of the texts will

determine if the line of argument is valid.
In addition, does Descartes draw duration from moments
that have no duration?

The same critics who allege that

time for Descartes is discontinuous, also presume that it
is constituted by moments that have no duration.

This

chapter, then, will address itself to the thesis that:
Descartes' theory of time is paradoxical, but the reader
must be alerted to the fact that this thesis cannot be
sustained or disproved by appealing to arguments based on
the scattered texts presented by the critics.

It can only

be resolved by examining time and how it functions within
the broader context of Descartes' metaphysical dualism and
the scientific concerns which dominate his philosophical
life.

Our study will accomplish that resolution.
Chapter III will be directed to an examination of time

as the "number of movement" insofar as it applies to the
material substance.

Initially, the chapter will examine

the concept of 'movement' found in the pre-Principles period
of Descartes.

There are two reasons for considering this
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period separately.

The first is that in Descartes' early

writings he espoused the existence of a vacuum and explained
the movement of falling bodies in terms of the force of
gravity.

Secondly, prior to 1640 Descartes considered weight

to be an objective quality in bodies and a factor in movement.

Descartes abandoned both positions and he no longer

believed in the existence of a vacuum nor did he consider
weight an objective quality in bodies.

After 1640 Descartes'

definition of bodies now included only their extension and
the displacement of their extended parts.
Given this geometrical concept of bodies, Descartes
found it necessary to redefine motion.

After 1640 Descartes

conceived only local motion to be possible, defining it as
a transference or instantaneous displacement of one part
of matter by another part in the immediate vicinity.

As

our analysis will bear out, this concept has a myriad of
implications that condition our understanding of time.
In the pre-Principles period time played only a minimal role
in Descartes' concept of movement.

However, after he

redefined bodies in the Principles time becomes a decisive
factor in the explanation of local movement.
Descartes' theory of the instantaneous transmission of
light plays a pivotal role in his philosophical system and
within his physics.

Consequently, this chapter will

examine that theory apart from the concept of 'movement'.
Part of that examination will include a consideration of what
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Descartes means by the term 'instant', since it is the
temporal condition for the transmission of light.
Chapter IV will shift from time as it relates to the
material substance to a consideration of the temporality
of the thinking substance as it is manifested in the mental
events which constitute its duration.

Descartes abandons

the term 'instant' when he speaks about the thinking
substance.

The Cogito and all other truths are seen in

that primary moment known as the 'present'.

For Descartes,

the 'present' has epistemological consequences.

His meta-

physics is formulated to define the thinking substance as
an agent of knowing.

It is from this perspective that we

must approach the temporality of the thinking substance
since its essence is limited solely to thought.
The Rules cannot be dismissed simply because they
were never finished.

Descartes offers a systematically

developing philosophy, and the Rules are Descartes' initial
attempt to set down a method for attaining truth in the
sciences.

While Descartes may have changed his thinking

on some minor areas, he never rejected the fundamental
precepts laid down in the Rules.

Clearly enunciated in this

work is the principle that there are only two means by which
certitude is possible:

intuition and deduction.

Hence,

the efficacy of the thinking substance as an agent of
knowing is demonstrated when the mind employs these two
mental operations.

As mental events that constitute the
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duration of the thinking substance, they reveal the manner
in which Descartes thinks the soul's temporality can be
and should be most powerfully expressed.

In examining

these two mental activities and their temporal implications,
special attention will be given to the concept of the
'present'.

Insofar as the past and future are parts of

time, we will consider in detail the synthetic activity by
which the mind coalesces the past and future with the
present so as to constitute an unbroken continuum.
Since the thinking substance is the noetic foundation
of Descartes' science, it is worth attempting to ascertain
its ontological status and determine whether Descartes'
metaphysics posits a permanent subject whose substantial
identity is preserved in time.

Science as a developmental

intellectual event requires this.
Chapter V introduces an historical look at the meaning of time.

It examines Book IV of Aristotle's Physics

and Books XI and XII of the Confessions of St. Augustine.
Their treatments of time will serve to support and clarify
the interpretation offered by this study.

The comparative

analysis will demonstrate that one can scarcely deny
Descartes' obvious affinity to both Aristotle's and Augustine's theories.

In the case of Aristotle the parallels

in language are striking.

For both Aristotle and Descartes

we find time described as the "number of movement" and a
"measure" that can be applied to motion and the duration of
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things.

St. Augustine's treatment of time provides us with

a theory that stresses the psychological aspect while-it
recognizes the objective reality of time as a property of
created substances.

This dual perspective of time is

integral to Descartes' theory.

For Des~artes shares a

belief that time is real, yet he acknowledges that the point
of reference for understanding that temporality is the soul.
Thus, Descartes defines time as a "mode of thought".
The comparative analysis will establish that the areas
of similarity between Descartes and his two predecessors
are pronounced.

This lends credence to our claim that

Descartes made use of their theories in his own philosophy.
The final chapter will serve to summarize the previous
chapters and will justify our approach and the four goals
we set out to accomplish.

More importantly, it will

establish that Descartes' theory of time can stand on its
own merits as a coherent theory of time that is accommodated
to his metaphysical dualism and to his more fundamental
scientific goals.

CHAPTER I
THE NEW SCIENCE
A. A Mathematical Physics
The fabric of Descartes' philosophical system is
tightly woven of diverse strands of thought whose meaning
and value are determined by the manner in which they serve
to complete the intended design.

Because of this an under-

standing of the individual strands is conditioned by viewing
the system as an integrated whole.

Without that insight the

meaning and significance of any one strand are obscured and
ultimately become entangled and distorted.

In view of this

our intent is to examine time as it functions within the
tapestry of Descartes' philosophical system.

To do this it

is necessary to determine the singular fundamental concern
which provided the impetus for Descartes' philosophical
endeavors.

As a preliminary to the examination proper we

propose to identify this dominant project which forms the
central pattern of Descartes' philosophical system.
Descartes was an innovator and a man with a mission.
At an early age i t became apparent what direction that mission would take.

Sometime in the year 1618, at the age of

twenty-two, Descartes met Isaac Beeckman, a Dutch physician
and engineer.

Beeckman, himself a committed man, had a
14
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vision of a new 'mechanical' philosophy that viewed the
world as an order of atoms moving according to mathematicmechanical laws.

Descartes joined Beeckman in a brief

apprenticeship in natural philosophy and mathematics.
Together they believed they could construct a natural
philosophy that would be a combination of mechanics and
mathematics, a philosophy most properly called 'physicomathematics'.1

They never systematized their speculations.

Influenced by Beeckman's work, Descartes pursued mathematical
researches on his own.
The year of 1619 was significant for Descartes.

In

November of that year we are told that Descartes had a
dream in which the Angel of Truth revealed that he was to
devote his whole life to science, and that mathematics was
the sole science that would provide a solution to all the
secrets of nature.

2

The dream was the confirmation of his

already held conviction that there could be one single universal science that included all the narrow sciences and
that each of the sciences required the same certitude and
the same method. 3
The dream of a universal science perdured.

Contrary

to Aristotle, who believed that all the sciences required a
different method of approach and analysis,

4

Descartes

believed that all the sciences were identical to wisdom and
could be comprehended by the same method:
Il faut done bien se convaincre que toutes les sciences
sont tellement liees ensemble, qu'il est plus facile de
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les apprendre toutes a la fois, que d'en isoler une des
autres.
Si quelqu'un veut chercher serieusement la
verite, il ne doit done pas choisir l'etude de quelque
science particuliere; car elles sont toutes unies entre
elles et dependent les unes des autres;8
The unity of all sciences would mean not only that
there would be one method of approach and analysis, but more
importantly, one criterion for certitude.that would embrace
all things knowable.

Descartes' dream of unity was essen-

tially a dream of certitude that would raise science from
the level of hypothesis to the level of conclusions.

He

deprecated the common philosophers who were content with
hypotheses and were committed to the thesis that the most
that could be achieved in the field of physics was to say
how things could be without proving that they could not be
.
6
ot h erwise.

Descartes adhered to the belief that there

could be a science more certain than popular belief-admittedly an infinite work.that no one man could achieve,
yet possible.

7

Mathematics held the key to that possibility:

Pour la physique, je croirois n'y rien savoir, si je ne
savois que dire comment les choses peuvent etre, sans
demontrer qu'elles ne peuvent etre autrement; car
l'avant reduite aux mathematiques, c'est chose
possible.a
Descartes believed that of all the sciences mathematics
alone furnishes us with an illustration of self-evidence and

. d e. 9
certitu

If all the sciences could be comprehended as

one, then whatever method was used in mathematics could
justifiably be used in every scientific pursuit.
The dynamics of this method was the primary concern of
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Descartes' earliest philosophical work which he entitled
Rules for the Guidance of Our Native Powers.

In it Descartes

sets down a method for achieving truth and self-evident
knowledge in the sciences.

The method, which was to be more

than provisional, consisted in intuition and deduction and

was endemic to mathematics:

"C'est a l'arithrnetique et a la

Geometrie seule parmi les sciences deja trouvers, que nous
reduit l'observation de notre regle.~

10

The success of the

mathematician in discovering truth and resolving problems
led Descartes to propose that this method, which served the
mathematician so well, could be utilized by every other
discipline.

All the other sciences, such as Astronomy,

Music, Optics, Mechanics, among others, could employ the
method since ultimately the questions in these sciences were
questions that gave rise to problems about order and measure.
While their objects are different, what they have in common
are the various relationships or proportions among their

.
11
o b Jects.
Et si l'on y reflechit plus attentivement, on remarque
enfin que seules toutes les choses ou l'on etudie
l'ordre et la mesure se rattachent a la mathematique,
sans qu'il importe que cette mesure soit cherchee dans
des nornbres, des astres, des sons, ou quelqu'autre
objet; on remarque ainsi qu'il doit y avoir quelque
science generale expliquant tout ce qu'on peut chercher
touchant l'ordre et la mesure sans application a une
matiere particuliere, et que cette science est appellee
.•• mathematique universelle, parce qu'elle renferme
tout ce pourquoi les autres sciences, sont dites des
parties de la mathematique.12
If all the questions that arise in any science are fundamentally mathematical questions, then the method of inquiry
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used by the mathematician can be universally applicable by
any scientist regardless of the discipline.
this will be the attainment of certitude.

The results of
What is suggested

in the Rules is that the principles of mathematics could be
applied to the phenomena of nature.

What is only implicit

in the Rules becomes explicit later on in the Principles:
Que je ne recois point de principes en Physique, qui ne
soient aussi receus en Mathematique.~.& que ces principes suffisent, d'autant que tousles Phainomenes de
la nature peuvent etre expliquez par leur moyen.13
What Descartes has done is to reduce the laws of Physics to
the laws of Mathematics.

14

As Descartes' letter to Mersenne

indicates, there is no intrinsic principle of action of
forces that can explain the phenomena in nature.

Nature acts

in a mathematical manner, and therefore everything in nature
can be explained by the laws of mathematics.

15

If there is any question about the extent to which
Descartes was committed to the belief that the universe
could be read off in mathematical terms, it is resolved in
Part I of the Principles:
Et il est certain que toutes les regles des Mechaniques
appartiennent a la Physique .•• Car, par example, lors
qu'une montre marque les heures par le moyen des roues
dont elle est faite, cela ne lui est pas moins naturel
qu'il est a arbre de produite ses fruits.16
As the text confirms, Descartes imposes a mathematical
quality on the phenomena of nature.

There is no distinction

between living and non-living phenomena; all are subject to
the laws of mathematics.

Radical as this vision of reality

may seem in contrast to Aristotle's vision, it was the only
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one in Descartes' eyes, that would ensure the certitude
that was demanded by any science conceived as wisdom.

J. Goodfield's observation captures it well:

"Descartes

answered Montaigne in the same way Plato answered Socrates,
by anchoring down the concept of science on timeless geo. 1 f ound a t·ions. 1117
metrica

B. The Metaphysical Foundation pf Physics
Historically, perhaps too much emphasis has been placed
on Descartes' metaphysics and not enough on his scientific
concerns.

Descartes' Discourse on Method and the Meditations

remain the required reading in universities, while his
scientific treatises are relegated to the school of scholars
with scientific orientations.

The metaphysical works of

Descartes are an essential component of his philosophical
system, but they play a subordinate role to his overall
fundamental scientific project.

Those who have studied

Descartes in depth and considered his metaphysical treatises
as parts of an integrated system acknowledge that Descartes
proposes to be a metaphysician, but this for the sake of
.
.
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There is evidence to support this theory.

The complete

title of the Discourse written in 1637 is Discourse on Method
of Rightly Conducting the Reason and of Seeking Truth in the
Sciences.

Primarily a metaphysical work, it was meant to

be an introduction to Descartes' three scientific treatises:
Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology.

The Discourse was written
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as an autobiographical account demonstrating how Descartes
himself used the method for discovering the truth contained
in the physical treatises that followed.

Descartes hoped

that those who learned of the method would appropriate it
for themselves.
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As an introduction, the Discourse would

validate the truth of the treatises; it would demonstrate
that the conclusions reached were the result of a method
grounded in principles of knowledge which could yield
certitude.

As history attests, the scientific works which

Descartes hoped would be read were ignored, and the Discourse
became the important work.
Four years after the Discourse, Descartes' major
metaphysical work, the Meditations on First Philosophy, was
published.

Like the Discourse, it was a means to an end

and not the end itself.

Descartes' purpose in writing the

Meditations was to provide a metaphysics that would serve as
the foundation for his physics.
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The mathematical nature of

Descartes' physics demanded a metaphysics unlike Aristotle's,
where all reality was grounded in a world of immaterial,
indivisible, substantial forms.

Such forms failed to meet

the exigencies of a mathematical science whose principles
and laws were to be applied to all the phenomena in nature.
Motivated by his dream to establish a mathematical physics,
Descartes proposed to establish a new metaphysics that would
serve as the foundation for such a physics.

Not wishing to

openly reject Aristotle's metaphysics, he, nevertheless,
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confided to Mersenne that this was his intent in writing the

.
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Meditations.
After the Meditations was written Descartes spent the
next few years writing the Principles.

Wishing to solidify

his metaphysics, Descartes proposed that this new work contain
all the principles from which one could derive a knowledge of
all the things in the world.
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The Principles was structured

so that the first two parts were to form the ground for what
followed in the last two parts.

Hence, we find in Part I

the principles of knowledge which included a metaphysics of
the thinking substance as well as the three proofs for the
existence of God.

In Part II Descartes discusses the princi-

ples of material things.

In Parts III and IV he treats of the

visible world and the earth.

The structure of the Principles

is in keeping with Descartes' belief that science needs a
firm metaphysical foundation.

He prefaces the Principles

with the well-known claim:
Ainsi toute la Philosophie est comme un arbre, dont les
racines sont la Metaphysique, le tronc est la Physique,
& les branches qui sortent de ce tronc sont toutes les
autres.23
As we have seen, Descartes' metaphysics was to be a
foundation for his physics.

As such his metaphysics would

have to accommodate the mathematical kind of physics that
he envisioned.

While it is not our purpose to evaluate or

defend each of the constitutional parts of Descartes' metaphysics, we can sketch out its basic components.
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When it came to constructing a metaphysical foundation
Descartes chose to depart from the traditional Aristotelian
metaphysics.
decision.

Epistemic considerations prompted Descartes'

The idea that reality could be explained in terms

of substantial forms was inadmissable to Descartes.

There

was primarily one reason for this, and it can be traced to
the fact that these forms failed to provide the necessary
certitude.

In Descartes' estimation these indivisible forms

had a mysterious quality to them that made them elusive to
the scientist.

The human mind has no notion or particular

idea to conceive them by.

When we talk about them and assert

their existence we are asserting something we do not conceive
or understand.
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Along with his rejection of the substantial forms was
the disavowal of the reality of sensible qualities.

Again,

it was the question of the failure of these to yield certitude.
As the analysis of the wax demonstrates, all sensible qualities appear confused and unclear.
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Neither the substantial

forms nor sensible qualities could provide a basis for
certitude.

What Descartes was looking for was something that

was real and could give manifest and mathematical reasons for
.
26
th e p h enomena in
nature.
In the analysis of the wax Descartes finds the quality
he is looking for.

What remains in spite of the changes and

. t'inct is
. ex t ension.
.
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wha t appears c 1 ear an d d is

Extension is

the singular attribute that defines the material substance.
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It is the sole quality that the scientist would have to work
with in order to attain truth.

Descartes' theory stripped

the world of the animate and rejected physical action by
imposing an inert quality on the material world.

All natural

action could be explained by mathematical reasons, since
everything was fundamentally mathematical in nature.

The

Principles definitively establishes the quantitative nature
of material substances.

Descartes affirms that

••• je ne connois point d'autre matiere ces choses corporelles que celle qui peut etre divisee, figuree, et
meue en toutes sorte de facons" c'est a dire celle que
les Geometres nomment la quantite.28
The essentially mathematical nature of bodies impelled
Descartes to offer a new definition of movement.

Descartes

rejected the common notion of movement as the action by which
a body passes from one place to another.

Movement is relative

and essentially no different than rest, "ce qu'il ya de
positif en la nature du mouvement se trouve aussi bien en
.
t ne se point
.
. n29
ce 1 ui. que une d'it vu 1 gairemen
mouvoir.

The

denial of action as an essential property of movement meant
that Descartes must offer what he believes to be the true
definition of movement.

Movement he says is

.•• la transport d'une partie de la matiere, ou d'un
corps du voisinage de ceux que le touchent immediatement,
et que nous considerons comme en repos, dans le voisinage de quelques autres ••• Et je dis,qu'il est le transport & non pas la force ou l'action qui transport, afin
de montrer que le mouvement est toujours dans la mobile
& non pas en celui que rneut.30
Descartes recognizes only one kind of movement and that
is locomotion:
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Nous pouvons aussi concevoir fort distinctement ••• diverse
facons d'entendue, ou qui appartiennent a l'etendue,
comme generalement toutes les figures, la situation des
parties & leurs mouvemens, pourvue qt:te nous les considerions simplement comme les dependances des substances
ou elles font; & quanta ce qui est du mouvement, pourvue que nous pensions seulement a celui qui se fait d'un
lieu en autre, sans rechercher la force qui le produit,
laquelle toutefois j'essayerai de faire connoitre.31
It is local motion alone that is clear and distinct.

All of

the diverse phenomena that occur in the world can be explained
by the diverse displacement of extended parts and the various
dispositions and relations between the particles of matter.
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The world was devoid of animation and physical action.
Descartes' metaphysics projected a world of automata in
which there was no difference between artifacts and natural
bodies.

The tree operated according to the same mechanical

laws as a clock that tells time by the movement of its
hands.
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Descartes was convinced that nature was funda-

mentally quantitative.

Hence, there was no natural action

or intrinsic force that could explain the physical occurrences.

Nature acts in a totally mathematical manner.

Bodies are extended entities whose relations and
motions can be described according to mathematically quantified laws.

This understanding of bodies according to such

laws provides the only clear and distinct way such entities
can be known.

Hence, Aristotle's notion of "natural motion"

as well as his notion of substantial forms is irrelevant.
With the world reduced to extended quantity the mathematical
model was intact.

From the standpoint of the object the
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metaphysical condition for certitude was fulfilled.

What was

needed was someone to apply the principles of mathematics to
the phenomena of nature.

This exigency could be met only by

structuring a metaphysics of the thinking substance that
would accommodate his mathematical physics.

That substance

would have to be in the world but not of the world.

More

importantly, it had to be empowered to know the world and to
know it with certitude.

Let us look at that thinking sub-

stance as an epistemic condition for Descartes' physics.
While we have seen Descartes come to discover the truth
concerning the nature of material substances, the existence
of the thinking substance is epistemically prior.

As the

Meditations confirms, it is the discovery of the truth of
his own existence that constitutes the first principle of
Descartes' philosophy.

The discovery of this truth is the

necessary prerequisite for the discovery of all other truths
for three reasons.

First of all, it answers the skeptics by

demonstrating that truth exists.

Secondly, it paves the way

for the establishment of a criteria for truth that can be
applied to all other questions regardless of the subject
matter.

Thirdly, it demonstrates that the thinking substance

has the cognitive power to attain truth.

As is apparent in

the structure of the Meditations, Descartes first discovers
the truth of his own existence and later he determines,
through the analysis of the wax, that the nature of material

. ex t ension.
.
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sub s t ances is
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The Meditations, which Descartes intended to contain
all the principles upon which he would build his physics,
would not be complete without establishing God's existence.
The import of this is made apparent by the fact that
Descartes offers three separate proofs.
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The certitude that

Descartes hoped for could be absolutely guaranteed only by
calling on an ultimate source of veridical appeal.

Notwith-

standing the fact that the thinking substance is empowered
to attain the truth, he is fundamentally finite.
tude is radical and cannot be overcome.
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The fini-

The truth of this

is concretely manifested in those moments in which man
doubts, forgets,

is

deceived and proves feeble of memory.
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These limitations as expressions of man's finitude preclude
his being the absolute source of truth.
of anything unless he knows God exists.

He cannot be certain
38

It is in the

knowledge that God exists and has given man a faculty for
discerning truth that the possibility of truth is guaranteed.
The efficacy of the faculty is ensured provided that one
affirms as true only that which is seen clearly and distinctly.39

Moreover, God guarantees the reliability of

memory in the process of deduction when the reasons have
.
d out o f present consciousness.
.
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In this general overview of the thinking substance we
have seen how Descartes has formulated his metaphysics so as
to show the possibility of truth from the perspective of the
knower.

A more germane and ontological concern is to clarify
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the nature of that substance from which all truths are
generated.

In the primary relationship of knower and known

there inheres a unity by way of appropriation.

The intellec-

tual grasp of some aspect of reality becomes a part of the
mental warehouse along with the other true ideas.

Paradoxi-

.

cally, the unity is grounded in an ontological difference
between the knower and the known.
There exists a radical polarity between the two kinds
of substances.

In defining material substances in terms of

extension Descartes stripped the world of animism and power.
To meet the exigencies of his mathematical physics he filled
the world with inert extended objects.

Because of the

quantitative nature of phenomena, presumably the laws of
nature could be expressed by mathematical formulations of
geometrical relations between material particles.

The world

was knowable and could theoretically yield conclusions.
Descartes had to make a decision.

Either man's definition

would include both body and soul, in which case he was a part
of the world and assumed its determination; or, he would be
defined solely in terms of his soul and retain his absolute
freedom.

Descartes chose the latter.

In truth he says

••. je connu de la que j'etais une substance dont toute
l'essence ou la nature n'est que de penser & qui pour
etre n'a besoin d'aucun lieu, n'y depend d'aucune chose
materielle~ En sorte que ce Moi, c'est a dire l'ame
par laquelle je suis ce que je suis est entierement
distincte du cors.41
What then could be said of the human body to which the
soul was united except that it was like any other material
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substance?

The human body could in no way be conceived to

have any intrinsic power of action.

Descartes assumed a

radical position and proposed that the human body was analogous to a machine that had certain parts and operated in
accordance with certain mechanical laws.
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In contrast, the

soul by which man is defined is the center of action:
Comine, lorsque je veux, que je crains, que j'affirme
ou que je nie, je concois bien alors quelque chose
cominon le sujet de !'action demon esprit.43
The material substance is marked by its lack of power.

The

dynamic nature of the thinking substance is marked by its
intrinsic cognitive power:
Car, que j'ai la faculte le concevoir ce que c'est
qu'on nomine en general une chose, ou une verite,
aucune pensee, il me semble que je ne tiens point
cela d'ailleurs que de ma nature propre.44
The material substance is projected as an object whose movements are determined according to mathematical laws.

The

thinking substance expresses his freedom as the subject of
responsibility:
Mais, pour ce que est des inclinations qui me semblement aussi m'etre naturelles, j'ai souvent remarque,
lorsque il a ete question de se faire choix entre les
vertus & les vices, qu'elles ne m'ont pas moins porte
ou au mal qu'au bien.45
Finally, unlike the body, which is essentially divisible into
parts, the thinking substance is without any parts:
••• lors que je considere mon esprit, c'est a dire
moi-meme en tant que je suis seulement une chose qui
pense, je n'y puis distinguer aucunes parties, mais
je me concoi comine une chose seule et entiere.46

29

Whatever may be the limitations of Descartes' dualistic
metaphysics it succeeds as a metaphysical foundation for his
science.

The world is knowable and the knower endowed with

a natural power of understanding need only will to act on
that power and to use it correctly.

The ground has been laid

for the fulfillment of Descartes' vision of a mathematical
kind of physics.
C. Time
Our first effort has been to set the background for our
central concern, which is to examine Descartes' thinking on
time.

We are able to give a general meaning to time as the

measure of the duration of both material and thinking sub47
stances • .

However, a more precise determination of its

nature can be reached.

That precision will be the result of

viewing time in light of Descartes' metaphysical dualism.
Since Descartes has a two-substance metaphysics, and time
is a basic feature of both kinds of substances, then an
account of a Cartesian theory of time must take this into
consideration.

It must explain the manner in which time is

such as to be a property of each substance.
We should be able to find a coherency of thought
between the different elements that constitute Descartes'
philosophical system.

The Cartesian theory of time should

reflect and support the fundamental philosophical consideration of that system.

It has been demonstrated in a general

way how Descartes' metaphysical dualism accommodates his
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primary scientific goals.

Hence, one way to test the

coherency of Descartes' theory of time in terms of its role
in an integrated system is to test its coherency with the
most immediately related element, Descartes' metaphysical
dualism.

Our study will do this.

Later chapters will depart

from a general notion of time and concentrate on time as an
analogical concept.

That examination will concentrate on the

distinctions of time that reflect the distinctive properties
of the two kinds of substances.

This will determine if, and

in what sense, Descartes' theory of time is coherent with
his basic primary philosophical concerns.
Our present concern is more general.

What is needed

before examining time as an analogical concept is to give
some general meaning to time as it presents itself in
Descartes' philosophy.
of time.

Descartes offers no clear definition

Yet the texts tell us several things about time.

Time is one of those common sensibles like size, shape,
place, and movement.

These are naturally known.

If you try

to define them you only obscure them and cause confusion.
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Descartes has more important things to say about time.
In a passage from the Meditations in which Descartes
makes the distinction between imaginary or representative
things and real things as extension, figure, number, etc.,
he places time in the category of real things:
••• il ya des choses encore plus simples & plus universelles, qui sont vraie et existantes ••• De ce genre
de choses est la nature corporelle en general, & son
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entendue; ensemble la figure de choses entendue, leur
quantite ou grandeur & leur nombre, comme aussi le lieu
ou elles sont, le temps qui mesure leur duree & autre
semblables. 49
There are three things Descartes says about time in
this passage.

Initially he tells us that time is universal.

Descartes terms universal any singular idea of which we avail
ourselves in order to think of all the individuals which have
. s1m1
. ·1·t
a certain
1 u d e. SO

In the course of-analysis we will

determine what this similitude is insofar as time is predicated of both substances.
time is real.

Secondly, Descartes tells us that

As the text indicates, time is as real as

extension; it is an essential property of the existing
substance insofar as that substance endures.
universal and real.

Time is both

When we form the idea of time and apply

it to all material things denoting their similitude, time is
a universal.
in reality.

That conceptual universality has a counterpart
It is important to keep this in mind because

other texts to be considered later suggest that time is
simply a construct of the mind.
The third and most salient point to note in the text
is that Descartes identifies the real temporal property of
things when he says that time measures the duration of things.
Duration is common to all substances:
Par exemple, a cause qu'il n'ya point de substance qui
ne cesse d'exister, lors qu'elle cesse de durer, la
duree n'est distincte de la substance que par la
pensee.51
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Insofar as all substances exist, they endure, and insofar as they endure, their duration can be measured by time.
BY calling time a measure, Descartes introduces a quantitative
aspect to the notion of time and similarly to the correlative
concept of duration.

Time can only be conceived as a kind of

measure if there is something measurable, that is, a species
of quantity.

Descartes' definition of dimension implies

this:
Par dimension nous n'entendons rien autre chose que le
mode et le rapport sous lequel un quelconque est juge
mesurable, en sorte que non seulement la longuerer, la
largeur et la profondeur sont des dimensions ••• la vitesse
et ainsi d'une infinite d'autre choses de cette sorte.52
Dimension is a species of quantity of which there are
two kinds.

Quantity is either discrete, like the point, or

it is continuous, like spatial magnitude.
visible and are not per se measurable.

Points are indi-

As discrete quantity,

they can be counted or they can be ordered in relation to
other points.

Continuous quantity, like the magnitude, is

measurable, and it is the quality of continuity that presents
itself as the measurable aspect of things.
Time can serve to measure the duration of things
because duration presents itself as a species of continuous
quantity.

Duration is a real property of things since there

is no substance that does not cease to exist when it ceases
to endure.

When we comprehend that duration it is conceived

as kind of continuous quantity.
to measure that duration.

Hence, time can function

This measurable aspect of duration
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is articulated by Descartes when he says that "la duree est
un mode ou une facon dont nous considerons cette chose.en
tant qu'elle continue d'etre. 1153
Wherever there is a continuum, there we find a measurable object that can be conceived in terms of more or less
or of long or short.

The measurable aspect of duration is

made apparent in the practical order.
lasted less than three hours.

We note that the movie

Or, similarly, we measure the

duration of the movie as lasting a long time.

Duration

presents itself as a continuum, a kind of stretching out of
existence that in some sense must be conceived as a species
of magnitude.

This is the case in all questions that con-

sider the 'more' or 'less'.

This is implied in the Rules:

Il faut noter ensuite que rien ne peut etre ramener
a egalite que ce qui comporte le plus et le moins
54
et que tout cela est compris sous le nom de grandeur.
Everything that is measurable is a dimension that has
the quality of spatial extension.

Regardless of the subject

matter, the exact determination of whether something is more
or less can only be achieved "par une certain analogie avec
l'entendu d'un corps figure. 1155

The possibility of measuring

duration is grounded in the fact that duration is continuous,
and therefore is analogous to extension.

This aspect of

duration is underlined in Descartes' letter to Burman:
Notre pensee ••• est etendue et divisible quanta la
. .
en par t.ies. 56
d uree parce que sa d uree peut etre d ivise
As an extended body with its continuous quantity is measur-

•
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measured by an appropriate standard of measurement such as
the yardstick, so too is duration measured by a standard.
That standard is time.
As we noted previously, Descartes offers no one clearcut definition of time.

From the foregoing texts we know that

time is universal and real, and that it is a measure of
duration.

Another mathematical perspective of time emerges

in the Principles in which we find Descartes saying that:
••• le temps, par exemple, que nous dist-inguons de
la duree prise en general, & que nous disons etre
le nornbre du mouvement, n'est rien qu'une certain
facon dont nous pensons a cette duree, pource que
nous ne concevons point que la duree des choses
qui sont meuees soit autre que celle des choses
qui ne le sont point.57
There are several aspects of this passage that deserve attention.

Initially, we should take cognizance of the fact

that Descartes insists that time can be called a number of
movement only if one understands that per se movement is not
being numbered but merely movement insofar as it implies
duration.

Descartes makes this clear when he remarks that

the duration of things moved is no different from the duration of things not moved.
specifically movement.

Time numbers duration and not

Descartes' definition of time as a

number complements his definition of time as a measure.
Duration as measurable is a species of dimension, and
dimension, because it is a quantity, is numerable.
simply functions to express that measure:

Number
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Enfin il faut remarquer que, quoique nous abstrayons
ici des nombres les termes de la difficulte, pour en
examiner la nature, neanmoins il arrive souvent que
cette difficulte peut etre resolue avec les nombres
donnes, plus simplement que si on l'en avait abstraite;
cela se produit a cause du double usage des nombres
ainsi que nous l'avons deja vu plus haut, les memes
nombres expliquant tantot l'ordre et la mesure.58
When it is a question of measurement and the numbering
of that measurement there must be some unit that acts as the
standard of measurement:
On doit savoir aussi qu'au moyen d'une unite d'emprunt
les granduers continues peuvent etre ramenees a la
quantite, Earfois tout entieres et toujours au moins
en partie. 9
In the case of a true magnitude, either the metric unit or
its United States equivalent serves as the standard of
measurement.

In the case of duration, the temporal unit

serves as the standard by which one can measure the duration
of things.

Thus, a duration of ten minutes is measured by

the temporal unit of a minute, ten hours by the temporal
unit of an hour, ten days by the temporal unit of a day, etc.
If we retain the analogy that duration has with magnitude, we understand that as a true magnitude is measured as
a unit, duration is also comprehended as an actual whole.
In measuring a continuous magnitude of ten inches, we consider the object as a whole that is potentially divisible
into parts or units of inches.

Similarly, in measuring a

duration of ten minutes, that duration is comprehended as
an actual whole that is potentailly divisible into units of
minutes.

When it is a question of measurement, the parts are
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subsumed by the whole.

The object of measurement is the

quantity of the whole as Rule XIV indicates:
Si nous considerons, en effect les parties que forment
le tout, on dit alors que nous comptons •.. si nous
considerons le tout en tant que divise en parties, nous
le mesurons; par exemple, nous mesurons les siecles par
les annees, les jours, les heures, les minutes; mais,
si nous comptons les minutes, les heures, les jours et
les annee:s,nous finirons par remplir des siecles.60
Thus, insofar as time. functions as a number that measures
duration, its object is per se the whole, that is, the actual
unit conceived as a length of existence.

Or more appro-

priately, it is the quantity of time in which one has
continued to exist.

Insofar as time numbers this quantity,

it correspondingly measures it.
In light of what Descartes says in the Rules, it is
possible to provide another mathematical perspective of time
as a number:

Number also functions to express order.
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This double function of number, that is, to express order
and to measure, has its basis in the mathematical method
which consists in the reduction of all questions of measure
into questions of order:
On doit savoir aussi qu'au moyen d'une unite d'emprunt les grandeurs continues peuvent etre ramenees
a la quantite parfois tout entieres et toujours au
moins en partie; la quantite des unites peut ensuite
etre disposee dans un ordre tel, que la difficulte,
qui etait relative a la connaissance de la mesuree,
ne depende plus enfin que de la consideration de
l'ordre progres pour lequel ma methode est d'une
grand secours.62
What is measurable is orderable, and number functions to
express both aspects.

This rule can be applied to time
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since time is a kind of number.
We have observed the manner in which time functions as
a number that measures duration insofar as that duration
presents itself as a continuity analogous to extension.

Cor-

responding to the quality of extension as a spatial magnitude, duration, when comprehended as a whole, implies the
divisibility of parts.

In the case of duration, these parts

take on the mode of 'before' and 'after', constituting a
relationship of order.

While the duration -of substances is

measured as an actual whole, its measurement is made possible
because duration is fundamentally successive.
is not simultaneous.

That is, it

It is constituted by a succession of

moments related to each other in an order of 'before' and
'after'.
This aspect of duration is articulated in Descartes'
correspondence with Arnauld.

To Descartes' treatment of the

duration of the soul in the third Meditation Arnauld had
objected that the duration of a spiritual being was nonsuccessive.63

Descartes' response is emphatic in making the

point that there is no distinction between the duration of
thinking substances and that of material substances, both
are characterized as successive:
Jene connois pas autrement la duree successive des
choses qui sont mues, ou meme celle de leur mouvement
que je fais la duree des choses non mues; car le devant et l'apres de toutes les durees quelles qu'elles
saient, me parait par le devant et par l'apres de la
duree successive que je decouvre en ma pensee avec
laquelle les autres choses sont coexistantes.64
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We are presented with a dual perspective of duration.
on the one hand, duration is measurable because it is
analogous to extension, "Notre pensee ••• est etendue et
divisible quanta la duree".
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On the other hand, as

Descartes' response to Arnauld indicates, the extended unit
is divisible into discrete parts, related to each other in
an order of 'before' and 'after'.

We are in the presence of

a quantitative object that is both continuous and discrete;
as such, it is both measurable and orderable.

Time as a

number functions to express both the measure and the order
in the following manner:
A duration measured as a unit of ten days is divisible
into parts that are related in a successive order.

The first

day comes before the second day which comes before the third
day and after the first day, etc., until we reach the tenth
day.

Each day is singularly related to the other as either

a 'before' or an 'after'.

This is a concrete example of the

mathematical method which consists in the reduction of
measure to order.

The applicability of the method is most

appropriate in the case of duration.

The essential consti-

tution of duration is by nature that of order since it is
successive.

It is only after two or more of the units have

followed in a successive order that they can be measured.
If one were to inspect any measurement, it would be found to
be grounded in a relationship of order.
To give further insight into the mathematical
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perspective, we cannot ignore the countable factor and the
relationship that the units have to one another.

The

relationship of order is the primary and essential relationship between the individual temporal units.

While

the relationship of temporal order implies a numerical
assemblage of countable units, as countable units per se
they are not necessarily related.
is measured as ten days.

Consider a duration that

At each twenty-four hour interval

we mark one day, two days, three days, etc. until we reach
ten days, comprehending the totality as a unit in itself.
While the units constituting the measure, insofar as they
are countable units are related, the relationship is not
essential.

Their relationship is parallel to that of units

in a numerical series where the 'two' is related to the 'one'
to the extent that you cannot have a 'two' without a 'one',
but you can have a 'one' without a 'two'.

Similarly, you

can have a 'three' without a 'four' but not a 'four' without
a 'three'.

By analysis one can see that, while the prior

number in the series is included in the concept of the
subsequent number, as 'four' includes 'three', the 'four' is
the result of the addition of singular units each designated
as one.

The relationship is constructed by an external

factor.

In the numerical series neither the 'one' and 'two'

nor 'three' or 'four' are correlative concepts.

This is

verified by the fact that the concept of 'one' is understood
apart from the concept of 'two' as 'three' is understood as
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unrelated to 'four 1

•

In the case of parts ordered one to another the relationship is essential.
strate the point.

An analytic proposition will demon-

A rainy day is a wet day.

is contained in the subject.
following proposition.

The predicate

The same holds true for the

The day before precedes the day after.

The predicate adds nothing to the concept of the subject
since it is essentially contained in the subject.

'Before'

and 'after' are understood in terms of each other, and in
this sense their relationship is essential.

If one under-

stands the concept of 'before' one understands that it is
related to 'after' by virtue of its order.

The relationship

of parts ordered one to another is prior in the order of
being to that of the relationship of parts constituting
a numerical assemblage.
The point can be graphically illustrated:
Figure 1.

Figure 2.

In both Figure 1 and Figure 2 we have a numerical
assemblage of six units.

In Figure 1 the assemblage consti-

tutes the intelligible geometric figure of a triangle.

It

does this because each of the points has a necessary position
in relation to the other points.

In Figure 2 the assemblage

does not form any intelligible geometric figure for the
reason that points are randomly placed.

In Figure 1 we need
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only inspect the order to apprehend a triangle.

In other

words, it is not the countability of the points that results
in the figure of a triangle but the order of the points.
Figure 2 lacks the relationship of order, hence it is not
apprehended as an intelligible geometric figure.
To demonstrate the point further:

I am seated at the

piano with the intention of playing a piano sonata.

Unable

to remember the order of the notes I play a random selection
of notes for the first few minutes.

I am able to perceive

each note in the sequence as having some sound and duration
and can count them as one, two, three, four, etc.

As an

assemblage of sounds their relation to each other is extrinsic
or accidental.

As such, they do not blend harmoniously to

form the desired melody.

If, however, I play the notes in

accordance with the musical score, they are played in a
certain order in which each note has a necessary place and
duration.

It is not the simple assemblage of notes that

constitutes the melody, it is the assemblage of notes in so
far as each note is ordered one to another.

In this sense,

it may be said that the relationship of parts ordered one
to another is prior to the relationship of parts constituting
a numerical assemblage.
When it is a question of measurement, all numerical
assemblages can be broken down to the relationship of order.
This is the essence of what Descartes proposes in Rule XIV:
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on doit savoir aussi qu'au moyen d'une unite d'emprunt
les grandeurs continues peuvent etre ramenees a la
quantite, parfois tout entieres et toujours au moi_ns en
partie; la quantite des unites peut ensuite etre disposee
dans un ordre tel, que la difficulte qui etait relative
a la connaissance de la mesure, ne depende plus enfin
que de la consideration de l'ordre, progres pour lequel
ma methode est d'une grand secours.66
This rule can be translated in terms of time which
numbers duration.

Because duration is continuous time can

serve to measure it.

The temporal measurement is expressed

by a cardinal number as ten minutes.

Because the continuum

of duration is made up of parts essentially related in a
successive order of 'before' and 'after', time as a number
expresses that order.
temporal unit.

This is done by means of an ordinal

Thus, the units constituting the measure are

clocked off as the first minute, second minute, third minute,
etc.

This successive order makes it possible to comprehend

the assemblage of these units as a measured quantity.

In

other words, the first minute, second minute, third minute
can be counted as one minute, two minutes, three minutes,
etc. until the measured quantity of ten minutes is reached.
As the measure depends on the order, so too does the cardinal
number depend on the ordinal.
As measurable and orderable, duration is numerable.
And time is the number.

That which is numerable is numbered

only if there is a numberer.

This subjective aspect of time

is punctuated in the Principles:
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Ainsi, le temps, par exemple, que nous distingons
de la duree prise en general, & que nous disons etre
le nombre du mouvement, n'est rien qu'une certain
facon dont nous pensons a cette duree .•• 67
The Principles calls us to the fact that duration is
numberable, time is the number and the mind does the numbering.

The process of numbering is twofold.

The mind must

choose a temporal unit as a standard of measurement, as the
minute, hour, day, etc. and do the actual numbering that
denotes the order or measure.

One of the objective elements

intrinsic to the subjective process of numbering is the
duration of things.

The other is the temporal unit that

serves as the standard of measurement:
Mais, afin de comprendre la duree de toutes les choses
sous une meme mesure, nous nous ferons ordinairement
de la duree de certains mouvemens reguliers qui sont
les jours & les annees, & la nommons temps, apres
l'avoir rien, hors de la veritable duree des choses,
qu'une facon de penser.68
In addition to the temporal units created by the astronomical
system are those which are constructs of man:
C'est en effet quelque chose de reel que la pesanteur
de corps, la vitesse, ou la division de siecle en annees et en jours; mais ce n'est pas quelque chose de
reel que la division du jour en heures et en minutes,
etc. Et cependant toutes ces choses sont equivalentes,
si on les considere seulement sous le rapport de la
dimension comme on doit le faire ici et dans les science
mathematiques;69
We would be mistaken were we to emphasize the distinction between the measurement of centuries, years, and days, and that
of hours and minutes.
commonality.

What is more important is their

Whether it be the movements of the heavens or

the movements created by the hands of the clock, both serve
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as standards of measurement.
Time as a mode of thought means that without the mind
there would be no measurement of duration.

And if duration

is measured, a commonly accepted standard of measurement is
applied.

In the practical order, this objective element

constitutes the general basis for measuring.

In addition to

this objective aspect of the measuring process is a subjective aspect that has two dimensions.

The first is the

choice of a standard of measurement, and the second is the
interpretation of the measure.
Consider the question of a choice.

Experience verifies

that neither the movements of the heavens nor the movements
of the hands of a clock are always used as temporal standards
of measurement.

The time it takes to drive from A to C does

not have to be measured by the clock.

Depending on the

subjective circumstances, another standard of measurement may
be equally appropriate.

Rather than compare the duration of

a drive from A to C to the movements of a clock (ten minutes),
it may be compared to the length of duration it takes to
cycle from A to M.

It will take as long to drive to the

drugstore as it does to cycle downtown.

The choice of a

unit of measure reflects the purpose of the measurer and for
that reason an objective standard of measure need not be used.
What is necessary is that some movement be chosen as the
standard of measurement.

Whether that be the movements of

the heavens which create the days and years, or the movements
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of the hands of a clock which generate the minutes and hours,
or an arbitrary movement such as cycling, all may be r~garded
as standards of measurement.
The second dimension of the subjective aspect of time
is disclosed in the process of interpretation or evaluation
of the measure.

For the scientist, a movie on microbes that

has a duration of two hours may seem to have lasted a short
time.

For the dancer, whose interests are far removed from

microbes, the same movie may be interpreted as having lasted
a long time.

In both cases, the evaluation of the objective

standard of measurement (two hours) is grounded in subjectivity.
ment.

Descartes himself alludes to this factor of measureIn his hopes for utilizing the method he has come to

discover for attaining truth, he bemoans the fact that it
must be done in "la court duree de ma vie 11
is short:

forty, fifty, perhaps seventy?

•

70

How many years

The temporal unit

remains objective, the interpretation of that remains
subjective.
This brings us back to our initial premise.
measures the duration of both kinds of substances.

Time
The

successive mode of that duration draws them into a relationship to one another in respect of 'before' and 'after'.
Their coexistence in these moments means that the physical
events taking place within the universe are simultaneous with
any mental events.

At the same time that some phenomenon

occurs in the world the substance can intellectually and
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volitionally react to it.

This indicates that the thinking

substance, like the material substance, exists in the
world, and in that sense is an object.
between the .two kinds of substances.

There is a unity
Both the thinking

substance and the material substance coexist in the world.
There is another dimension to that unity.

It is reflected

in the fact that both kinds of substances share a common
measurement of their diverse types of duration.

In spite of

the unity that exists between the thinking substance and the
material substance, a difference remains.

For while the

thinking substance is an object, it is also a knowing subject.
Its successive mode of duration must, it seems, reflect that
characteristic.
The two kinds of substances are radically heterogeneous.

The metaphysical foundation of Descartes' science

was structured in accordance with the exigencies of his
mathematical physics.

Descartes fashioned a world of

material substances that were essentially characterized by
extension.

In doing so he provided the mathematical model

for his physics.

The thinking substance that coexisted with

these spatial entities was defined solely in terms of
thought.

Defined in this way, the thinking substance pos-

sessed a dynamic quality that was absent in material
substances.

It was that dynamic nature in contrast to the

inert mathematical nature of the material substance that
established the thinking substance as a knower able to
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comprehend the phenomena in nature in terms of mathematical
relations.

From an epistemic standpoint, Descartes' m~ta-

physical dualism served him well.
That metaphysical dualism cannot be ignored when it
comes to the question of time.

Material substances and

thinking substances share a successive mode of duration, and
time measures that duration.

Given the radical distinction

between the two kinds of substances, their duration cannot
be manifested in the same way.

Nor does it seem that time

which measures their duration can be predicated of both
substances univocally.

Rather, it is our intent to show

that a precise understanding of time warrants a perspective
that views time as an analogical concept.

We will see that

within the philosophical system of Descartes there is a kind
of static time and lived time that corresponds to the two
separate substances.

Further, we will see if, and in what

manner, the polarity between the two modes of time is viable
in terms of Descartes' vision of a universal mathematical
kind of physics.
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CHAPTER II
THE PARADOXICAL NATURE OF TIME
We have seen that time functions as a measure of
duration insofar as duration presents itself as a continuous
species of quantity.

Time also functions as a number for

duration insofar as that duration is constituted by parts
ordered one to another as 'before' and 'after'.
is measurable, it is numerable.

Duration

It is comprehended as both

continuous quantity and discrete quantity.

Similarly, time

as a mode of thought by which we think about that duration
is both continuous and discrete.

This dual perspective

of time and duration evokes two questions.

The first

question concerns the nature of the unity of the moments
insofar as they are arranged to form a continuous whole.
A second question is directed to the nature of the individual
moment as a discrete unit.
Objections regarding Descartes' theory of time have
been directed at these two questions.

It is important for

this study to establish if the objections are justified
since i t affects our final evaluation as to whether
Descartes has a coherent theory of time.

However, at this

stage of the study no definitive resolutions of the issues
can be offered.

These will follow only as a result of our
56
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analysis of Descartes' theory of time as it functions within
the context of his overall philosophical system.

The ger-

mane concerns of this chapter are limited to an introduction
to the genesis of the objections and to an assessment of
the evidence offered by the commentators in support of their
claims.

Let us begin with the introduction.
A. Continuous Creation

The genesis of these two questions can be traced to
Descartes' doctrine of continuous creation.

The import of

the passage justifies its citation:
Et encore que je puisse supposer que peut-etre j'ai
toujours ete comme je suis maintenant, je ne saurois
pas pour cela eviter la force de ce raisonnement, et
ne laisse pas de connoitre qu'il est necessaire que
Dieu soit l'auteur demon existence. Car tout le
temps de ma vie peut etre divise en une infinite de
parties, chacune desquelles ne depend en aucune facon
des autres; et ainsi de ce qu'un peu auparavant j'ai
ete, il ne s'ensuit pas que je doive maintenant etre,
si ce n'est qu'en ce moment quelque cause me produise
et me cree, pour ainsi dire, derechef, c'est-a-dire me
conserve. En effet c'est une chose bien claire & bien
evidente a ceux qui considereront avec attention la
nature de temps qu'une substance, pour etre conserver
dans tousles moments qu'elle dure, a besoin du meme
pouvoir et de la meme action qui serait necessaire
pour la produire et la creer tout de nouveau si elle
n'etait point encore. En sorte que la lumiere
naturelle nous fait voir clairement que la conservation
& la creation ne different qu'au regard de notre facon
de penser & non point en effet.l
In the following texts we see that conservation is
defined in terms of continuous creation:
Car, tout de meme que, bien que j'eusse ete de toute
eternite, et que par consequent il n'y eut rien eu
avant moi, neanmoins, parce que je vois que les parties
du temps peuvent etre separees les unes d'avec les
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autres et qu'ainsi, de ce que je suis maintenant, il
ne s'ensuit pas que je doive etre encore apres, si,
pour ainsi parler je ne suis cree de nouveau a chaque
moment par quelque cause, je ne ferais point difficulte
d'appeler efficiente la cause qui me cree continuellement
en cette facon, c'est-a-dire me conserve.2
As the texts indicate, Descartes' argument for the existence
of God is predicated on the fact that there must be a cause
who creates and conserves the substance since each of the
moments of time in which the substance exists can be
separated and are reciprocally independent of one another.
The separation of the moments is the manifestation that the
limited essence of the substance does not contain existence.
Moreover, it attests to the fact that the substance lacks a
principle of autocontinuation since it lacks the essential
power to exist in any single moment.

For this reason God

must not only create the substance in the first moment in
which it exists but must continue his creative action if the
substance is to continue to exist.
According to M. Gueroult, Y. Belavel, and others who
follow them, Descartes' doctrine of continuous creation
clearly establishes the discontinuity of time. 3

Gueroult's

comment expresses this thesis:
Ayant demontre que Dieu est necessairement l'auteur de
moi-meme, en vertue de la creation continuee, ayant
prouve la creation continuee par l'independence absolu
des diverses parties de temps de ma vie, Descartes
parait bien soutenir la these de la discontinuite
du temps. 4
If this is the fundamental mode of time and duration it is
contradicted in the order of experience where time and
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duration are experienced as a continuum.

Moreover,

Descartes himself conceives duration as continuous and
underlines this aspect when he defines duration as a mode
. h we continue
.
' t •S
under wh 1c
to ex1s

This is a continuity

analogous to extension taken as an unbroken whole.

6

Descartes appears to have a paradoxical view of time
and duration.

On the one hand, time and duration are made

up of a sequence of separate and independent moments, none
of which is necessarily connected to the other.

Contrary

to this view, time and duration are comprehended as a whole
that is constituted by moments necessarily connected to
each other.

It seems we are confronted with schism and

organization, diachrony and synchrony, and discontinuity
and continuity.

It is by no means certain, however, that

this dualism translates into a real contradiction.

Nor is

it certain that Gueroult is correct when he suggests that
Descartes has a paradoxical view of time in that he draws
continuous time from a repetition of discontinuous moments.
B. Discontinuity - Continuity
In order to sustain Gueroult's allegation it is
necessary to give evidence that time, for Descartes, is
discontinuous.

Without providing any textual evidence,

Gueroult claims that discontinuity is defined in terms of
separation, reciprocal independence, and contingency and
since the moments of time have these three characteristics,
they are discontinuous. 8

The texts on continuous creation

7
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do not support the claim.
The texts do not say that the moments are actually
divided nor actually separated.

What the texts do say is

that the time of my life "can be divided into an infinite
number of parts" and that the parts of time "can be separated one from another."

There is a distinction between

what is actually divided and separated and what is only
potentially divisible and separable.

While actuality

implies potentiality, what is potential does not necessarily
imply actuality.

9

That distinction, however, seems to have

been overlooked by Gueroult.
Y. Belavel appears to maintain the same line of thinking as Gueroult, noting that the separation and independence

' l'ies t h eir
. d'iscon t 'inui' ty. lO
o f moments imp

H'is reasoning
·
·
is

based on his claim that Descartes does not distinguish the
contiguous from the continuous, and since the moments are
separated and reciprocally independent, that is not contiguous, they do not constitute a true continuity analogous
to the continuity of a line as an unbroken unity.

The

discontiguity of the moments establishes their discontinuity.11 In order for that claim to be sustained it must be
shown that, for Descartes, the contiguous is identical to
the continuous.

Here are the texts on which Belavel bases

his claim:
(A) This is Descartes' definition of contiguity.
Mais je n'ai jamais ne qu'elle (la superficie) fuit
le terme du corps; au contraire, je croi qu'elle
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peut fort proprement etre appelee l'extremite, tant du
corps contenu que de. celui qui contient, au sens que
l'on dit que les corps contigus sont ceux dont l~s
extremites sont ensemble. Car, de vrai, quand deux
corps se touchent rnutuellement, ils n'ont ensemble
qu'une meme extremite, qui n'est point partie de l'un
ni de l'autre, mais qui est le meme mode de tousles
deux. 12
(B) This is Descartes' definition of continuity.
Des lors, peu importe comment les autres definissent
continu et contigu: pour moi, je dis qu'il ya continuite lorsque les surfaces de deux corps sont jointes
d'une maniere tellement qu'ils entrent simultanement
en mouvement ou en repos ••. Ceux qui se comportement
autrement, sont contigus.13
Implicitly Belavel seems to be drawing from these two
texts the following conclusions:

When Descartes says in

(B) that when the "surfaces of two bodies are so immediately
joined that the two begin to move and come to rest simultaneously, they are continuous," he implies that the
continuous bodies are actually bodies whose "surfaces" are
really one surface.

Since (A) says that "surface" can quite

properly be called "extremity", then the "two surfaces" (B)
are really the one "extremity" mentioned in (A).

The point

Belavel seems to be making is that the reason why the two
bodies move and come to rest simultaneously (in which case
they are continuous) is that their extremities are one and
the same.

But this has not been proven, it has merely been

stated.
Al though neither the term '.contiguity' or 'continuity'
is used in Descartes' letter to Mersenne, Bela~el offers it
as Descartes' definition of continuity based on contiguity.
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Here is the text Belavel cites from that letter:
Pour la superficie que j'ai dit ne faire point partie
du pain ni de l'air qui est autour, elle ne differe en
rien du locu Aristotelicus des echoles, ni de toutes les
superficies que considerent les Geometres, excepte en
l'imagination de ceux qui ne les concoivent pas comme
ils doivent, & qui supposent que superficies corporis
arnbientis soit une partie du cors circoniacent.14
What the text establishes is that circumjacent bodies have
a common extremity, and that extremity is not a part of one
or the other, but the place of contact with other bodies.
Belavel insists that such contact (contiguity) establishes
.
their
con t 'inui' ty. 15

There is no justification on the basis

of this text to consider, as Belavel seems to do, the
following proposition to be analytict What is contiguous is
continuous.

Rather than supporting his theory, the text

may, in fact, weaken it.

Since Belavel seems to be arguing

that the contiguous is identical to the continuous, and
that Descartes' definition of contiguity is identical to
Aristotle's, the truth of the proposition must be based on
the assumption that for Aristotle the contiguous is identical
to the continuous.

Is this the case?

Here is Aristotle's definition of contiguity:
. in
. succession
.
. con t·iguous. 16
th at is
an d touc h es is

a thing
Here is

Aristotle's definition of continuity:
The continuum is a subdivision of the contiguous.
Things are called continuous when the touching limits
of each other become one and the same and are, as the
word implies, contained in each other; continuity is
impossible if these extremities are two. This definition makes it plain that continuity belongs to things
that naturally in virtue of their mutual contact form
a unity.17
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Aristotle then proceeds to qualify and explain exactly
what relationship the contiguous has with the continuous.
It is not one of identity:
And if there is continuity there is necessarily contact, but if there is contact, that alone does not
imply continuity; for the extremities of things may be
together without necessarily being one; but they cannot
be one without being necessarily together.18
An analysis of the texts shows the following:
Aristotle's definition of contiguity is distinguished from
his definition of continuity in this manner:

His definition

of contiguity is defined simply in terms of contact between
bodies whose extremities may be together without being one.
Continuity is defined not only in terms of contact but
contact between bodies whose extremities are one and the
same in the sense that the touching limit is common to both.
Aristotle's definition of contiguity is different from that
of continuity; his definition of continuity is simply
Descartes' definition of contiguity which is based on a
common extremity.
While it is true that Aristotle's definition of
continuity and Descartes' definition of contiguity have
something in common--both require two things becoming one-Belavel has not proved the point that the text was intended
to make.

This for the reason that his argument is based on

two false assumptions.

The first assumption is that

Descartes' definition of contiguity is identical to
Aristotle's definition of contiguity (Descartes, it seems,
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was incorrect in thinking that it was).

The second assump-

tion is that Aristotle's definition of contiguity is_
identical to his (Aristotle's) definition of continuity.
If these were true, it could be argued that since Descartes'
definition of contiguity is identical to Aristotle's, and
Aristotle's definition of contiguity is identical to his
definition of continuity, then Descartes' definition of
contiguity is identical to his definition of continuity.
However, as the texts demonstrate, these assumptions are
not true, and Belavel's argument cannot be sustained.
Descartes' definition of continuity differs from
Aristotle's.

According to Aristotle, things are continuous

simply by virtue of the fact that their extremity is one and
the same so that they are necessarily connected.

How does

Descartes' definition of continuity imply something other
than Aristotle's?

Let us reconsider the original texts

(A) and (B) that Belavel used as evidence that the contiguous is identical to the continuous. In (A) Descartes
defines contiguity solely in terms of a common boundary.
In (B) we note that when Descartes defines continuity he
says that the bodies are so joined that when they move it
is in a single motion and when they come to rest they do so
simultaneously.

If they act otherwise they are contiguous.

It is not quite clear exactly what Descartes means by this
last statement.

Rather than identify contiguity with

continuity it seems that he wishes to distinguish the two.
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Based on what he says in texts (A) and (a) that distinction
would be manifested in the following manner:

If I rub my

arm with my hand their extremity (place of contact) is one.
Thus they are contiguous.

They do not, however, move

simultaneously nor do they come to rest simultaneously since
at the same time that my hand is moving my arm remains at
rest.

According to the definition of continuity (B), while

the two bodies are contiguous they are not continuous since
they do not come to move and to rest simultaneously.

Hence,

texts (A) and (B) that Belavel provides to support his
claim are insufficient in themselves.
There is an important point that Belavel has failed to
observe.

In Cartesian physics motion is the principle of

.
19
separa t ion.

In the Principles movement is defined as

le transport d'une partie de la matiere, ou d'un corps,
du voisinage de ceux qui le touchent immediatement, et
que nous considerons comme en repos, dans le voisinage
de quelques autres.20
Following that definition Descartes clarifies his meaning of
the above:
J'ai aussi adjoute que le transport de corps se fait
du voisinage de ceux gu'il touche dans le voisinage
de quelques autres, & non pas d'un lieu en un autre,
pource que le lieu peut etre pris en plusieurs facons
qui dependent de notre pensee, comme il a ete remarque
cy-dessus. Mais quand nous prenons le mouvement pour
le transport d'un corps qui quitte le voisinage de ceux
gu'il touche, il est certain que nous ne saurions
attriber a un meme mobile plus d'un mouvement, a cause
qu'il n'y a qu'une certain quantite de corps qui le
puissent toucher en meme temps.21
The above text has been amended.

In the original Latin

"ceux qu'il touche" is written as "contiguorum.

1122

The
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correction has been made to conform to the definition given
of movement (Prin. II, 25) that uses the phrase, "tou~hent
mutuellement," which in the Latin is written as "immediate
contingunt.

1123

Since Descartes is defining movement in both

places, movement can be properly defined as the transportation of one part of matter from the vicinity of those which
are contiguous to it.

Because movement is the separation

of one part of matter from another part of matter contiguous
to it, then contiguity cannot be identical to continuity
since the latter is defined in terms of two bodies which
"sont jointes d'une maniere tellement qu'ils entrent
simultanement en mouvement ou en repos".

Whereas in the

case of contiguous bodies, the bodies can separate, in the
case of continuous bodies, they move or rest as one.
However, the case cannot be dismissed entirely.
another perspective contiguity implies continuity.

From

There is

only one movement proper to an individual body since it can
move away, that is, separate, from a certain number of
contiguous bodies.

Nevertheless, it can participate in

innumerable movements since all of the bodies are moving at
the same time.

24

Insofar.as a body does participate in other

movements, there may be a basis for the position that, for
Descartes, the contiguous is continuous.
argued in the following manner:

The case might be

Because, on the one hand,

there cannot be any other body between the two, 25 then no
action can be exercised on either where their surfaces meet;
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and since, on the other hand, the universe is a plenum

26

and

the whole system is displaced together at the same time, 27
the bodies have action exerted on their other sides so that,
through the effects exercised on them by surrounding bodies,
they move and come to rest as a unity.
While it may be intuitively correct that what is
contiguous is continuous, no textual evidence has been
offered by Belavel to justify this claim.

It has not been

shown that Descartes himself believed that the discontiguous
is discontinuous.

Since this is the premise upon which

Belavel's claim that time is discontinuous is made, the
validity of that claim is periled.
However, let us grant that Belavel is correct in his
premise.

Is it legitimate to transfer what is valid in

terms of spatial contiguity to temporal contiguity?
considerations provoke this question.

Three

The first is that

extension is an essential attribute of material substances
and does not apply to thinking substances.
does.

Time, however,

It is a measure of the duration of substances, and it

is a mode of thought about all substance insofar as these
substances endure.

Hence, time applies not only to the

extended substance but also to the indivisible thinking
substance.

Secondly, if we accept that what is spatially

contiguous is spatially continuous, contiguity is essentially
a spatial property (place} relative to other bodies.

Since

'place' can undergo perpetual change in any direction, there

68
is nothing parallel to 'place' in time.

For the parts of

time have a necessary order of 'before' and 'after'.
'place', that order cannot be juxtaposed.

Unlike

Thirdly, in the

case of spatial extension the parts exist simultaneously.
This is not the case with the moments of time.

Since time

is constituted by a successive order of moments, no one
moment can exist simultaneously with another.
No doubt Descartes' theory of time seems paradoxical.
On the one hand, the moments of time can be separated and are
independent of one another; no one moment is necessarily
connected with any other moment.

On the other hand, time is

experienced as a continuum of moments each of which is
necessarily connected with the other.

However, the problem

of the discontinuity or continuity cannot be resolved by
appealing to dispersed quotations.

It must be referred to

the whole Cartesian conception of movement as well as
Descartes' metaphysics of the thinking substance.
be done in the remaining chapters.

This will

Our immediate concern

here is to address ourselves to another kind of criticism
that arises from Descartes' doctrine of continuous creation.
C. Indivisibility - Divisibility
In addition to the question regarding the kind of unity
that exists between the moments that form a given continuity
there is the question of the nature of the moment itself.
Those who presume that time is discontinuous also
presume that time is constituted by absolutely indivisible
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instants that have no measurable duration.

If this is so,

then Descartes has a paradoxical view of time and Gueroult
is correct when he alleges that the difficulty of Cartesian
. th a t h e d raws d uration
.
f rom instan
.
t s t h at d eny it.
. 28
time is
What needs to be proven to sustain Gueroult's objection is
to demonstrate that, for Descartes, the instant is
absolutely indivisible.
However, even prior to determining this there is the
initial question regarding the assumption that the 'moment'
and 'instant' are identical.

The texts on continuous

creation found in the Meditations and Responses refer to the
temporal unit only as a 'moment'.

Nowhere in these. texts

do we find the unit referred to as the 'instant'.

There is,

however, evidence for interchanging the terms.
In the Discourse, where Descartes speaks about the
action of the light, we see that the light reaches the earth
in an 'instant':
Et ici m'entendant sur le sujet de la lumiere, j'expliquai bien au long quelle etoit celle qui se devoit ·
trouver dans le Soleil & les Etoiles, & comment de la
elle traversoit en un instant les immenses espaces des
planetes & des Cometes vers la Terre.29
The same action of the light is discussed in the
Principles.

In that text we note that the light reaches the

earth in a 'moment':
Mais d'autant que le cercle de la matiere qui se meut
ainsi ensemble, est plus grand, d'autant le mouvement
de chacune de ses parties est plus libre, a cause qu'il
se fait suivant une ligne moins courbee, ou moins different de la droite: ce qui peut servir pour empecher
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qu'on trouve estrange, que souvent le mouvement des plus
petits corps etende son action jusques aux plus grandes
distances; & ainsi, que la lumiere du Soleil & des
Etoiles le plus eloignees passe en un moment jusques a
la terre.30
on the basis of these two texts it seems that, for
Descartes, the 'instant' and 'moment' are interchangeable.

31

In neglecting to provide these texts the critics assume a
premise that should have been argued for.
To return to the criticism itself.

Ferdinand Alquie

states it in this manner:
Il (temps) est fait d'une suite d'instants dont chacune
est une sorte de neant de duree.
Il n'a aucune force,
n'aucune realite propre.
Il ne recele en lui aucune
principe de continuite.32
The following text is offered to support this:
Mais, parmi ces natures simples, il convient aussi
de compter leurs privations et negations, en tant
que nous les comprenons; car la connaissance par
laquelle j'ai l'intuition de ce qu'est le neant,
l'instant ou le repos, est non moins vraie que celle
qui me fait comprendre ce qu'est l'existence, la
duree ou le mouvement.33
As the text indicates, the instant is understood as
the privation of duration.

In which case it may be said

that the instant is durationless.
apparent.

The problem becomes

Either the instant is a duration and can be

divided into parts or, if it has no duration as the text
suggests, then it cannot be a part of continuous time and
becomes a relation between points which are without duration.
Since duration is extended and divisible into parts,

34

it

would seem to follow that each of the parts themselves would
have to be divisible units of duration.

If the instant is
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without duration then it is indivisible; if it is indivisible, how can an assemblage of these form a continuous whole
that is divisible into parts?

That contradiction was

already anticipated by Aristotle, who maintained that
indivisibles cannot be arranged so as to compose a continuous whole.

35

Are the instants per se indivisible?

The isolated

text from the Rules is not sufficient to categorically say
that the instant is indivisible for Descartes.

In justify-

ing his claim that the instant is absolutely indivisible,
Gueroult appeals to Descartes' theory of light.

According

to Gueroult, if the instant was not absolutely indivisible,
the light would traverse a distance.
a temporal movement and real speed.
light rejects just this.

This would result in
Descartes' theory of

Moreover, Gueroult claims, that

if light was not instantaneous the entire structure of
Descartes' physics would be shaken.
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Norman Kemp Smith proposes another perspective of
Descartes' theory of the instant.
Descartes had no option considering that he viewed
all changes (qua causal) as instantaneous (effects
not temporally sequent to causes) than to adopt a
view of time that consists of atoms, non-durational
instants independent of every other.37
If Smith means by atomic that they are indivisible, then in
what sense are they so?

Certainly, for Descartes, the atom

is inconceivable in relation to bodies since matter is
. f.ini. t e 1 y d'ivisi
. 'bl e. 38
in

That divisibility, however, must
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be qualified.

What is conceptually infinitely divisible by

virtue of the definition is distinct from what is phy~ically
infinitely divisible.

While Descartes espouses the concep-

tual infinite divisibility of matter since the nature of
matter is extension, he denies the physical infinite divisibility of matter.
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Regardless of the fact that matter

is potentially infinitely divisible, it remains true that
no finite substance is empowered to actually divide it to
infinity.

Yet, if we grant that what is inconceivable in

relation to spatial entities is not inconceivable in relation to time, then in what sense is the instant indivisible?
Since divisibility is qualified in terms of conceptual and
physical, is not indivisibility qualified?
We do not know if Smith means that the instants are
atomic in the sense that they are conceptually indivisible,
and therefore a fortiori physically indivisible, or that
they are physically indivisible because we lack the means
to divide it.

Not everyone would agree with Smith's claim

that the atom necessarily implies non-duration.

Diodorus,

a contemporary of Aristotle, believed that the atom, unlike
the geometrical point, is a partless unit that has a positive size.

He conceived that temporal atoms were not

indivisible in the sense that they have no duration, but
that they were indivisible as partless units. The present,
as an atomic unit, cannot be divided into a before and
after; it is a partless minimum in contrast to a longer
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period, t h e 1 eas t percepti'bl e time.
What this suggests is that the concept of the instant
is susceptible to interpretation.

Even if Smith rightly

conceives the instant to be an atom and implies by this that
it is indivisible, the question still remains:
sense is it indivisible?

In what

Is it indivisible in the absolute

sense such that it is both conceptually and physically
indivisible?
sense?

Or is it indivisible only in the physical

If it is absolutely indivisible in the first sense

then it means that it has no duration.

If it is indivisible

in the second sense then it means that it is not durationless.
According to Jean LaPorte, the instant is indivisible
in this second sense, but the instant is not indivisible
in the absolute sense that it has no duration.

It is

divided from the 'before' and 'after' but in itself it is
the shortest segment that can be known.
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LaPorte offers

the following text to support his thesis:
[C]ar encore qu'il arrive quelquefois qu'elles se
trouvent disposees en meme sorte que celles qui
sont representees en cette figmre" elles ne s'y
arrestent neanmoins que ce peu de temps qu'on
nomme un instant.42
Again from the Principles LaPorte cites another text which
indicates that the instant must contain some duration since
it measures an action that is extremely prompt.

Since

speed is measured by time the quantity of the instant is
proportionate to the quantity of the speed.

This seems to
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be what LaPorte is drawing from this text which says that
la matiere de premier element qui rempiira incontinent
tout l'espace qui sera entre-deux, y aura aussi assez
de force pour en separer encore quelques autres; &
pour ce que sa force s'augmentera d'autant plus qu'
elle en aura ainsi separe davantage de la superficie
de cette tache, & que son action est extremement
prompte, elle separera presque en un .instant toute
la superficie de cette tache de celle du Cie1.43
If LaPorte is correct in his analysis, then the
instant can be conceived as a present with a depth.

While

its duration cannot be measured, nevertheless, it does have
an enduring quality.

That which is physically indivisible

is not necessarily conceptually indivisible.

Similarly,

what is physically immeasurable is not necessarily conceptually immeasurable.

It does not follow that because some-

thing cannot be measured by finite means, it is absolutely
immeasurable.

Measurability is conditional since what is

measurable can only be actually measured if there is a
measurer empowered to measure.

If the senses and under-

standing in their finite constitution are unable to grasp
the minuteness beyond a certain point then that thing may
be said to be physically immeasurable.
We conceive that there are an indefinite number of
snowflakes that fall in any given moment.

Yet this is

contradicted in the order of experience where we are able
to count a definite and limited number.

While the order of

experience may provide a mode of verification sufficient
for a workable hypothesis, it cannot serve as the absolute
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ground for certitude.

If we translate this in terms of the

instant it may be that it cannot be measured because of its
extreme minuteness.

Does it follow that the instant is

without duration and is absolutely indivisible, like a
geometric point?

Could it not be the case, as LaPorte

suggests, that while the instant cannot be physically
divided into 'before' and 'after' it is not absolutely
indivisible in the way that a geometric point is.

It is a

partless unit that has some duration notwithstanding the
fact that we cannot measure it.
Consider the typist who is rapidly hitting the keys
with such speed that we fail to note the individual striking
of the keys but only note the variation in patterns of the
sounds.

There is a similar case in the perception of a

musical composition where we only perceive chords or pieces
of melodies and not the individual notes because of the
rapidity of the playing.

In both examples the instant is

conceived as the unperceivable infinitesimal unit of time.
Insofar as we cannot measure the instant, it is physically
immeasurable, but certainly it is not durationless.

Nor can

we say that absolutely it cannot be divided.
The issue, it seems, is not whether, for Descartes,
the instant is indivisible, but rather in what sense it is
indivisible.

Is it absolutely indivisible like the

geometric point, as some critics attest it to be, or is it
indivisible in the sense that it is a partless unit?
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Certainly it is important to determine that answer
since it determines whether or not Descartes' theory of
time is paradoxical.

If the instant is absolutely indivi-

sible in the first sense then there is a paradox:

duration

as a divisible quantity is constituted by a succession of
indivisible durationless instants.

If, however, the

instant is indivisible only in the sense that it is a
partless unit, then there is no contradiction in Descartes'
theory.

However, aside from that point there is the funda-

mental importance of grasping a true understanding of the
Cartesian theory of time as an integral part of a total
philosophical system.

The truth of this will become

apparent when we see how that theory conditions his physics
and his metaphysics of the thinking substance in terms of
its epistemological ramifications.
D. Metaphysical Resolution
Let us return to our original point of inquiry.
Descartes' doctrine of continuous creation initiates objections reflecting the paradoxical nature of his theory of
time and duration.

We have seen that doctrine to be the

source of the question regarding the disparity between
discontinuity and continuity.

While the doctrine is itself

the source of the problem it is seen by some critics to
provide a metaphysical solution.

44

Negatively, the dis-

continuous duration of the substance is the absence of
power to exist.on one's own.

Positively that duration is
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the presence of God's creative action that provides a
simulacrum continuity.

Through that action discontinuity

is resolved into an indissoluble continuity.

While the

moments appear to be naturally united, the unity and continuity that is experienced is essentially a continuous
repetition of creations whereby the existence of the
substance is renewed in each moment.

It is that perpetual

repetition which goes unnoticed that generates a unity
between the moments so that they appear to form a true
continuity.

This seems to be what is implied in terms of

a metaphysical resolution.
Norman Kemp Smith succinctly assesses the paradoxical
question and its metaphysical resolution when he says:
Endurance is not proper to the creaturely as such,
this must mean that God, in creatively upholding it,
is by His continuous action, at every instant creating
the new additional time.
It is God's active ever
present agency which is alone continuous & abiding;
and insofar as the creaturely seems to be, what yet
it is not, self maintaining continuously enduring,
it is so solely because of its mirroring, or rather
seeming to mirror, characters which in their proper
nature belong exclusively to its Creative Source.45
The radical finitude of the substance to which Smith
alerts us is certainly one that is implied when Descartes
says that, if for one single moment God withdrew his
creative power, "toutes chose qu'il a crees retournaient au
neant pour cette raison qu'elles n'etaient qu'un neant
avant qu'elles fussent crees. 11 46

We know that in any one

moment the substance could cease to exist.
if these moments are discontinuous.

We do not know

Moreover, we know that
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God's essence is indivisible, simple, absolute unity and so
is His action, "l'idee que nous avons de Dieu nous apprend
qu'il n'y en lui qu'une seule action, toute simple et toute
pure. 1147

From the side of God, the continuous action by

which God conserves the substance is fundamentally one,
simple, eternal act and, as such, falls outside the temporal
series that is proper to created substances whose duration
is essentially successive.

From the side of the creature it

is the ever-present influence which alone can account for the
continuous duration of the substance who lacks a principle
of autocontinuation.
A question remains:
resolution needed?

It is, we suppose, if the moments are

actually discontinuous.
by any critic.

Is any kind of metaphysical

This, however, has not been proven

The texts on continuous creation themselves

never establish the discontinuity of the moments.

Nor do

they even establish the assumption of the argument - that
the moments are actually separate and divided one from the
other and are therefore discontinuous.
establish is the following:

What the texts do

The time of my life can be

divided into an infinite number of parts and these parts
can be separated one from the other.

As a proof for the

existence of God, it seems that Descartes' point in proposing continuous creation is not that the moments of time
are discontinuous, but that the continuity of the duration
of finite substances, deprived of a principle of auto-
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continuation, can only be explained by a transcendental
cause.
Duration is analogous to extension.

And like exten-

sion it is conceived as an unbroken whole that is poten. 11y d.ivisi
. . bl e in
. t o parts. 48
tia

Considering that analogy,

it is questionable whether or not Descartes meant that the
moments are actually separate and independent.

The texts

on continuous creation do not establish that they are.
Hence, the appeal to a metaphysical resolution would seem
to be unnecessary.
Even: .if the critics were correct in their assumption
that the moments are discontinuous and continuous creation
provides a metaphysical resolution to the discontinuity/
continuity question, it does not seem to resolve the other
question:

How can Descartes draw duration from instants

that have no duration?

The question, however, is only

valid if it is true that the instant is absolutely indivisible.

This fact has not been proved.

Hence, it has not

been proved that Descartes' theory of time is paradoxical.
On the contrary, there is evidence beyond that presented
which establishes that Descartes has a coherent theory of
time.

The truth is that Descartes has a dual perspective

of time that is accommodated to his metaphysical dualism.
Let us turn to consider time and its role in the Cartesian
physics.
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CHAPTER III
TIME - THE NUMBER OF MOVEMENT

A. Movement - Pre-Principles
"Thoroughgoing geometrization--the ~ardinal sin of
Cartesian thought leads to the intemporal:
tained but time is eliminated."

1

space is re-

Does Descartes' theory of

movement imply the denial of time, as A. Koyre and others
attest?

2

Time is the number of movement, it is the way in

which we think about that duration. 3

If time is eliminated

it is because Descartes' concept of movement excludes time.
An examination of that concept will determine if, and in what
sense, time is eliminated.
What Descartes has to say about movement prior to
1640, when he was writing the Principles, should be considered separately.

There are two reasons for this.

The

first is that in Descartes' early writings he espouses the
existence of a vacuum.

Hence, we find him explaining the

movement of falling bodies in terms of the force of gravity.
After 1631, however, Descartes no longer believed that there
was such a thing as a vacuum and he abandoned his theory on
the movement of falling bodies.

4

Secondly, before 1640,

weight was an objective reality in bodies.

After that,

Descartes regarded it as a sensible and subjective quality.
86

5
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Descartes could no longer define a body by its weight nor
consider weight a factor in movement.

These shifts i~

Descartes' thinking account for the disparity between
Descartes' earlier notion of movement and his later one.
Let us briefly consider Descartes' thoughts on movement
before 1640.
Commenting on the early writings of Descartes,
J. Vigier makes the observation that, for Descartes, the law
of inertia dominates the material world.

That law proposes

the constancy of speed, and time loses all importance.

An

invariable speed is one detached from time, since it is the
product of the mass and distance covered; but all other
speeds increase or decrease with time.

6

Vigier's assess-

ment deserves consideration.
Descartes provides us with an example of how the
concept o~ speed is to be understood.

In 1629, still be-

lieving in the existence of a vacuum and the reality of
weight, Descartes gives an explanation of how a body falls.
Descartes provides a geometrical description in which he
traces the fall of a body as if it were moving along a
vertical spatial trajectory:
Dans laquelle vous me demandez pourquoi je dis que la
vitesse est imprimee par la pesanteur, au premiere
moment comme un, au second moment comme deux, etc .•••
Permettez-moi de vous repondre que je ne l'ai pas
entendu ainsi; mais la vitesse est imprimee par la
pesanteur au premier moment comme un, et au second
moment par le meme pesanteur common un encore, etc.
Or, un au premier moment et un au. second font deux,
et avec un au trois, et la vitesse est augmente ainsi
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en proportion arithmetique ••• D'ou il suit certainment
que, si vous laissez tomber une boule en spatio plane
vacuo de 50 pieds de haut, de quelque matiere qu'elle
peut etre, elle emploierait toujours justement trois
fois autant de temps aux 25 premieres pieds qu'elle
ferait aux 25 derniers.7
In the first moment the body receives an impetus that produces a motion of a definite speed, that is, the elementary
speed.

In the second moment the body receives a new impetus

that produces a motion with a speed equal to the elementary
speed of the first moment.

This new elementary speed of

the second moment is added to the elementary speed produced
in the first moment so that the actual quantity of speed in
the second moment is double that of the first.

Thus, in

each moment after the first moment the speed is double,
then triple, then quadruple, etc.

The addition of constant

speeds means that in each moment the increase in speed will
always be arithmetically proportional.

What we find is

that the variability of the quantity of speed found in each
moment, that is, the increase of speed, is constituted by a
sum of invariable elementary speeds.

The uniformity and

variability can be numerically expressd.

(The lower case

letter represents the new unit of elementary constant speed.)
Starting with the first moment we can see how the increase
in speed in each moment thereafter is arithmetically proportional:
l

1 + 2(1 + la) + 3(1 +la+ lb) + 4(1 +la+

b + 1 C ), etc.

Because the elementary speed of each moment

is invariable, it is possible to project, as Descartes does,
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that the time needed to cover the last 25 feet will be
three times less than the time needed to cover the first
25 feet.
It is evident, however, that speed is the product of
.the force of gravity and distance traveled rather than the
time elapsed.

A stone, for example, which is attracted to

the earth in a vacuum, receives a unit of speed and covers
a single space.

In the second moment it receives an addi-

tional unit and covers a double space, and in the third
moment it covers three times the space covered in the first
moment, etc.

The primary question for Descartes is not how

fast the body falls but how far.

Only secondarily does

Descartes consider the fact that it will take less time to
travel the last distances than it did the first.
Can we say that time is eliminated from Descartes'
concept of movement?

It seems so if we consider that time

is only an extrinsic factor--one which is simply another
way of describing the speed.

Insofar as Descartes proposes

the invariability of speed, time is not an intrinsic factor
in the measuring of speed.

Time is merely an extrinsic

factor in the measuring of speed and acceleration since the
latter is simply the arithmetically doubling, tripling,
etc. of the invariable speed-movements.

With the invari-

ability of speed, Descartes can eliminate time as an
intrinsic factor in his consideration of speed since arithmetic takes the place of time.
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However, if Descartes deserves to be criticized for
his belief in the invariability of elementary speed, it is
not because he detaches it from time.

The invariability

of speed points to Descartes' mistakenly believing that
the force which moves the stone remains constant.

So long

as the force remains constant it will produce a constant
speed since the speed is proportionate to the force.
Descartes soon discovered that such a law is contrary to
nature.

All natural powers act to a greater or lesser

degree depending on the manner in which their subject is
disposed to receive their action.

Hence, Descartes realized

that a stone's disposition to receive a new motion, or an
increase in speed, is not always the same.

A stone moving

very fast would be more resistent to a new motion than if
. were moving
.
1 1 y. B
it
very sow

So long as Descartes main-

tained a belief in the constancy of force the invariability
of speed was destined to be a by-product.

Since speed was

invariable, Descartes could dispense with giving primary
consideration to the question of how much time it takes
for the body to fall.

One could obviously see that, since

the speed increases in arithmetical proportion, the time
would be proportionate.

As the speeds increase, the time

necessary to cover the same distance would decrease.
Let us pursue the claim that time is eliminated from
Descartes' concept of movement.

After 1631 Descartes no

longer believed in the existence of a vacuum and he
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abandoned his concept of the force of gravity. 9

The prob-

lem of falling bodies ceased to be a concern to Descartes.
He then turned to the problem of forces in equilibrium.
Unlike Galileo, who considered speed a factor in explaining
forces in equilibrium, Descartes chose to ignore speed.
Descartes considered only the factors of distance and
weight:
La premiere chose dont on peut en ceci etre preoccupe,
est que plusieurs ont coustume de confondre la consideration de l'espace avec celle de temps ou de la
vitesse •••• Que si j'avois voulee joindre la consideration de la vitesse avec cette de l'espace, il m'eut
etre necessaire d'attribuer trois dimensions a la
force, au lieu que je lui en ai attribue seulement
deux, afin de l'exclure.10
From the above text there seems to be every indication that
Descartes is eliminating speed from his concept of movement.
What is behind this strategy?

Underlying Descartes'

disavowal of speed and time is his rejection of any concept
of movement that could be explained in terms of an intrinsic principle of action.

Such a concept presumably would

posit an occult quality which would elude calculation.

This

seems to be one of the points that Descartes is making in
his letter to Mersenne:
Ce vous dites que la vitesse d'un coup marteau surpend
la Nature, en sorte qu'elle n'a pas laisir de joindre
ses forces pour resister, est entierement centre mon
opinion; car elle n'a point de forces a joindre, ne
besoin de tem~s pour cela, mais elle agit en tout
mathematique. 1
Given the two determinate factors of size and distance,
Descartes could project the possibility of mathematically
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calculating the movement of bodies.

The greater the size of

the hammer, the more the air resists it and thus it follows
that more force is needed to make it go higher.

The rate

of motion is then seen to be the product of the mathematical
factors of size and distance (extension).

Theoretically,

that rate could be statistically determined.
It was no doubt Descartes' vision of a mechanical universe that prompted him to exclude the consideration of
speed:
Je voudrais etre capable de repondre ace que nous
desirez touchant vos Mechaniques; mais encore que
toute ma Physique ne soit autre chose que Mechanique
je n'ai jamais envisage particulierement ces questions
qui dependent de mesures de la vitesse.12
Why does Descartes exclude speed?
with his mathematical physics?

How is it inconsistent

He gives us the answer:

Je vous prie de m'excuser si je ne repons point a
votre question touchant le retardement que recoit
le mouvement des corps pesans par l'air ou ils se
meuvent; car c'est une chose qui depend de tant
d'autres, que je n'en saurois faire un bon conte
dans une lettre; ~ je puis seulement direr que rii
Galilee ni aucun autre ne peut rien determiner
toucher cela qui soit clair & demonstratif, s'il
ne fait premierement ce que est que la pesanteur,
13
& qu'il n'ait les vrais principles de la physique.
One cannot consider speed for the reason that one cannot
perform any experiment accurately enough to determine how
the speed could be increased or decreased since these
depend on so many factors which elude perception.

There

was simply ho demonstrative solution when one employed the
concept of speed.

Hence, it was inconsistent with

Descartes' mechanical physics.
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Prior to the Principles, time, as merely an extrinsic factor in the measurement of speed, plays an in-.
significant role in the Cartesian physics.
achieve an important role?

Does time ever

New insights prompted Descartes

to reassess his ideas of bodies.

This gave rise to new

ideas and explanations of the movement of bodies and time.
For one thing, Descartes abandoned his belief in the
objective reality of weight; it could no longer be a determination in the rate of motion.

In the Principles Descartes

ranks it among the secondary qualities such as color and
hardness.

As non-essential properties, they could be taken

away from the body while the substance still would remain
intact.

What is essential to bodies is that they are

extended in length, breadth and depth.

14

Since bodies were

no longer defined in terms of weight, motion could no
longer be understood as the product of weight and distance.
As far as the Cartesian physics is concerned, all that can
be clearly and distinctly perceived in these bodies is
their extension, the division of their parts into different
sizes, their figure, situation and local movement, which
latter has all degrees of duration. 15

Having arrived at

a geometrical concept of bodies, Descartes would have to
redefine motion in terms of this definition of body.

This

definition would alter the role time plays in the Cartesian
physics.
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B. Local Movement - Circular Movement
After 1640 Decartes proposes a theory of movement in
accordance with his definition of bodies.

All the matter

in the universe is one and the same kind; it is extended
and divisible and its parts are movable.

Given the geo-

metric nature of matter, Descartes conceived only local
movement to be possible.

The latter is properly defined as

le transport d'une partie de la matiere, ou d'un
corps du voisinage de ceux qui le touchent immediatement, et que nous considerons comme en repos, dans le
voisinage de quelques.16
Since there is no void, in effect all local movement
translates into circular movement.

This view that all

motion is circular reflects Descartes' belief that our
planetary system is a huge vortex at the center of which is
the sun.

There are smaller vortices, including the earth,

which move in the same direction as the larger vortex.
Moreover, everything in these vortices follows the same
circular path.

17

Descartes spells out very specifically

what he means by circular movement:
Apres ce qui a ete demontre cy-dessus, a sauvoir
que tousles lieux sont pleins de corps, & que chaque
partie de la matiere est tellement proportionee a
la grandeur du lieu qu'elle occupe, qu'il n'est pas
possible qu'elle en remplisse un plus grand, ni qu'
elle se referre en un moindre, ni qu'aucun autre corps
y trouve place pendant qu'elle yest, nous devons conclure qu'il faut necessairement qu'il y ait tous-jours
tout un cercle de matiere ou anneau de corps qui se
meuvent ensemble en meme temps; en sorte que, quand un
corps quitte sa place a quelqu'autre qui le chasse,
il entre en celle d'un autre, & cet autre en celle d'un
autre, & ainsi de suite jusques au dernier, qui occupe
au meme instant le lieu delaisse par le premier.18
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There is no general consensus about Descartes' post1640 understanding of time in relation to movement.

J. Wahl

contends that Descartes' definition of movement supposes
only the ideas of the instant and of immediate contiguity.
Therefore, in order to understand circular movement which is
effected instantly, it is necessary to admit a division of
19
tl.·me and matter.
is not the case.

Guerou lt , h owever, 1.ns1.s
·
· t s th a t th'1.s
The absolute indivisibility of the instant

entails the infinite division of extension rather than the
divisibility of extension entailing the division of time.

2O

It is evident that circular movement implies the
divisibility of matter.

Since there is no void, and all

bodies are moving at the same time, it is necessary that the
matter constantly divide itself so that it can be accommodated to the disproportionate spaces left by contiguous
parts.

It is not so evident, however, that circular move-

ment implies the divisibility of time.
that it does not.
in the instant.

Nor is it evident

We know the circular movement takes place
The question is one of determining the

divisibility or indivisibility of the instant.
The point of departure for our inquiry is to determine
if the instants engender real finite speeds.

This is war-

ranted because speed is a dimension of motion, and all
dimension is measurable in the same way that a line is
measurable.

What is measurable is also divisible, it can be

measured and it can be divided.

Since motion is measured
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by time, the instant as a part of time would presumably be
a measurable quantity falling under the category of
magnitude and therefore also divisible.

The dynamics of

the relationship between speed and the divisibility or
indivisibility of the instant will become clearer as we
proceed to explore the issue.
In perusing the Principles we see that contrary to
Descartes' early thinking he now introduces the factor of
speed as a major consideration in his theory of movement.
This decided shift in Descartes' view of movement no longer
asks the question:

How far does a body travel?

The quantity

of motion ceases to be equal to the weight times the distance.

Nor does Descartes propose that bodies are moving

at constant speeds.

The quantity o~ motion is now seen

to be the product of size (or volume) and speed.

We now

see that speed is variable.
Car, bien que le mouvement ne soit qu'une facon en
la matiere que est meue, elle en a pourtant une
certaine quantite ••• qui n'augmente & ne diminue
jamais ..• encore qu'il yen ait tantot plus & tantot
moins en quelques unes de ses parties. C'est pourquoi, lors qu'une partie de la matiere se meut deux
fois plus vite qu'une autre, & que cette autre est
deux fois plus grande que le premiere, nous devons
penser qu'il ya tout autant de mouvement dans la
plus petite que dans la plus grande; & que toutefois & quantes que le movement d'une partie diminue,
celui de quelque autre partie ••• augmente a proportion.21
Given Descartes' law of the conservation of movement, we
must conceive that in each instant the same quantity of
motion is retained regardless of the fact that some bodies
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are of unequal size and move at unequal speeds.

The seven

rules of impact that follow the general law of the conservation of movement are Descartes' attempt to explain how it
might be possible to determine, according to the factors
of size and speed, the exact extent of changed or unchanged
motion in each body at each instant. 22
The quantity of motion is always the same, the apportioning of that motion, however, is contingent on size and
speed.

For example, if B was twice as large as Cit would

transfer one-third of its quantity of motion to C and its
speed would be reduced by one-third, so that B would need
as much time to travel a distance of two feet as it
previously did to travel a distance of three feet.

23

Theo-

retically, according to these rules of impact, one could
explain in terms of size and speeds how bodies would react
under ideal conditions.

Presumably, one could predict the

rate of motion and the direction of a moving body in the
next instant by knowing the size and speed of the body
moving and those of the body it is contacting in the present
instant.
Let us consider what takes place in these instantaneous elementary movements.

First of all, the divisibility

of matter is necessary for circular movement.

According to

Descartes, it is not possible for the matter which now fills
the space G, for example, to fill successively all the
spaces of gradually decreasing sizes between G and E unless
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these parts adapt their shape and divide themselves to fit
24
.
bl e d'1mens1ons
.
exac tl y th e innurnera
o f t h ese spaces.
secondly, circular movement implies not merely the divisibility of matter but also variable measurable speeds.

It

is not enough that the bodies undergo indefinite division.
Something more is required.
speeds.

They must move at different

For in the case of an imperfect circle it is the

speed of the movements that compensates for the inequalities
of the places,
toute la matiere qui est comprise en l'espace EFGH
peut se mouvoir circulairement, & sa partie qui est
vers E, passer vers G, & celle qui est vers G, passer
en meme temps vers E, qu'il faille supposer de condensation ou de vide, pourvue que, cornrne en suppose
l'espace G quatre fois plus grand que l'espace E &
deux fois plus grand que les espaces F & H, on suppose
aussi que son mouvement est quatre fois plus vite vers
E que vers G, & deux fois plus que vers F ou vers H,.
& qu'en tous ~es endroits de ce cercle la vitesse du
mouvement compense la petitesse du lieu. Caril est
aise de connoitre en cette facon qu'en chaque espace
de temps qu'on voudra determiner, il passera tout
autant de matiere dans ce cercle par un endroit que
par l'autre.25
In Descartes' early concept of movement he proposed
the invariability of speed and time was not an intrinsic
factor in his consideration of movement.

However, in the

Principles, Descartes now introduces the variability of
speed (i.e., acceleration and deceleration) and he reestablishes the importance of time in his consideration of
movement.

The point in question is how Descartes conceives

the instant when he sees it as the unit of time in which
the elementary movements take place.
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Speed is a dimension of motion and dimension is a
quantity.

Quantity is either discrete like the indivisible

point and countable as arithmetic quantity; or quantity is
continuous and analogous to extension and therefore measurable as geometric quantity.

While a point is used as an

aid by which we construct a numerical assemblage, Descartes
makes if clear that if anything can be conceived in terms
of 'more' or 'less' it falls under the category of magnitude
and is measurable and divisible. 26

Insofar as there are

rates of speed that can be conceived in terms of fast and
slow (that is, more or less speeds), speed falls under the
category of continuous quantity that is both measurable and
divisible.

Time then becomes that measure by which we

conceive of the motion of bodies insofar as that motion has
some speed.

Since there are variations of speed (real

finite speeds) in the instant, and these are measurable and
divisible, then the instant as a unit of time presumably
must have the characteristics of measurability and divisibility.

For that which serves as a measure must be

homogeneous with the measured; thus we measure spatial
magnitudes by spatial magnitudes, that is, by a cubit or a
yardstick or some other linear measure.

27

It would seem that Descartes conceives the instant to
be a measurable and divisible quantity.

This is precisely

the issue. Several texts provide us with a basis for
resolving the issue.

In Article 33, Principle II (cf.
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ftn.

#18), Descartes talks about the elementary movements

and notes that the bodies "meuvent ensemble en meme temps,"
and "occupe au meme instant le lieu delaisse par le
premier."

In that text, while referring to these instan-

taneous elementary movements, he also notes that in "chaque
espace de temps" the same quantity of matter will move in a
circle (cf. ftn. #25).

Since all circular movement takes

place in the instant, we must assume that he is referring
to the instant as that "espace de temps."
"l'espace" is identical to extension.

28

For Descartes
If Descartes

conceives the instant as a space of time, as apparently
he does, then it is analogous to an extended line and
would be both measurable and divisible.
A clearer illustration of this concept of the instant
is implied in the following text:
On ne sauroit determiner aucune partie si petite entre
tousles points F & D qu'elles ne soit plus grande que
celle qui doit sorter a chaque moment hors de la ligne
FD a cause que pendant tousles moments de temps que la
boule s'approche de B, elle accourcit cette ligne FD
et lui fait avoir successivement plus de differentes
longueurs qu'on n'en sauroit exprimer par aucun
nombre.29
In each moment that the globule moves from F to D the
distance is successively shortened.

The length of the

distance traversed is proportionate to the speed of the
moving globule in each instant.

Let us suppose that the

length of time it takes for the globule to cover the
distance from F to Dis five minutes.
Descartes says, in each of the moments

According to what
30

the globule is
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moving at some speed so that no matter at what rate of
speed it is moving some length of space is always being
covered.

Since some space is covered in each of the moments,

the remaining time and distance necessary to reach Dis
proportionately shortened.

This would only be possible if

the moments themselves had some length.

For we conceive

the total time of five minutes as a length of time; time is
either long or short as when we say that the journey took a
long time.

And just as a line is divisible into units that

have length, similarly the elementary moments of time are
conceived as having some length that is both measurable and
divisible.

If the elementary moments of time, i.e., the

instants, are identical in length, they can serve as the
common unit of measurement for the extent of distance
traversed.

The fifth law of impact demonstrates the point,

ainsi, apres que B rencontre C, il iroit d'un tiers
plus lentement qu'auparavant, c'est a dire qu'en
autant de temps qu'il auroit parcourir auparavant
trois espaces, il n'en pourroit plus parcourir que
deux.31
The above two passages project both speed and time as dimensional quantities that are extended and divisible into
parts.

If we are to give any credence to what Descartes

says in these texts, it seems evident that the elementary
movements have a real finite speed that take place in a
brief "espace de temps".
But why do we emphasize the fact that the elementary
movements have a real finite speed?

Because, it is the only
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kind of speed consistent with Descartes' definition of
speed as a dimension of motion which is measured by time.
we know that speed is a dimension of motion, and that motion
can be conceived in terms of fast or slow.

Anything that

admits of a 'more' or 'less' is a matter.of comparison.
When we are comparing two things there is no way of determining exactly in what proportion the greater exceeds the lesser
unless we treat the quantity as being in some way analogous
.
1
. o f magni't u d e. 32
an d pace
i't un d er th e ca t egory
t o ex t ension
Insofar as we treat the quantity as a magnitude it is
measurable.

The only way in which we can account for the

fact that the movements are conceived to be fast or slow
is to assume that they are real speeds that have been
measured in some way.

While it may be impossible to measure

the exact rate of speed, nevertheless, it can be measured
in a general way by comparing it with the speeds of other
movements.

We see this in the case of any given magnitude

that we wish to measure.

We may not have·an exact linear

measure as a cubit or yardstick to measure a given spatial
magnitude, yet if we compare it with another given magnitude
we can determine whether or not it is greater or lesser than
the other.

The same holds true for speed.

It would be impossible to determine the speed of any
movement as being fast or slow unless it was compared with
some other movement that had a finite speed.
way in which we measure motion.

Time is the

We measure the rate of the
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speed of a car by the time it takes to travel a certain
distance.

The movement of the car can be measured by _time

because time itself is a movement.

Clock time, that is,

the temporal units of minutes and hours, is nothing more
. than the movements of the hands of a clock; and the temporal
units of days and years are determined by the movements of
the heavens.

33

When it comes to measuring the speed of the elementary
movements it may be true that no exact measure can be determined.

This does not preclude any measurement in terms of

fast or slow.

Since all of matter is undergoing change at

the same time, it is possible to compare the speed of the
motion of one part of matter with that of another part of
matter.

It is possible to determine their respective speeds

relative to each other as being fast or slow.

Even in the

case of invariable speeds where each of the elementary
speeds remains constant, the fact that one can determine,
as Descartes did, that the speed of these remains constant
implies that the speed of the latter movement has been
compared to the speed of the movement preceding it.
The comparative aspect of speed is even more apparent
in the Principles, which manifests Descartes' new thinking
on movement.

Here Descartes has presented us with a concept

of speed as a real finite quantity.

We find that movements

have relational velocities that are measurable, they are
fast or slow, and these movements take place in an "espace

104
de temps".

bescartes clearly endorses a notion of speed as

a finite and measurable quantity and an intrinsic factor
in his understanding of movement:
Or le mouvement n'etant point une qualite reele, mais
seulement on ne peut concevoir qu'il soit autre chose
que le changement par lequel un cors s'eloigne de
quelques autres, & il n'y a en lui que deux varietez
a considerer; l'une, qu'il peut etre plus ou mains
vite; & l'autre, qu'il peut etre determine vers
divers cotez.34
There is no evidence that Descartes ever countenanced a
notion of infinite speed as it relates to movement.

Never-

theless, Gueroult has made the categorical claim that the
speed must be infinite for the reason that the instant is
absolutely indivisible. 35

Neither is the case.

Nowhere does Descartes ever talk about speed as
infinite.

Speed is measured in passing time.

The finite

cannot be composed of infinites and in Descartes' view
infinite speed is a contradictory concept:

"Et je puis

seulement dire qu'il implique contradiction qu'il ya ait
une vitesse infinie en la nature." 36

We know that speed is

a dimension of motion, and all dimension is measurable.
speed was infinite it would not be measurable.

If

Infinite

speed, then, is inconsistent with Descartes' definition of
speed as a dimension of motion.

Moreover, it is inconsistent

with Descartes' mathematical physics since it introduces
a theoretically incalculable factor in nature.

The infinite,

by definition, cannot be comprehended by the finite
intellect. 37

Further, Descartes never believed anything,
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except God (whose concept contains infinity)
tually infinite.

38

to be ac-

Even extension can only be called indefi-

nite in the sense that it extends further than any man
can conceive.
What we find Descartes saying about speed is that
there are degrees of speed ranging from extreme slowness to
extreme swiftness.

The following three passages attest to

the indefinite quantitative aspect of speed.

In attempting

to explain how bodies strive to move away from the center
of their movement, Descartes uses the example of the motion
of an ant:
Jene doute point que le mouvement de cette fourmi
ne doive etre tres-lent au commencement, & que son
effort ne sauroit sembler bien grand, si on le rapport seulement a cette premiere motion; mais aussi
on ne peut pas dire qu'il soit tout a fait nul, &
d'autant qu'il augmente a mesure qu'il produit son
effet, la vitesse qu'il cause devient en peu de temps
assez grande ••• Au premiere moment qu'on fera mouvoir
ce tuyau auteur de centre E, cette boule n'avancera
que lentement vers Y;39
As Descartes suggests, speed can be so slow that it is
almost next to complete rest.

One cannot, however, conceive

it to be so slow that it would be equal to zero speed.
In contrast to the extreme slowness of the motion of
some bodies there is the extreme swiftness of the motion of
other bodies,
qu'il n'y a point de vide, il faut necessairement
qu'il s'y trouve une telle matiere dont les parties
soient si petities & se meuvent si extrement vite,
que la force dont elles recontrent les autres cars
soit suffisante pour faire qu'elles changent de figure 40
& s'accomodent a celle des lieux ou elles se trouvent.
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The following passage from the Traite clearly establishes Descartes' belief that each instant, including the
elementary phase of movement, contains a movement having
degrees of speed that can be measured in terms of 'more'
or 'less'.

Discussing God's causality in regarding the

disposition of movements in the universe Descartes writes,
des le premier instant qu'elles (movements) sont
crees, les unes commencement a se mouvoir d'un cote,
les autres d'un cote, les autres d'un autre; les
unes plus vite, les autres plus lentement & qu'elles
continuent par apres leur mouvement suivant les loix
ordinaires de la Nature.41
Speed is a dimension of motion, and dimension is the
aspect according to which something is measurable.

This is

not to say that the degree of slowness or the degree of
swiftness can physically be measured.

As a matter of fact,

for Descartes they cannot,
mais nous n'avons pu determiner en meme facon combien sont grandes les parties ausquelles cette matiere
est divisee, ni quelle est la vitesse dont elles se
meuvent, ni quels cercles elles decrivent.
Car ces
choses ayant pu etre ordonees de Dieu en une infinite
de diverse facons.42
Speed is a dimension of motion and motion takes place
in time.

The elementary movements, broken down as they are

into instantaneous movements, are measurable in the same way
that a length is measurable.

Hence, the instant as a part

of time, however brief, must be conceived as an "espace de
temps", that is, a measurable and divisible quantity.
Otherwise, it cannot serve as the condition for speed which
is a quantitative dimension and, therefore, is both
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measurable and divisible.

The fact that the speed cannot

actually be physically and exactly measured or divided does
not affect the truth that theoretically it could be.
In the Principles Descartes spends considerable effort
in describing how movements take place in the universe.

In

accordance with Descartes' vortex theory·a11 movement is
circular.

And, as we see, such movements break down into

instantaneous elementary movements.

While all movement is

circular, nevertheless, it tends to rectilinear movement.

43

The inclination to rectilinear movement persists, although
bodies are not actually moving in a rectilinear path.
Descartes provides us with an example of what he means when
he says that all circular movement tends to rectilinear
movement.

If a wheel is turned on its axis it would still

have the inclination to go straight.
from its axis it would in fact do so.

For if it was released
44

The same thing

applies to a stone that is whirled around a string.
. re 1 ease d 1·t goes s t raig
. ht • 45
as 1·t is

As soon

However, wh.l
1 ea 11

movement tends to be rectilinear, yet because of the
existence of obstacles, i.e., contiguous bodies, its movement is impeded and is forced to be circular.

46

The inclination to rectilinear movement can be traced
to the action of light that is ontologically prior to all
local movement.

For Descartes, the action of light serves

to explain all the movements that constitute the universe.
For this reason, Descartes' theory of the transmission of
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light is the ultimate point of reference for our understanding of the role time has to play in the Cartesian physics.
No analysis of time would be complete without considering
that theory.
C. Instantaneous Transmission·of Light
There is no question as to the import of Descartes'
theory of the transmission of light:
Je vous dirai que je suis maintenant apres a demeler
les chaos, pour en faire sortir de la lumiere, que est
l'une des plus hautes & des plus difficiles matieres
que je puisse jamais entreprendre; car tout physique
yest presque comprise.47
To give an exhaustive treatment of Descartes' theory of
light is beyond the scope of this study.

Yet, something

must be offered in the way of a general overview if we are
to understand the temporal dimensions of that theory.
In the Traite de Lumiere Descartes presents a detailed
description of his theory of light.

The Principles, however,

provide a clearer picture of how that theory is connected
with the rest of his physics.

Ultimately, the action of

light explains the phenomena of movement in the universe.
All the matter in the universe is composed of one principal
kind of matter that is fine and fluid, and differs in size
and shape.

The three elements that constitute the visible

world all have the properties of light.

The first element,

the sun and stars, is defined by its luminous character;
it sets up the action of light.

The second element has

interstices that are filled with particles of the first
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element through which light is transmitted.

The third ele-

ment, the earth and the other planets, is defined by its
opaque character; it reflects the action of the sun.

48

While the sun and fixed stars do not move from place
to place, they are very mobile as they move on their own
axis.

That movement resembles the movement of fire.

49

Because the sun is composed of very fine fluid and mobile
matter, it carries the surrounding parts of the heavens with
it.

Each of these heavens moves independently and sepa-

rately around their own center while they move together in
groups around other points so that a vortex system is
created.

As the sun moves around its own axis, its agitation

creates a whirlpool effect so that all of the vortices in the
universe are constantly being agitated by the sun at the
same time. 50

It was Descartes' belief that the constant

movement of the three elements, that is, their effort to
separate and divide, could be traced to the action of light.
In the third part of the Principles Descartes attempts
to explain the movements of the first and second elements.
Light is that 'effort' by which the small particles of the
first and second elements recede from the center around
which they revolve.
Je tacherai maintenant d'expliquer le plus exactement
que je pourrai, quel est l'effort que sont ainsi, non
seulement les petities boules qui composent le second
element, mais aussi toute la matiere du premier, pour
s'eloigner des centres S, f & semblables, autour
desquels elles tournet; car je pretends faire voir
cy-apres que c'est en cet effort seul que consiste la
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nature de la lumiere & la connoissance de cette verite
pourra servir a nous faire entendre beaucoup d'autres
choses.51
Descartes proceeds to move on to the fourth part of
the Principles in which he explains the movements of the
earth and planets by the 'action' of light:
Quant a la lumiere, qui est la troisieme action que
nous avons ici a considerer •.. je pense avoir des-ja
cy-dessus assez explique sa nature; il rest seulement a remarquer que ••• bien que tous ses rayons
viennent en meme facon du Soleil, & ne facent autre
chose que presser en ligne droite les corps qu'ils
rencontrent, ils causent neanmoins divers mouvemens
dans les parties du troisieme element, dont la plus
haute region de la Terre est composee.52
The action of the light consists in a pressure to centrifugal
motion.

Since the sun rotates on its own axis the action of

the light reaches the earth from all points of the sun's
surface.

Because the pressure does come from all points it

occurs along straight lines which are the sun's rays.

The

rays are the direction by which the pressure of the sun is
emitted as it passes through the transparent medium to the
earth.
We are prompted at this point to note that while our
discussion of the nature of light will be incomplete because
our central concern is not Descartes' physics per se, this
does not prevent us from raising some questions regarding
Descartes' theory of light.

An appropriate question at this

time regards the ontological status of light.

Descartes

certainly suggests that light is ontologically prior to all
other matter in the sense that the action of the light serves
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as a cause that can account for all the movements in the
universe.
The light as a material substance is essentially no
different than other substance.

Nor is it essentially dif-

ferent from any of the other heavens.
and the sun is the center.
heaven.

It has its own vortex

Yet, the sun is the principal

It emits a pressure as it continuously turns around

its own center with "tres grande vitesse" and presses on
all sides of the matter of the sky, and that matter extends
without interruption to our eyes. 53
However, the light, as a material substance, has no
intrinsic power or force by which it can effect any natural
action.

Yet, Descartes insists the light is an efficient

cause,
car si la lurniere, c'est a dire lux, est l'action ou
le rnouvernent dont le soleil pousse la rnatiere subtile qui l'environne, ••• il ne suit pas de la qu'il
premier que cette action, ny qu'il en soit la cause
efficiente.54
While Descartes refers to the light as an efficient cause, he
does not wish us to consider it as a causa secundurn fieri,
that is, a cause of corning into being.

If it were, the sun

would not need to exist once it had produced its effect,
as is the case of the father who begets the son.

The sun

must be understood as a causa secundurn ~ , a cause that
can account for the continuation of the effect.

55

The sun

continues to shine and the parts of matter continue to move.
If we conceive of the light as a cause, albeit a causa
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secundum esse, it cannot be understood in any way as being
a cause by virtue of an intrinsic principle of action.
For, it is essentially extended matter.
The movement of the sun as well as all the other movements of the parts of matter can only be accounted for by
appealing to a transcendantal cause.

Without that cause all

movements, including that of the light, remain totally unexplainable.

There is, and can be, only one cause in the

Cartesian universe and that cause is God:
Pour ce qui est de la premiere (la cause) il me semble
qu'il est evident qu'il n'y en a point d'autre que Dieu,
qui de sa Toute puissance a cree la matiere avec le
mouvement & le repos & qui conserve maintenant en
!'universe, par son cours ordinaire autant de mouvement & de repos qu'il yen a mis en le creant.56
As far as the light is concerned, it must be conceived
as a secondary cause, or more accurately, as the condition
for movement:
La reponse que vous leur avez donnee, a savoir que,
lors que Dieu a dit:
fiat Lux, il a fait mouvoir
les parties de la Matiere, leur a donne inclination
a continuer ce mouvement en lignes droites, est bonne;
car cela meme est la Lumiere.57
Insofar as God always conserves the sun with its movement,
the rest of the universe moves with this sun.

Ultimately,

God is the absolute cause of all movement.
If one insists on calling the light a 'cause' it
remains true that its causality is derivative.

In order to

avoid any misunderstanding of the 'action' of light, the
latter should be called more accurately a 'condition'.
Descartes never refers to the light as a condition, he

While
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suggests that this term is appropriate.
following analogy:

He makes the

The light is prior to all movement as

man is prior to his reason.
reason, he must first exist.

In order for man to use his
In order for movement to take

. place, the sun must first exist.SB

By appealing to a

transcendental cause Descartes is able to explain the ontological priority of light as a cause.
While this metaphysical approach answers the question
regarding the ontological status of light, it does not make
it easier to understand what Descartes means by his theory
of light.

This, in part, can be traced to inconsistencies

in terminology.

We have seen Descartes talk about the light

as an 'effort', and as an 'action' "presser en ligne droit".
Elsewhere we find Descartes referring to the light as an
inclination to movement.

"Par la lumiere," he writes, "je

n'entendais pas tant le mouvement lui meme, que l'inclination ou le propension au movement."

59

Thus far we have been

led to believe that light is some kind of elusive 'force'
whose effects are alone experienced.

He makes light out to

be the tendency towards movement or the condition for
movement.
Yet elsewhere, Descartes implies that it is some kind
of movement.

In the Dioptrics he refers to the light as

"un mouvement ou une action qui tend a causer quelque
mouvement." 60

In that same treatise he leads us to believe

that light is a movement, noting that "la lumiere ••• est un
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certain mouvement ou une action fort prompte

&

fort vive,

qui passe vers nos yeux, par l'extremite de l'air
autres corps transparens." 61

&

des

If Descartes wishes us to

understand light as a kind of movement, it certainly is
distinguished from other movements.

In the Principles he

clearly says that it is not a movement, but a "force"
that causes pressure:
La force de la lumiere ••• ne consiste point en la
duree de quelque mouvement, mais seulement en ce que
ces petities boules sont pressees ..• encore qu'elles
ne s'y meuvement peut-etre pas actuellement.62
Burman informed Descartes that he found it difficult to
understand how pressure could happen without movement.

63

In reply to Burman, Descartes notes that we can take a metal
instrument or a piece of wood or metal and press it with
our hands on either side in such a way that no motion is
produced since the pressure and resistance on both sides are
equal.

In the same way, pressure from the matter of the

second element is resisted by the pressure of the eye.

64

How can this concept of light as a force that causes
pressure be reconciled with Descartes' concept of light as
"uncertain mouvement ou un action fort prompte et fort
vive"?

Is this a real contradiction or only an apparent

contradiction?

Descartes did not seem to think there was

any contradiction:
Or d'avoir dit generalement en plusiers endroits qu'elle
est un mouvement ou un action & en un autre d'avoir dit
qu' elle es_t qu' une .action.- Ce ne sont point d.eux choses
qui se contredisent ••• Comme, lors qu'on dit de quelque
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un qu'il est toujours en action, cela veut dire qu'il
se remue toujours.65
Descartes seems to suggest that it is only a matter of
semantics.
movement?

Why is it that Descartes can call the light a
Primarily because the movement of the sun sets up

the action or inclination to rectilinear· movement.

While

the sun does not move from place to place, it does have its
own proper movement.

The centrifugal force of the particles

of the sun agitate in such a way (like a flame) that the sun
causes pressure to be emitted from all of the points of its
surface.

The rays of the sun are the straight lines along

which the pressure tends.

66

The rays are not light cor-

puscles, however, but simply the direction that the force
takes.

Nothing material passes from the light.

67

We must

not think that the force of the sun is actually emitted in a
true rectilinear direction, this is not the case.

The same

laws that apply to movement apply to the tendency to movement:
Caril est bien aise a croire que !'action ou inclination a se mouvoir que j'ai dit devoir etre prise
pour la lumiere, doit suivre en ceci les memes lois
que le mouvement.68
What does this mean?

Although the action of the light tends

to move along straight lines and is emitted equally in all
directions from the body of the sun, there is no actual
rectilinear movement.

When the rays meet certain bodies

they are deflected by them or weakened in the same way that
the movement of a ball thrown in the air is deflected by the
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objects aroun d i

While the rays of light always tend

to move rectilinearly, since there is no void, no actual
rectilinear movement is possible.

In effect, the rays are

curved or bent lines; but because there is an infinite
number of them, they are considered to be straight when they
pass through the transparent medium.
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At the instant that

we open our eyes the pressure from the sun tends in a
straight line towards our eyes.

Yet, because the rays are

impeded by other bodies they are never exactly straight
when they reach us.

However, in each instant that the

action of the sun is transmitted, the tendency towards
rectilinear movement persists.

What can be said about that

instant?
We know that the force of the light does not consist
in "la duree de quelque mouvement''

(cf. ftn. #62).

When

Descartes speaks of a durational movement he is thinking of
a successive kind of movement that takes place in passing
time.

In this sense light is not a movement.

The passage

of light, like the elementary movements of circular motion,
is effected in the instant:
Et ici m'entendant sur le sujet de la lumiere,
j'expliquai, bien au long quelle etoit celle qui se
devoit trouver dans le Soleil & les Etoiles, & comment de la elle traversoit en un instant les immense espaces des cieux & comment elle se reflechissoit des Planetes & des Cometes vers la Terre.7 2
Since the action of light is conceived by Descartes to be the
cause of all the elementary movements in the universe and
since these movements take place in the instant, then what is
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true of the 'instant' as it pertains to the elementary movements should be true of the 'instant' as it pertains to the
action of light.
We have argued that the elementary movements have real
finite speeds, and that the instant in which the movements
take place is both measurable and divisible.

If we are to

find coherency in Descartes' theory of time in his physics,
we should be able to find that the action of light has a
real finite speed which takes place in a measurable and
divisible instant.

The following passage provides us with

insight and can serve as a starting point for our inquiry:
En la lumiere, je ne considere pas le mouvement, mais
l'action ou !'inclination a se mouvoir laquelle etant
instantaneous ne peut diminuer.73
On the basis of this particular text, Gueroult makes the following observation:

"Descartes, considering that the instant

cannot be diminished and is rigorously indivisible, concludes that elementary speed is also absolutely indivisible
and that real movement (temporal) is derived from the
repetition of these indivisibles. 1174
Here Gueroult's claim is based upon questionable textual
interpretation (only one of the problems of the topic).

The

first difficulty with Gueroult's interpretation is that not
enough text is provided to make clear Descartes' intent.
Secondly, there is an overreading of the text (making a
subtle point on the basis of a text which seems to be saying
something commonplace and straightforward).

Thirdly, there
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is misrepresentation of the text since subsequent portions
of the text tend to negate the basis of Gueroult's interpretation.

Finally, there is the failure to provide

additional texts to support his claims.
Let us consider what Descartes actually says in the
text and what he does not say.

The first point to note is

that he does not say that the instant is indivisible.

Nor,

in fact, does he ~ay that the instant cannot be diminished.
He says that the action or inclination cannot be diminished.
Secondly, as regards the instantaneity of the action, one
could propose that Descartes means nothing more by this
than that the action occurs in the shortest time possible,
that is, a time with a minimum duration.
from this passage is to overread the text.

To assume more
More important,

however, is the fact that Gueroult fails to cite the subsequent part of the text which reads as follows:
Et encore qu'elle diminueroit, il est certain que ce
doit etre de fort peu, vu qu'elle ne se perd pas toute
en venant du soleil jusqu'a nous, et ainsi que cela
ne doit point etre considere.75
There are two possible interpretations for this last
text.

In citing the first part of the text Gueroult in-

sisted that the instant was indivisible because it could not
be diminished.

If this was what Descartes meant in that

text, the second text would seem to refute it.

For now

Descartes says that, if the instant would be diminished
(he does not say if it is or is not), it would have to be
ever minutely diminished.

Obviously, then he is not
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maintaining a rigid position on the instant.

Gueroult's

interpretation is, no doubt, predictated on the thesis that
in the first part of the text Descartes is actually saying
that the instant cannot be diminished.

However, this does

not seem to be what Descartes is saying at all.

In fact,

we know from other texts, that it is the action which can
be diminished as it passes through a vortex other than its
own.

Speaking about the light, which as we know from other

texts, Descartes refers to as a 'force'

(cf. ftn. #62), as

well as an 'action', Descartes says:
Enfin la force de la Lumiere est non seulement plus ou
moins grande en chaque lieu, selon la quantite des
rayons qui s'y assemblent, mais elle peut aussi etre
augmentee ou diminuee par les diverses dispositions
76
des corps qui se trouvent aux lieux par ou elle passe.
Considering this passage from the Traite de Lumiere, the
point that Descartes seems to be making in his letter to
Mersenne (which Gueroult failed to cite in full)

is that,

although the action would be diminished, the diminution
would be very little since it would still have the force
to produce its effect.

In other words, if the sun lost any

of its efficacy, it must only be slight since the empirical
evidence is that the light and its reflection on the earth
are contemporaneous.

In the passage cited from Mersenne's

letter there is no evidence that Descartes wishes us to
understand that the instant cannot be diminished, and is,
therefore, indivisible.

Instead, Descartes wishes to

emphasize the ontological priority of the light.

At the
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same time he wants to disavow its temporal priority since
the light as a cause is simultaneous with its effect •. This
interpretation can be sustained.
The action of the iight is a perfect example for illustrating that what is ontologically prior.need not be temporally prior.
Car si la Lumiere, c'est a dire lux est l'action ou
le mouvement dont le soleil pousse la matiere subtile
qui l'environne .•• il ne suit pas de la qu'il soit premier que cette action, n'y qu'il en soit la cause
efficient ••• si vouz voulez qu'il soit premiere qu'elle
ce sera seulement en meme facon que l'homme est premier que sa raison, en tant gu'il doit etre au exister
avant qu'il puisse en user.77
Light is not propagated according to a local movement
measured in passing time.

The action or movement of the sun

means that the rays of the sun and its point of emission are
simultaneous with its illumination of all of the parts of
the hemisphere.

To illustrate what he means, Descartes

compares the action of the light to the movement of a stick
in which both ends are moving at the same time:
Et pour tirer une comparaison de ceci, je desire que
vous penses que la lumiere n'est autre chose, dans
les corps qu'on nomme lumineux, qu'un certain mouvement, ou une action fort prompte & fort vive, qui passe
vers nos yeux, par l'extremite de l'air & des autres
corps transparens, en meme facon que le mouvement ou
la resistence des corps, que rencontre cet aveugle,
passe vers sa main, par l'extremite de son baton •••
vous scaves que !'action, dont on meut l'un des
bout d'un baton doit ainsi passer en un instant
jusques a l'autre et qu'elle (lumiere) devroit passer
en meme sorte.78
There is nothing in this text (nor in any other text that we
could discover) which could lead us to say that instantaneity
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is defined in terms of absolute indivisibility.
Further, if indivisibility means that there is no real
finite speed, then this is more evidence that the instant is
not conceived in terms of indivisibility.

Considering that

the light has to pass through different mediums, Descartes
proposes that the speed of light is not always the same.
Light is an action upon the subtile matter which fills the
pores.

But some of the matter is less disposed to receive

the action.

Where the light is impeded or weakened it loses

some of its velocity.

Contrary to this, if the medium is

more disposed to receive the light its speed is augmented.
A ball thrown in the air moves more rapidly when the wind
blows on the side that is moving, and it moves less rapidly
if the wind is blowing against the side that is moving.
The same applies to the action of light.

79

We have seen

that the action of light follows the laws of motion (cf.
ftn. #68).

Hence, the speed of light depends on the nature

of the medium through which it passes.

Light travels

faster in a denser medium in the same way that a ball moves
faster on a harder surface than on a softer one. 80

Moreover,

regarding Descartes' discussion of the refraction of light
rays, Fermat objected to Descartes' failure in La Dioptrigue
to distinguish between the pressure that is the determination for motion and the speed of the movement, noting that
the determination could not have a speed.

81

Descartes'

response to Fermat was clear and to the point.

As far as
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Descartes was concerned, Fermat's objection was "contre mon
sens

&

contre la verite," since

cette determination ne peut etre sans quelque vitesse
bien qu'une meme vitesse puisse avoir diverses
determinations, & une meme determination etre jointe
a diverses vitesses.82
Whether Descartes conceives the light to be the 'action' or
movement, i.e., the transmission of light through the
different media, or simply the determination or pressure,
the light always has some finite measurable speed.

There

are certainly no indications that Descartes ever conceived
83
. ht to b e in
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When Descartes does speak about the speed of the movement of the light (cf. ftn. #61), he describes it as being
"tres prompte

&

fort vive".

"tres grande vitesse"

The light is a pressure having

(cf. ftn. #53).

These are real speeds

that can be conceived in terms of more or less, can fall
under the category of magnitude and can be analogous to
the extension of a body considered measurable and divisible.84

Again, we see Descartes in Principles describing

characteristics of light:

"Son action est extremement

prompte, elle separa presque en une instant toute la superfice de cette tache. 1185

These descriptions of light, plus

the fact that Descartes' espouses a medium theory of light
which entails differences in the speed of light, lend weight
to the opinion that Descartes believed the velocity of light
to be finite.
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Can Descartes give us a clearer picture of what he
understands by the action of the light when he speaka of its
instantaneity?

We know that the sun appears on a point of

the horizon and, in an instant illuminates the entire
hemisphere, even to the extreme points 9f the earth.

We

also know that light passes through different mediums and
reaches the earth in an instant, and when impeded, its
speed gets modified.

While there are variations in the

speed of light as it traverses to the earth, it still
remains true that the light and the reflection of its rays
on the earth are simultaneous events.

That simultaneity is

an essential characteristic of the light and its importance
is indicated in Descartes' letter to Beeckman.
When Beeckman proposed to Descartes that there was an
interval of time between the emission of the light from the
sun and the reception of its rays in the eyes, Descartes
responded,
elle fait voir manifestement qu'il n'y a pas d'intervalle ni de retard de ce genre entre l'instant ou la
lumiere sort d'un ob~et lumineux et l'instant ou elle
entre dans nos yeux. 6
The import of this cannot be underestimated.

On it rests

the whole of Descartes' philosophy:
Et vous aviez tellement confiance en votre experience
que vous declariez tenir pour fausee toute votre
Philosophie, s'il n'y avait pas un intervalle entre
l'instant ••• Je disais au contraire que, si on percevait un tel retard ce serait l'encroulement de
toute ma Philosophie.87
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The instant denies neither speed nor time.

It denies

only causal temporal priority which would demand a de~ay
between the emission of the rays of the sun and its reception
by the eyes.

There is no question that this is Descartes'

view:
Et pour la difficulte que vous trouvez en ce qu'elle
au mot instant; car il semble que vous le considerez
comme s'il nioit toute sorte de priorite en sorte
que la lumiere du Soleil puis ici etre produite sans
passer premierement par tout l'espace qui est entre
lui & nous; au lieu que le mot d'instant n'exclud
que la priorite du temps, & n'empeche pas que chacune
des parties inferieures du rayon ne soit dependante
de toutes les superieures, en meme facon que la fin
d'un mouvement successif depend de toutes ses parties
precedentes.88
What Descartes seems to be saying is that the light travels
so incredibly fast that one could observe no interval between
its transmission from the sun and its reflection on the
earth.

The instant excludes not only the 'before' but it

excludes the 'after' because it excludes the concept of
succession.

However, it does not exclude the 'befo~e• and

'after' absolutely, that is, in the sense that the instant
is without temporality.

What Descartes means is that the

emission of the sun's rays did not occur before and after
the rays on the earth were perceived.

Descartes clearly

points out that there is no time delay between the two
events.

The emission of the sun's rays and their reflection

on the earth are simultaneous events, and in no way does
the instantaneity of these events deny their temporality.
Simultaneity is a temporal concept that refers to
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events taking place at the same time. If I simultaneously
(at the same time)

juggle four balls, two balls in my right

hand and two balls in my left hand, that simultaneity does
not mean that the time in which I juggled the four balls
has no measurable and divisible duration.

It only means

that I did not juggle the two balls in my right hand before
I juggled the two balls in my left hand.

Clearly, the

juggling of the balls .is a simultaneous event that has
temporal duration, since the time I started the juggling
was before the time I finished.
Instantaneity is a characteristic of the transmission
of light and its reflection on the earth.

These events

take place at the same time, and that time, the instant,
is a measurable and divisible segment of time.

This is

made plain in the following text from the Principles:
[C]ar encore qu'il arrive quelquefois qu'elles se
trouvent disposees en meme sorte que celles qui sont
representees en cette figure, elles ne s'y arrestent
neanmoins que ce peu de temps _9!!'on nomme un instant
pource qu'elles sans cesse en action pour se mouvoir
ce qui est cause qu'elles continuent leur mouvement
sans interruption.89
To Hyperaspistes he writes, "on ne sauroit admettre meme
pendant l'instant le plus court ••• , 1190 clearly a description
of the instant as a segment of time that has some measurable
duration.
In defining the instant Descartes excludes the
priority of time, the instant does not exclude temporality.
In itself, it has duration, however brief that may be.
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Descartes presents us with a quantitative description of
the instant.

It is a "peu de temps", "le plus court".

Conceived in those terms, it may be included under the term
magnitude which is per se both measurable and divisible.
Although we may not be able to actually ~easure or divide
the instant, Descartes leaves us with the idea that it is
conceptually possible.

Any other interpretation does not

seem to be sustainable.
D. Discontinouous-Continuous Movement
We have seen that Descartes' physics comprehends the
world where everything is extended in one unity and everything depends on everything else.

Ceaselessly the world

is undergoing instantaneous mutations.

Yet, the variety

and multiplicity of the particular configurations and the
91
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What we do perceive is continuous movement measured by
passing time.
ceptible.
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The instantaneous mutations are imper-

This leads us to ask the question again, as we

did in the second chapter, whether or not time is discontinuous.

It is the position of Gueroult, Vigier, and others

that discontinuous time fundamentally conditions our
. .
93
understanding of the Cartesian physics.
The fact is,
however, that continuous time is the only kind of time that
is actually verifiable in the order of experience.

94

Therefore, it must be demonstrated that continuous time is
inconsistent with Descartes' mathematical physics.

This
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has not been done.
The fact that change takes place in the instant does
not, in itself, prove that the instants are discontinuous,
that is, that they are separate and independent in a manner
that causes a rupture which prevents a true continuity from
ever being realized.
Descartes seems to suggest that the instants are
continuous:
[Clar encore qu'il arrive quelquefois qu'elles se
trouvent disposees en meme sorte que celles qui sont
representees en cette figure, elles ne s'y arrestent
neanmoins que ce peu de temps qu'on nomme un instant,
pource qu'elles continuent leur mouvement sans
interruption.95
There are two possible interpretations.

When Descartes says

"sans interruption" he could mean there is no break in the
actual continuity as we would find in the case of a true
magnitude.

Or, Descartes could mean that there is no break

in the uniformity, that is, in the repetition of separate
instantaneous mutations.
Descartes' discussion of the sun would seem to discredit the second interpretation.

According to the laws of

nature the flame, like all bodies, having been once formed,
"continueroit d'etre" unless destroyed by some external
cause.

The flame, however, can be dissipated by the sur-

rounding air, and for this reason, there must be "renaissance
continuellement d'autre flame qui lui succede"; unlike the
flame, "nous voyons pas que le Soleil soit ainsi dissipe
par la matiere du Ciel qui l'environne; c'est pourquoi nous
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n'avons pas sujet de juger qu'il ait besoin de nourriture
comme la flamrne. 1196

Whereas the flame's continuous e~istence

can be interrupted, the Sun enjoys a continuous existence
without any interruption or possibility of non-existence
initiated by an external cause.

That c~ntinuity is not a

repetition of renewals of existence, it is a continuity that
is projected as an unbroken unity in which the Sun gives
off its own light without any cessation of its existence.
And time, as the measure of that duration, must share that
continuity.
While the texts suggest that time is continuous, in
pursuing the issue of the continuity of time, a broader
reference must be used since it is the critics' contention
that Descartes' physics is conditioned by discontinuous
time.

Hence, our reference must be Descartes' overall

philosophical project to construct a mathematical kind of
physics.

What must be determined is whether discontinuous

time is a condition for Descartes' mathematical physics.
The fact that it is mathematical, in which case the laws
of mathematics would apply to phenomena, does not, in itself,
prove the case for discontinuous time.

Insofar as mathe-

matics deals with quantities, it treats both discrete and
continuous quantity under the rubrics of arithmetic and
geometry.

We must look to see what Descartes had in mind

when he envisioned his physics.
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No doubt, in a world where everything is extended
matter, and movement is defined in terms of instantaneous
mutations, Descartes has fashioned a mathematical model to
which one could seemingly apply laws of mathematics.

The

Principles is Descartes' most precise and systematized
attempt to describe the physical universe and what he
believed took place within that universe.

In that treatise,

Descartes constructs a mathematical model to which one
could theoretically apply the laws of mathematics.

The

seven laws of impact found in the Principles are examples
of what Descartes might have had in mind.

These laws are

nothing more than mechanical rules governing the changing
relations among material particles.

The laws are dominated

by the principle that the same quantity of motion is conserved in each instant.

Given the factors of size and

speed, one can presumably determine how that motion will be
divided between the bodies in contact.

An example of what

Descartes means can be found in the fifth rule, which reads
in part:
Ainsi, apres que B auroit rencontre C, il iroit d'un
tiers plus lentement qu'auparavant, c'est a dire qu'en
autant de temps qu'il auroit pu parcourir auparavant
trois espaces, il n'en pourroit plus parcourir que deux.
Tout de meme si B etoit trois fois plus grand que C,
il ne lui transfereroit que la guatrieme partie de son
mouvement, & ainsi des autres.97
Do these rules of motion and Descartes' general statements about motion presume the discontinuity of the instants?
Gueroult contends it is the discontinuity of the instants
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that makes it possible for Descartes to consider the elementary movement as geometrical relations which, in each
instant, can be statistically determined.

98

If this were

true, then presumably the movement of a body in each instant
would seem to proceed in conformity with a mathematical
rule.

Moreover, to effect such a procedure, it would be

necessary to envision what H. Bergson refers to as a
'cinematographic' kind of movement. 99

This concept of

movement would be one in which each elementary instantaneous
'

mutation was viewed like a slide of a movie projector.

Each

movement, like the slide, would be distinct and separate.
The question seems to be whether Descartes' physics
was meant to be applied to specific cases; or whether it was
intended to provide general laws and mechanical models
about possible patterns of behavior.

If they are only

general laws, then the instant would not have to be discontinuous since statistical measurement of the particular
instants would not even come into question.

There is simply

no evidence that Descartes ever envisioned that his physics
could actually make it possible to statistically measure
the elementary instantaneous movements.

Given the nature

of the Cartesian physics, it would be impossible for us,
to actually formulate any simple mathematical laws regarding
particular instances.

The primary reason is that the world

is a plenum of contiguous bodies undergoing constant
change, hence, we cannot isolate phenomena.

Descartes was
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aware that in such a world we can never know all of the
determinate ways in which the parts of matter are divided
nor at what speeds they are moving, and, therefore, one
cannot formulate any mathematical laws regarding particular
phenomE;?na.

100

Nor can we dismiss the fact that the Principles were
intended to be only descriptive.

Therefore, whatever laws

are formulated cannot be used to prove anything.

The laws

yield only a conjecture about the likely patterns according
to which nature acts. 101

Descartes' aim is to show how

natural bodies could be made in terms of his mechanical
models, although one ought not to conclude that they are
really made in this fashion.
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E. Brehier and J. Collins

rightly point out that the Principles do not contain mathematically expressible laws.

Descartes' philosophy of nature,

then, is not intended to convey pure and absolute certitude
but only a moral certitude sufficient to increase our
practical grasp of the visible.
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While Descartes believed

that some general principles might be known with certitude,
he was forced to admit that in particular cases experiment
. vita
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.
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.
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.
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is

Certainly this

admission by Descartes does not leave us with the belief
that he ever intended his mathematical physics to function
in such a way as to ever be able to statistically determine
movements of particular bodies.

The conclusion we must

reach is that no evidence has been presented by others, nor
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found by us, that Descartes' physics is conditioned by
discontinuous time.

What we find is that continuous time

is totally compatible with the Cartesian world where
everything is moving "sans interruption."
There is little question that Descartes discusses
movement in terms of instantaneous elementary movements.
We have seen how he does this in the case of circular
movement and in his theory of the instantaneous transmission
of light.

Moreover, given that the nature of matter is

extension, one has clear evidence that Descartes envisioned
a mathematical kind of physics, one which always remained
within the bounds of human limitations.

Physical time is a

reality for Descartes, because it is a property of extended
substances and a descriptive feature of their duration.
Granted that the world is a plenum of extended substances,
nevertheless we observe these substances exist, and for
them to exist is to endure.

That duration which is analo-

· lOS as con t·inuous quan t·t
d
gous t o ex t ension
i y can b e measure.
And time is the measure.

Since duration is measurable it

is also divisible into moments, and thus duration has a
quantitative character to it.

Time, as a correlative of

duration, assumes that same character.

There is a continuity

and divisibility that is manifest in the world.
substances are ceaselessly undergoing change.

For extended
This is pos-

sible because they have a continuous duration that is
divisible, and the possibility of measuring duration and
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separating the moments always persists.
The condition for that measuring and dividing i~ the
thinking substance.

While time is a property of all sub-

stances, it is more.
time.

There is a psychological aspect of

It is the way in which we think about the duration

of substances.
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What does this mean?

First of all, it

means that the thinking substance can measure duration with
a temporal measure of moments, hours, days, years, etc.
Secondly, it means that it can divide the duration into
parts of 'before' and 'after' and temporally conceive of
these as one minute, two minutes, etc., or one year, two
years, etc.
More importantly, the thinking substance can focus
on any single moment that exists in an order of 'before'
and 'after' and describe what takes place in that space of
time.

Descartes has done this by providing us with an

account of how he perceives bodies to behave in an instant.
He has described how the action of light is transmitted,
and how that action is manifested in the instantaneous
elementary movements of circular motion.

Descartes has

recorded the events that have taken place in one moment of
time, the instant.
We have seen, then, that extension is a property of
material substances.

But time is a property of both

material and thinking substances.

Insofar as these sub-

stances endure, time can serve to measure their duration.
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Having seen how time functions in relation to material
substances, our dual perspective approach to time dictates
that we turn our attention to the thinking substance.

As

we examine time from this perspective, we must keep in
mind Descartes' metaphysical dualism.

We have seen that

Descartes has a coherent theory of time in his physics,
What we hope to find is a coherency between the 'time'
that measures the duration of the material substances and
the 'time' that measures the duration of thinking substances.
The material world is projected by Descartes as an
object of knowledge, and the duration of material substances
is manifested in terms of that purpose.

Descartes' meta-

physics of the thinking substance is designed to meet the
exigencies of his mathematical physics that requires an agent
of knowing.

Hence, the duration of the thinking substance

is fundamentally manifested in terms of its essential
nature as a subject whose cognitive activities establish
it as an agent of knowing empowered to attain some degree
of certitude about the phenomena in nature.

It is from that

dimension that we must consider the temporality of the
thinking substance as it unfolds in the mental events which
constitute its duration.
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had collided with C, its speed would be reduced by onethird; that is to say, B would then need as much time to
travel a distance of two feet as it previously did to travel
a distance of three feet.
Similarly, if B were three times
as large as C, it would transfer to Cone quarter of its
motion; and so on."
98 Gueroult, pp. 275, 278; cf. Gueroult's Etudes, p. 91.
99

Henri· Bergson, p.
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lOOPrin. II, 53, A.T. IX, p. 93; Prin. III, 46, A.T. IX,
p. 124; Prin. IV, 1, A.T. IX, p. 201; Prin. III, 83, A.T. IX,
p. 149.
lOlPrin. III, 4, A.T. IX, pp. 104-105; Prin. IV, 1,
A.T. I X ~ 149. Descartes' mathematical physics seems to
be somewhat of an anticipation of the modern quantum theory.
This theory proposes to formulate equations about the positions, motions, etc. of particles at one instant with
knowledge of the positions, motions, etc. of particles at
the next instant. At best, this yields a theory of probability. Cf. Arthur Eddington, The Philosophy of Science
(Cambridge 1958), pp. 89-105, for a detailed analysis of the
epistemological consequences of the quantum theory.
l0 2 Prin. II, 64, A.T. IX, p. 101; Prin. 204, 205, 206,
A.T. IX, pp. 323-324; cf. James Collins,Descartes' Philos22!:!Y of Nature (Oxford 1971), p. 74.
103 Emile Brehier, Histoire de la philosophie (Paris
1928), Vol. II, pp. 97ff.; cf. Collins, pp. 93ff.
l0 4 Disc. A.T. VI, pp. 63-64; Prin. II, 53, A.T. IX,
p. 93.
105 Ent. avec Burman, Pleiade, p. 1358.
106P rin.
.
I, 57, A.T. IX, p. 50.

CHAPTER IV
DURATION AS A TEMPORAL EVENT

Things have a knowable essence.

They are made up of a

particular number of constitutive elements; the cognition
of which can be absolutely certain. 1

However, as the

Discourse and Meditations both confirm, the discovery of
the existence and nature of the thinking substance is
epistemically prior to the discovery of all other things.
One of the purposes of these writings is to overthrow
skepticism by establishing that truth exists.

The other

purpose is to establish the efficacy of the thinking
substance as an agent of knowing durationally.

Endowed with

a faculty for attaining truth, the thinking substance constitutes the noetic foundation for all knowledge.

It is

possible to attain knowledge and "ainsi nous rendre cornrne
maistres

&

possesseurs de la Nature. 112

For these reasons,

one must analyze the efficacy of the thinking substance
as it reveals itself in temporal durations.
Not only is the thinking substance epistemically prior
to material substances, it is ontologically prior because,
unlike material substances, the thinking substance has an
intrinsic principle of action.

Defined as a substance who

thinks, wills, understands, believes, opposes and denies,
147
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the thinking substance is fundamentally a concrete person
and "le sujet de quelques actes."

3

Thinking is an action

and "toutes nos actions se font dans le temps. 114

The

temporality of the thinking substance is singularly manifested in terms of cognitive actions, and these actions
constitute the mental events that make up the temporal
duration of the thinking substance.
While the knower maintains his radical essential
distinction from things in the physical order, the knower
and known are correlative concepts which suggest that there
is some degree of affinity between the two kinds of substances.

Common to all substances are such properties as

their existence, unity, order and their duration.

5

The

common successive duration of all substances means that
things, like thought, exist.

Things in the physical order

have essential knowable components and the simultaneous
coexistence of the knower and known brings the knower in
contact with the known whereby the latter becomes a possible
object of knowledge.
It is incumbent on the knower to "accroitre la
lumiere naturelle de sa raison" so that he may reap the
fruits of scientific inquiry. 6

This scientific inquiry

ideally will lead to an intellectual vision that is imbued
with the same certitude and clarity characteristic of
mathematics.

Descartes' epistemology is intended to show

us how the mind can attain that degree of cognitive force
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precisely through durational knowledge.

For while the

truth is eternal, the actions by which the knower must come
to see the truth are temporal events in the duration of
the thinking substance.
A. Intuition as Durational
Descartes had a firm conviction that of all the
sciences mathematics alone furnishes us with an illustration
of self-evident and certain knowledge 7 which, if durational,
models all other durational knowledge.

Convinced that all

the sciences could be comprehended as one, Descartes
believed that whatever method was used in mathematics could
justifiably be used in every scientific pursuit. 8

The

dynamics of this method was the primary concern of Descartes'
earliest philosophical work which he entitled Rules for the
Direction of the Mind.

In it Descartes set down a method

for achieving self-evident knowledge in the sciences. 9
The method set down in the Rules is the one used in
the science of mathematics:

No science is acquired except

by mental intuition or deduction, for these acts constitute
the way to truth:
Pour ne tomber ensuite dans la meme erreur, nous allons
enumerer ici tousles actes de notre entendement, par
lesquels nous pouvons parvenir a la connaissance des
choses sans aucune crainte d'erreur - il n'y en a que
deux; l'intuition et la deduction.l 6
Although for the most part Descartes abandoned the use of
the term 'intuition', it is apparently not because he had
any problems with it.

In the original Latin version of the
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second Responses, Descartes refers to the "cogito, ergo
sum 11 as a

II

•
1 ici
• • men t is
• intuitu.
•
• 11 11
simp

Moreover, Descartes

continued to use the term "connaissance intuitive" in his
correspondence, a further indication that the term was not
limited to the Rules and that it captured the meaning
Descartes intended.

12

That meaning is projected in terms of a metaphor.
When Descartes speaks about intuitive knowledge we find him
clarifying it as "lumiere naturelle ou intuitus menti 11 • 13
The metaphoric implication attached to the term 'intuition'
is noteworthy.

What it indicates is that Descartes wishes

us to understand intuition as somewhat _analogous to physical
sight and to the action whereby we see things in the
physical order.
Descartes' entire philosophy is linked to his theory
of light.

In the physical order the action of light is

ontologically prior to all movement.

Analogously, in the

spiritual order the act of cognition of the "lumiere
naturelle" is the highest kind of action.

Intellectual

vision of "la faculte de connaitre" that "nous appelons
lumiere naturelle" is akin to sense knowledge.

14

The

action of the light is the cause of the light being seen on
the earth. 15

Analogously, it is through the action of the

"lumiere naturelle" that the knower comes to see the truth.
It is always a matter of seeing what is able to be seen with
the "lumiere naturelle".

In the order of experience, we
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know that the action of physical seeing is a temporal event
in which what is present is visible to the eye.

If

temporality is a feature of physical seeing, no less is it
a feature of intellectual vision.
Intuition as a method of correct thinking is a mental
event that takes place in time.

That time is the present

when the mind attends to the actual evidence.

It is always

a matter of seeing something in the "meme temps" and "non
successive 11 • 16

Successive time includes the past as well

as the future.

Intuition excludes those parts of time.

All that is seen is seen in a present time which is liberated
from forgetfulness and doubt.

These latter characterize

respectively the past that no longer exists and the future
that does not yet exist.
The "cogito" as a "simplici intuitu" is the primary
example of the temporality of intuition; "I am", "I exist",
is necesarily true all the time that I pronounce it or
conceive it. 17

Implicit in that intuition is the presence

of what is seen by the mind's eye.

Every time that I think,

I see that my thinking necessarily implies my existence.
The "cogito" as an intuition is a case of seeing that my
present thinking is the actual evidence of the necessity
of my present existence.

The existential aspect of intuition

is not, however, unique to the "cogito", it is an aspect of
all intuition as a mental vision.
present in the present time.

It is seeing what is

152
While time is fundamentally successive, it has also a
simultaneous aspect wherein things are said to exist at the
same time.

This coexistence makes it possible to see the

presence of a coexistent thing and to affirm its presence.
Just as in the physical order something must be present to
be seen, intellectual vision demands an actual object.
Something must be present to the understanding.

It is not

a question of spatial presence but of temporal presence.
The present measures the actual, namely, that which has
actual temporal existence.

To understand the present as that

part of time in which intuition takes place is to understand
it always in relation to some actual object which is
'present' to the mind and to which the mind can attend
reflectively.

What is clear is what is present to an

attentive mind:
Par intuition j'entends, non pas le temoignange
changeant des sens ou le jugement trompeur d'une
imagination qui compose mal so.n objet, mais la
conception d'un esprit pur et attentif, conception
si facile et si distincte qu'aucun doute ne reste
sur ce que nous comprenons; ou, ce que est la meme
chose, la conception ferme d'un esprit pur et
attentif, qui nait de la seule lumiere de la
raison et qui, etant plus simple, est par suite
plus sure que la deduction.18
Intellectual vision obeys the same laws as physical
vision.

If something is present to the faculty of sight the

latter necessarily sees what is there.

In the same way, the

mind is of such a nature that it cannot help assent to what
is present to it.

"L'entendement ne peut jamais etre trompe

par une experience, s'il se borne a avoir !'intuition nette
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de ce qui se present a lui. 1119

While the self-evidency of

the truth characterizes intuition, something more is s_uggested in the above Rule.

There is, on the part of the

understanding, a certain passivity; it must affirm what
is there present to it.
Yet, intuition is a form of thinking and thinking is
an action analogous to sensible vision since "chacun peut
•

~

• t ui• t ion
•
I• 1
• t e. 1120
par in
qui
exis

On the one hand,

Descartes maintains that thinking is an action.

On the

other, it remains true that the understanding is passive
since it cannot deny the truth when the evidence is present
to it.

Descartes finds no difficulty with the disparity.

The power of knowing, Descartes tells us, is sometimes
passive and another time active, sometimes the seal and
sometimes the wax.

21

Like a seal that can receive diverse

figures, the soul can receive diverse ideas and the receiving
is not properly an action but a passion, "qu'il n'y a ses
volontez qui soient des actions. 1122
man is simply to think.

True; the nature of

And yet, willing, understanding,

imagining, sensing, etc. are just different ways of thinking
and all belong to the same indivisible soui.

23

The Cartesian method is grounded on the efficacy of
the thinking substance as an agent of knowing.

However, the

essence of that method resides in attention in which the
determining element is the will.

The seat of all actions is

the will which must adapt the attention to the true ideas.
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Attention is that methodical factor which conditions the
pure intellectual activity of the mind since attentio~ is
necessary to avoid the dispersion of the mind over too many
irrelevant objects.
sensible vision.

Intellectual vision functions like

In the physical order, if I see too many

things at one time, I see them confusedly.

For, in order to

see them clearly and distinctly, I must concentrate on only
a few things at one time.
for intuition.

24

The same conditions prevail

We must learn how to employ our mental

faculty of sight in the same way as we employ our eyes.
If we focus our attention on a multitude of objects we
become confused and cannot see them distinctly.

Therefore,

we cannot allow ourselves to become distracted by various
objects, but must attend to the simple constitutive elements
that we judge to be true.

25

It is a question of restricting

our attention to the relevant evidence present to the mind.
Thus, I come to have an intuition of the essence of the wax
which is "bien claire

&

distincte, comme elle est a present,

selon mon attention se porte plus ou moins aux choses qui
sont en elle,

&

dont elle est composee."

26

My present

attention is then the necessary condition for all truth.
The general principles and axioms (these include mathematical
propositions and ideas such as God and mind) cannot be denied
by anyone who regards them attentively.

27

When the will

obliges the understanding to focus its attention on that
which is present, the understanding must affirm the truth of
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the evidence.

It is not without reason, then, that Descartes

was disposed to consider that the highest perfection of man
is his ability to act freely or through the will.

28

The soul, without restriction, can extend itself to
any object in the present.

What becomes present in the

present is initiated by the will which goads the understanding to attend to the true ideas.

The actual evidence is

present only in the present, and simultaneous with the
presence of the evidence is the affirmation of truth.

The

present measures the actual existence of the knower, the
object known and (simultaneously) the actuality of truth.The existential aspect of intuition cannot be thought of
apart from the temporal aspect because actuality is confined
to the present time.
present.

What is true is always temporally

This temporal aspect of intuition is clearly

brought out by Descartes in Rule Eleven:
I l a fallu proceder ainsi, parce que nous exigeons
deux conditions de l'intuition, savoir; que la
proposition soit comprise clairement et distinctement,
et, de plus, tout entiere dans le meme temps et non
successivement.29
One of the features of intuition is its non-successive
character.

What is comprehended by the mind is grasped in

its entirety all at one time.

In excluding succession from

intuitive thought, Descartes manages to imbue intuition with
a certitude that is self-evident in the presence of actual
true ideas.

With the exclusion of successive time, there is

the exclusion of a past that no longer exists and a future
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that does not yet exist.

And what does not actually exist

cannot be seen clearly and distinctly.

Descartes giv~s us

examples of those propositions that the understanding
intuits.

"Chacun peut voir par intuition qu'il existe,

qu'il pense, que la figure est unie a l'etendue .•. "

30

It

is always in terms of the present tense that Descartes
speaks about intuition.
peut etre imparfaite
can be "bien claire

&
&

The perception of the wax, "laquelle
confuse, comme elle etoit auparavant,"

distincte, comme elle est a present. 1131

Contrary to some historians who contend that intuition
takes place in nontemporal, discontinuous instants, 32 intuition takes place in a present that has duration.

Intui-

tion is an event, and all events are characterized as
indivisible units from beginning to end.

As indivisible

units, events can be distinguished from other events.

The

Civil War is an historical event that is distinct and other
than the historical event of the American Revolution.

Both

of these events are indivisible units although the time they
started was before the time when they finished.
each of the events has its own extended duration.

Moreover,
Similarly,

intuition is a mental event that has some duration to it.
When Descartes characterizes intuition as non-successive, we are to understand it in the following manner:
If I am presently moving my arm at the same time that I am
walking and not successively, for Descartes this means that
I did not move my arm before I started walking.

It does not
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mean that no time had passed while I performed these two
actions. However, if I think of one thing (A) and then (B),
I have not thought of them at the same time, but successively.
I thought of (A) before (B) and of (B) after (A).

Just so,

if I understand one thing as a whole, that is, no understanding of part (A) before my understanding of part (B),
and of the whole (AB) after understanding (B), this does not
mean that the time span did not begin before it ended.

Nor

does it mean that there was no time span from when I began
and when I finished.

It means that I did not understand one

part before and then another part afterwards.
Thus, while time as a property of all events is fundamentally successive, there is also a simultaneous aspect to
it in which things are said to coexist at the same time.
The perfect example of that simultaneity is in the intuition
of the primary truth, the "cogito".

One of the conditions

for intuition is that the proposition is known entirely all
at once.

Descartes adheres to this condition in the case of

the primary truth.

Descartes stresses the point that he who

says "ego cogito, ergo sum" does not deduce existence from
thinking by means of a syllogism, rather it is known by a
II

•
1•1c1• mentis
• in
• t uitu.
• 11 33
simp

It is not a work of reasoning

by which I first know the proposition I think and then I
know the proposition I exist.

"Je pense, done je suis" is

"une connaissance intuitive" known entirely and all at once
per se. 34

At the same time I conceive the necessary
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simultaneity between my thinking and my existence.

This

truth is apprehended by a simple act of mental vision without any lapse of time.
While the "cogito" is a psychological event, it is at
the same time an intellectual event.

The knowledge of self

is known with more truth and certainty than is the wax, also
. t'inct 1 y. 35
more c 1 ear 1 y an d d is

Th e no t·ion o f th e sou 1

arises from an inner experience of one's own thought.

Its

certitude, however, goes beyond the perimeters of an individual subjective experience.

"L'ame ne se concoit que par

" a primi
. 't'ive no t'ion k nown per se. 36
1 , en t en d ement pur,

Th e

nature of spiritual substances is to think, yet not all
thought is pure intellection.

Descartes makes the distinc-

tion between direct thoughts such as the simple thoughts of
infants which are the feelings of pain, and the reflective
thoughts which occur when an adult feels something and
simultaneously perceives that he has not felt it before.
This latter perception, Descartes says, "je l'appelle
reflexion et je la rapporte a l'entendement seu1. 1137
Reflection, as an attribute of pure intellection, is
integral to the intuitive process.

The understanding needs

"une reflexion et attention particuliere" focused on the
objects present to it.

38

The objects are only mediately

seen as the mind sees itself.

Intuition calls for a "la

reflexion de l'entendement sur lui meme": and looking at
itself, the mind sees the actual evidence that must be
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.
d • 39·
af f irme

The term "reflexion" is appropriate since

Descartes identifies the mind as "intuitus mentis" ou "la
1umiere naturelle 11

40
•

In the physical order reflection is

the return of light waves from a surface.

In the spiritual

order reflection is the mind turning back on itself to see
what is simultaneously existing within the mind itself.

This

reflection illuminates what is present to the understanding,
and that illumination is nothing more than "une connoissance
intuitive" or a "simplici mentis intuitu" of the truth of
the object present to the "la lumiere naturelle."
In the moment of intuition there is the triple affirmation of the actuality of the soul's existence, the existence
of the object present, and the existence of truth.

To

exist, for Descartes, is to endure, and that duration is
.

measure d b y time.

41

Insofar as the duration of something is

actual, it is measured by a 'present' that envelops some
duration.

Simultaneous with the reflection of the mind on

itself is its affirmation of the soul's existence by which
the soul comes into contact with its own temporality.

In its

act of thinking the soul necessarily affirms the selfevidence of its own existence since the substance only
becomes aware of itself through its actions.
As the noetic foundation for all truth, the knower is
always implicitly aware of his own temporality.

The soul

always thinks, and in the very moment of thinking there is
no thought in us of which the soul fails to be actually
conscious.

42

Consciousness is not simply a psychological
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event; as an instance of pure intellection it has noetic
implications:
Etre conscient, c'est assurement penser et reflechir
sur sa pensee, ... et toutes les fois qu'il lui plait
reflechir sur ses pensees, ainsi, etre consciente
de sa pensee.43
The consciousness of one's own thought as an instance of
pure intellection implicitly contains the consciousness of
.
t h e su b s t ance as th e sub Ject
o f ac t"ions. 44

Hence, the

consciousness of oneself is integral to the conscious
reflection on one's thought and is, in itself, an instance
of pure intellection.

Further, in the awareness of the

substance's existence as the subject of actions, there is
alw~ys contained the awareness of one's own temporality
since all actions have a temporal dimension to them.

It is,

in fact, the temporal durative aspect of thought that
Descartes insists on in his letter to Burman:
Il est faux aussi qu'une pensee se fasse en un instant,
puisque toutes mes actions se font dans le temps, et
on peut dire que je continue et iersevere dans la meme
pensee pendent uncertain temps. 5
One of these actions is the intuition of the soul's own
existence.
In the Cartesian metaphysics the soul's temporality
can be seen by a single mental intuition.
~

"Je pense, done

suis" constitutes the primary truth from which all other

truths can be deduced.

46

The primary truth is essentially

a proposition about temporal existence.

That proposition is

not only a psychological event, it is raised to the level of
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pure intellection as a "simplici mentis intuitu" seen by the
"lumiere naturelle" (cf. ftn. #33).

The intuition of my own

existence is an awareness of my existence in time.

"Je suis,

j'existe est necessairement vraie, toutes les fois que je
. 1 a concois
. en mon esprit.
.
.. 47
la prononce, ou que Je

proposition is seen in its entirety all at once.

h
Tat

And the

thought by which I see the necessary simultaneity of my
thought and of my existence is an action that takes place
in time.

It is an action in which I can continue to

persevere.
While my past existence can only be inferred through
recollection and my future existence is in doubt, my present
existence is certain every time I presently pronounce or
conceive it.

The thought by which I know myself as pres-

ently existing envelops some duration, "je peut dire que je
continue et persevere dans la meme pendant uncertain
temps. 1148

As I persevere in my thought and am conscious of

my thought I, as the subject of this mental action, continue
to persevere.
existence.

I am always being "conserve presentement" in

49

In the order of discovery the Cogito forms the foundation for all other truths.

It is my present existence that

conditions all intuitional acts.

In the intuition of that

first truth we find the primary instance of what Descartes
means by intuition and the temporal character that attaches
itself to intuition.

The present awareness of the empirical

temporality of the self is, at the same time, the affirmation

r
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of the temporality of thought.

Intuition is not conditioned

by a discontinuous, durationless moment.

All intuition takes

place in a present enduring moment that forms an unbroken
continuity with other moments.

The Cogito, or the primary

intuition, is a perfect example of this.
The Cogito is not an isolated thought absolutely independent of all other thought.

While Descartes declares

that the Cogito is not a result of syllogistic reasoning,
he admits that the Cogito implies and is contingent on
previously known notions:
Je pense done je suis, est la premier & la plus certaine
qui se present a celui qui conduit ses pensees par ordre,
je n'ai pour cela ni qu'il ne fallut savoir auparavant
ce que c'est que pense, certitude, existence et que pour
penser il faut etre & autre choses semblables.50
Moreover, the Cogito has a discursive aspect to it.

Descartes

unequivocally maintains that this primary intuition is an
inference that presupposes a premise:
Avant cet~e conclusion: je pense, done je suis, on peut
avoir connaissance de cette majeur: tout ce qui pense
est, parce qu'en realite elle est anterieure a ma
conclusion et que ma conclusion s'appui sur elle ••• Mais
je n'ai pas toujours une connaissance expresse et
explicite de cette anteriorite, et j'ai connaissance
auparavant de ma conclusion, parce que je ne fais
attention qu'a dont j'ai l'experience en moi meme
savoir; je pense, done je suis tandis que je ne fais
pas aussi bien attention a cette notion generale: tout
ce qui pense est; en effet, comme j'en ai averti, nous
ne separons pas ces propositions des choses singulieres,
mais nous les considerons en elles.51
There is no express and explicit appreciation of the temporal
distance of the major premise because it is implicit and
integrated into the present intuition.

As the above two
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texts demonstrate, the Cogito is constituted by, and an
outgrowth of, elements that are distinct, though inseparable
from the present intuition.
Intuition is an instance of present conscious thinking.
Here is what Descartes says about consciousness:
Etre consciente c'est assurement penser et reflechir
sur sa pensee, mais que cela ne puisse se faire tant
que subsiste la pensee precedente, c'est faux parce
que, comme nous l'avons deja vu, l'ame peut penser
plusieurs choses en meme temps, perseverer dans sa
pensee, et toutes les fois qu'il lui plait reflechir
sur ses pensees, ainsi, etre consciente de sa pensee.52
The Cogito is the ultimate manifestation of what it means
to be conscious since it is the consciousness of one's own
existence.

That conscious thought involves reflection that

takes in several elements which are retained in the present
field of consciousness.

As Beyssade and C. Troisfontaines

rightly observe, the Cogito is a collection of simple
truths and the Cogito would lose its present evidence if
one separated it from its reasons.

53

The reflective nature of intuition demands a present
field of consciousness that includes the immediate past.
At the same time it is apparent that present consciousness
extends itself to include the immediate future.

Two thoughts

come together in the intuition, "je pense" and "je suis".
The "je suis" must be anticipated in order to form a single
simple proposition that first enunciates the "je pense"
before (done) the "je suis".

The cognitive operations of

retention and anticipation coalesce in the present which
contains the two temporal modaliti·es of the immediate past
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and immediate future.

Each of the present moments can only

be conceived as an enduring moment that is perpetually and
necessarily connected with the other moments to form an
unbroken continuity.

To be aware that "je suis" is to be

aware that I exist in time, and time, for Descartes, is
continuous.
The edifice of science is built on truth that remains
eternal.

Yet the mental events by which the knower comes

to see these truths are temporal.

These temporal events

constitute the highest expressions of the essential nature
of the thinking substance whose duration is qualitatively
measured by a 'present' in which the truth is seen.

However,

these present intuitions form but one link in .the long chain
of reasoning that culminates in an ordered nexus of intuitions.

Reason is a dynamic operational principle which

brings various intuitions together in a single, all-inclusive
intuition.

In the deductive operation we are confronted

with another way in which the thinking substance manifests
its own temporality as an agent of knowing.
B. Deduction as Durational
There are only a few pure and simple facts that are
known per~, all the others are deduced from them either
.
d iate
.
1 y or proxima
. t e 1 y. S 4
imme

Th ere is
. a psyc h o 1 ogica
. 1

factor in the inferential process, the movement of the mind:
La deduction .•• ne parait pas se faire tout entiere
dans le meme temps, mais elle implique uncertain
mouvement de notre esprit.55
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Descartes provides an example of simple deduction:

2 and 2

equal 3 and 1, 2 and 2 equal 4, therefore 3 and 1 equal 4. 56
As it turns out, however, deduction is not always as simple
as deducing a few terms.

More often it is complex and in-

.
th e name o f enumera t·ion. 57
d an d receives
vo 1 ve,

In the

process of enumeration the mind repeats the steps already
deduced.

This accomplishes three goals.

First of all, there is the ultimate goal to arrive at
a certain and indubitable knowledge:
Pour achever la science, il faut parcourir par un
mouvement continu et ininterrompu de la pensee toutes
les choses qui se rapportent a notre but et chacun
d'elles en particulier, ainsi que les embrasser dans
une enumeration suffisante et ordonne.58
Secondly, in complex cases where the conclusion is remote
we might have to rely on memory to remember the first and
intermediate steps.
fail;
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However, memory is weak and liable to

therefore, we must reduce our dependence on memory

by reviewing the steps repeatedly through a rapid movement
of the mind.

This second goal of enumeration, diminishing

the role of memory, is conjoined to the third goal of
enumeration as a temporal event:
as a whole at one time. 60

namely, to see the series

In essence, it is an attempt to

reduce the time factor so that what was once apprehended
successively is now apprehended simultaneously.
Descartes provides instructions for the mind to follow
in applying the enumeration method:
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Par exemple, si j'ai reconnu tout d'abord par differentes operations quel rapport il ya entre les
grandeurs A et B, ensuite entre Bet C, puis entre
C and D, et enfin entre D et E, je ne vois pas pour
cela quel rapport il ya entre A et E, et je ne
peux pas l'apercevoir d'apres ceux qui sont deja
connus, a moins de me les rappeler tous. Ainsi je
les parcourrai plusieurs fois d'un mouvement continu
de l'imagination qui, dans le meme t~mps, doit avoir
!'intuition de chaque chose et passer a d'autres
jusqu'a ce que j'aie appris a passer du premier au
dernier assez rapidement pour ne laisser presqu'aucun
role a la memoire et avoir, semble-a-til, !'intuition
de tout a la fois, on corrige aussi la lenteur de
l'esprit et d'une certaine maniere on etend sa
capacite.61
The purpose of enumeration is not to acquire new premises or
to infer anything new from previously acquired premises.

It

is a method of reviewing and repeating what has already been
deduced.

The repetitive process merely facilitates and

strengthens the memory.
C'est qu'en effet la memoire, dont nous avons dit que
depend la certitude des conclusions qui comprennent plus
de choses que nous n'en pouvons saisir en une seule
intuition, etant fugitive et faible, il faut la
rafraichir et l'affermir par ce mouvement continue et
repete de la pensee.62
Two points are worth noting.

In the first place, it

is apparent that Descartes never believed one could totally
eliminate the role of memory in a deductive process that was
heterogeneous and complicated.

Although he acknowledged its

weakness, nevertheless he proposed that memory could be
strengthened so that, nothing being forgotten, we would seem
to have a vision of the whole all at one time.

The repeti-

tive process, then, brings longer and longer sections of the
deduction chain within intuitional grasp.

I must run over
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the steps so rapidly that there is nothing that falls out of
the range of the present intuition and the whole seems to be
grasped all together at one time.
By the faculty of memory we distinguish past time,
that which was formerly or 'before'.

If we read the texts

closely, we see that Descartes recognizes two decidedly
different functions of memory, that of remembering and that
of retaining.

Concomitant with the act of remembering, one

recognizes that the remembered object was perceived 'before'
.
. now b eing
.
. d anew again.
.
63
an d tha t it
is
perceive

According

to this view of Descartes', to remember something is to
~-present a 'before' that has slipped out of consciousness
because of an intrinsically feeble memory.
The goal of enumeration is not to eliminate the role of
memory but to shift the role of memory from its function
of remembering to its function of retaining.

The faculty

of memory perceives the 'before' as either remote or
proximate.

When the 'before' has vanished from consciousness

and must be remembered or ~-presented it may be said to be
remote since it is removed in time from the present.

The

'before' is proximate when it is integrated into the present
consciousness by the memory which retains what has gone
before.

Enumeration serves to transpose the remote 'before'

into the proximate 'before' so that the remote 'before' as
an object to be remembered becomes the proximate 'before'
which is retained by memory as a part of present consciousness.

The 'before' that is retained is not re-presented, it

168
is 'present' in the mental field of present consciousness.
As we have seen, what is demanded in enumeration is
"uncertain mouvement de la pensee, qui voit chaque chose
en meme temps par une intuition attentive et qui passe aux
autres."
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The thread of continuity on which the certitude

of the conclusion is premised can only be unbroken if the
antecedent falls within the range of the present span of
consciousness.
into operation.

Here the role of memory as retainer comes
Concerning enumeration, Descartes holds that

"sa certitude depend dans une certain mesure de la memoire,
qui doit retenir les jugements, portes sur chacun des points
enumeres pour tirer d'eux tous un jugement unique. 1165

As

Descartes clearly indicates, the role of memory is not to
remember or re-present a remote 'before' that has slipped
out of consciousness.

The process of enumeration serves to

strengthen the memory so that it can retain the proximate
'before' "as present" within the intuitional grasp.

Hence,

Descartes counts "la memoire aussi ample au aussi present"
as one of the indispensible qualities which serve to perfect
the mind.
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Enumeration has a deductive and intuitive aspect to it.
Insofar as enumeration demands an uninterrupted movement
from one proposition to another, it is deduction.

Insofar

as the deduction forms a series of self-evident propositions
that are apprehended intuitively, it is intuition.

67

One

point of view stresses the immediacy and self-evidency of
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each of the propositions, and the other stresses the inferential aspect.

The successive movement of the min4 always

encompasses an integration of present intuitions because
each of the intuitions always includes its antecedents
retained by the memory.
A necessary adjunct to that memory is the will which
determines those objects to be retained and those to be
excluded from the present intuition:
Une pluralite d'objets ne peut aider l'entendement a
avoir l'intuition distincte de chaque chose. Mais
pour extraite quelque chose d'une pluralite d'objets,
ce qu'il faut souvent faire, il faudra retrancher
des idees qu'on a des choses tout ce que n'exigera pas
l'attention du moment, afin que le reste puisse etre
plus facilement garde dans la memoire.68
The inferential process is not an arbitrary compilation of
random facts.

The selectivity of objects to be retained

in the present field of attention is logically determined
by what has preceded it in the chain of reasoning.

The key

to the Cartesian method is order.
Turning to mathematics as the ideal science, Descartes
finds that the secret of mathematics resides in order.
Primarily, mathematics is concerned with proportions or
relations between things and the order in which they are
arranged and deduced from one another. 69

Attempting to

reach the same degree of clarity and cognitive force that
characterize mathematics, Descartes applies the mathematical
method of order as the principal ingredient in his own
method:
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Toute la methode consiste dans l'ordre et la disposition des choses vers lesquelles il faut tourner le
regard de l'esprit, pour decouvrir quelque verite.
Or nous la suivrons exactement, si nous ramenons ·
graduellement les propositions compliquees et obscures aux plus simples, et si ensuite, partant de
l'intuition des plus simples, nous essayons de nous
elever par les memes degres a la connaissance de
toutes les autres.70
As a reviewing process enumeration functions to
strengthen the retentive power of memory.

However, because

the mind can have several things before it at the same time
it is important to direct the flow of ideas and retain only
those that contribute to a logically ordered nexus of
truths.
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There is a necessary link between the antecedent

and consequent.

They so depend on one another that it is

impossible for either to change while the other remains
unchanged. 72

The necessary interdependency means that the

deduction of a single fact is conditioned by a number of
other facts that involve one another.
more certain than the premises.

The conclusion is no

Hence, if the logical

sequential order is subverted or a link of the chain is
omitted, the certitude of the conclusion is threatened.

73

Since the goal of enumeration as a form of deduction is
to intuit the whole as a synthesis of necessarily connected
terms, the inclusion of every term is vital.

The point of

beginning and the point of ending is intuition, and each of
the steps within the serial intuition is itself an intuition
necessarily li~ked to its neighbor.

One of the characteristic

features of enumeration is the immediacy and self-evidency
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contained in each of the intuitions.

The intellectual

illation logically constitutes an uninterrupted sequence of
self-evident data in which the antecedent is contained in
the consequent being presently intuited.

While each intui-

tion contains the antecedent, it does not contain it as a
'before' that no longer exists.

The antecedent is retained

"as present" within the present span of attention.
Each term in the process is simultaneously both an
antecedent and a consequent since each is related to the term
'before' and the term 'after'.

However, insofar as the

antecedent and consequent are contained in the present there
is, in truth, no past which has ceased to exist and no future
which is yet to exist.
present.

There is only the all-inclusive

The temporal goal of enumeration is to reduce the

time-span and to ideally bring the succession to a quasisimultaneity where the whole seems to be grasped all at once.
The time is diminished in proportion to the extension of the
present span of attention.

The repetitive process facili-

tates the reduction of the time as the memory is strengthened
to retain more and more objects in the present range of
attention.

Enumeration is the prescription which remedies

the deficiencies of memory and contributes to extending
the amplitude of the mental field of attention:
Apres que nous avons eu !'intuition de quelques propositions simples, si nous en deduisons quelque autre,
il est utile de les parcourir toutes d'un mouvement
de pensee continue et ininterrompu, de reflechir a
leurs relations, et, autant que cela est possible de
concevoir distinctement plusieurs choses a la fois.74
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There are three salient points contained in the passage.

The first is that the thread of continuity cannot be

broken by an interrupted movement.

This presumes that there

is a constituted fusion or unity between the diverse mental
acts.

Secondly, the unity is the creation of the under-

standing via the attentive reflection of the mind.

The

latter, at the same time, sees both the relation between
the antecedent and consequent as well as the distinction
between them.

Thirdly, the time span of the intuition must

be long enough to allow the mind to reflect on the distinction and the bonds that mutually relate the two propositions.
The time required must be long enough "a reflechir avec
sagacite aux moindres choses que l'on a precedernrnent
percues. 1175

The attention that Descartes prescribes is

equivalent to a "mediation attentive" on what has been
retained in the memory, "il faut moins les retenir par la
memoire que les distinguer par penetration d'esprit. 1176
Descartes' first dictate in Rule IX is to perform
the inferential process so that the movement of the mind is
uninterrupted.

Movement of even the thinking substance can

generally be conceived as an action or activity.

In the

case of enumeration, the action is one of concatenated
reasoning which synthesizes the separate mental acts into a
unity when the thinking substance perceives the binding
essential relationship between the implicitly distinct terms.
Enumeration is a repeated process.

First, I find out by a

173
single intuition the relation between A and B, then Band C,
then C and D and then D and E.

Then I run over allot these

several times in a continuous and uninterrupted movement so
that ultimately I see the relation between A and E.

It is

possible to do this because, as I run over all of the single
intuitions I have "dans le meme temps ••• l'intuition de ch~que
chose et passer d'autres" until I have "l'intuition de tout
a la fois. 1177

The continuity and rapidity of the movement

enables the mind to keep within the present attention-range
all the antecedents and consequents.

In the ultimate

intuition where one sees the relation between A and E, four
separate mental acts come together simultaneously.
No doubt, as Descartes admits, while we can view more
than one thing au a time, we cannot view a multitude of
particuliar things at the same time.

78

Just as the eye is

unable to distinguish a multitude of objects at the same
time, neither is the mind able to distinguish a multitude of
things.

However, through an effort of attentive reflection,

the mind with its limited field of consciousness can apprehend
simultaneously several ideas such as some simple premises and
their immediate consequences.

There is the mental field

that makes it possible to transpose a plurality into a unity
wherein four acts of thought come together simultaneously.
The mental field is manifested when the mind attends to and
grasps both the antecedent and consequent.

At the same

time that the mind is attending to one thing, it is reflecting
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on "lien qui unit chacun d'eux a ses voisins, cela suffira
pour que nous disions aussi que nous avons vu comment .le

•
. au premiere.
.
n79
dernier
es t 1 ie
Enumeration strengthens the power of the mind to
expand that limited mental field of atte~tion so that it
can encompass as many things as possible at the same time.
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By the distention of consciousness the attentive mind bridges
the gap from one term to another.

Each time the mind re-

peats the enumeration process more and more things are seen
simultaneously.

The discrete intuitions which were

originally intuited as a successive series of terms ordered
one to another as 'before' and 'after' respectively, past
and future, are ultimately integrated into the present
intuition that grasps the whole at one time.
That terminal intuition is analogous to the perception
of a continuous magnitude in which there are no actual parts,
yet which always implicitly contains potential parts.

The

parts are subsumed by the whole through a process of synthesis.

If we look at how the imagination functions in the

perception of a magnitude we come to a clearer idea of the
dynamics of the process of synthesis effected by the understanding.

There are two reasons that justify using the

comparison.

First of all, imagination is a mental action

included under the category of thought.

Secondly, there

is Descartes' thinking regarding the use of mathematical
symbols.

It is possible, Descartes maintains, that when we
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are attempting to understand proportions or relationships
between things, regardless of the subject matter, we can
use geometric figures to aid us in understanding the unity
that exists between things. 81
The unity that is effected in the simultaneous intuition of the whole has a correspondent operation in mathematics.

That operation is addition.

In addition we add one

part to another until eventually we reach the whole.

In

addition, we can conceive the subject under the form of a
line so that we add one segment to another until we reach
the whole that is now perceived as a continuous magnitude.
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Addition is fundamentally a process of synthesis effected
by the imagination which creates the continuous magnitude
by uniting one segment to the other.
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Visually, that

synthesis is demonstrated in the following manner:
First we consider the segment (a)
(b)
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And we obtain (c)
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In the original perception (a) and (b) were ordered to each
other as 'before' and 'after'.

First I consider (a) then

(b), that is, I consider them successively.

As the imagina-

tion moves along, it bridges the span and the order is
dissolved.

(a) and (b) are no longer perceived as distinct

successive segments but are joined to form (c), a continuous
magnitude that implicitly contains (a) and (b).

In the
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perception of that magnitude there is no longer the question
of position or order of parts since there are no actual
parts.

(a) and (b) exist simultaneously as (c)

The succession is reduced to simultaneity.
What is present to the imagination is an unbroken line
which is the product of its own inventive effort.

That same

imaginative power of the mind can make present what is not,
in itself, actually present.

The triangle that I see with

my mind's eye is not present.

Rather, "je considere ces trois

lignes comme present par la force
mon esprit. 1184

&

application interieure de

The triangle is made present through the

medium of the imaginative power.

As the imagination makes

the triangle present to the mind, similarly, the imagination
also makes present a continuous magnitude, a whole without
parts.

This is does through a synthetic operation.
In deduction we find an analogous case.

deduction comprises a nexus.

The order in

This synthesis of all the

discrete mental operations that form the chain of concatenated reasoning can only be effected through the meditative
effort of attention.

The simultaneous intuition of the whole

is conditioned by a mental field of consciousness which joins
all of the antecedents and consequents in the chain.

The mind

must have before it 'as present' the antecedents and consequents which are continuously being integrated just as the
imagination, in the process of addition, has present before
it the parts that it adds to form the continuous magnitude.
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Insofar as the antecedents and consequents were
originally discrete mental operations, they were forme~ into
a successive series in which each of the terms was related
to the other as 'before' or 'after'.

From the temporal

dimension their position in the long chain of reasoning could
be conceived as past or future.

Once the antecedent had been

intuited it became past, and the consequent yet to be intuited was, in respect of that antecedent, future.

The

ultimate intuition, however, does not view the antecedents
and consequents as 'before' or 'after'.

As that order is

dissolved, so, too, is the past and future as 'past' and
'future'.

The past and future are integrated and contained

in a field of presence.
Through a synthetic operation the antecedents and consequents, the past and future, are continuously being
integrated into the present intuition.

Each time that the

enumeration process is repeated, the antecedents and the
consequents'
nounced.

'presence' in the present becomes more pro-

Hence, in the ultimate intuition whereby the mind

sees the relationship between A and E, the terms in the long
chain of reasoning are so 'present' that no longer is the
repetitive process necessary.

The culmination of the

process, the intuition of an organic whole, presupposes that
the field of attention has been expanded so that it can
encompass all of the terms at one time.

No link in the

chain is outside of the present range of attention.
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We were able to see how the synthetic operation was
manifested in the process of addition whereby the segments
were added together to form an unbroken whole perceived as
an extended line.

The perception of a melody provides

another example of the dynamics of the process of deduction.
There is a striking resemblance between the operation
integral to deduction and that found in the perception of a
melody.

Both in the case of deduction and in the perception

of a melody, it is always a question of integrating parts
to form a cohesive whole.

Descartes' treatise on music

illustrates how the synthetic operation results in the
perception of a melody as a whole.
The basis of music is sound and the attributes of
sound are primarily two:

its differences of duration or

time and its differences of tension from high to low.
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Hence, we are dealing with relations and proportions between
things, and this is exactly what the mathematician treats.
There is a basis of similarity between the hearing of a
melody and the process of deduction.

First of all, in both

cases there cannot be a multitude of objects in question.
When it comes to the hearing of sounds there cannot be a
profusion of sounds which would fall on the senses in too
complicated or too confused a fashion so that the melody
could not be distinctly perceived.

86

Analogously we know

that in deduction the mind can see distinctly only a few
objects at one time; a multitude of objects would cause
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.
.
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confusion and ambiguity.

The second point of similarity is that in a melody the
perception of a pure and simple consonance depends not only
upon the qualities of each simple unit, but also upon the
resonance of all the component elements ~ogether.
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This

corresponds to what Descartes says in the Rules regarding
deduction.

If we know the consequent, a simple unit, we

necessarily know the antecedent, another simple unit.

Since

there is an essential connection between the two, the antecedent is always implicitly contained in the consequent. 89
The third point of similarity is that in a melody the
quality of consonance of the entire melody depends on the
correct order of musical tones.

9

°

Certainly we know that the

secret of the Cartesian method of deduction consists wholly

in the order and disposition of things upon which the
certitude of the conclusion depends. 91
Finally, it must be said that music is a science of
movements insofar as the basis of music is sound, while one
of the attributes of sound is the difference of duration or
time, the measure of motion.

Moreover, the ear perceives

these movements, and "moves" along with the sounds and
integrates them so that they form a unity.

Analogously, in

deduction the mind moves along, always perceiving with the
mind's eye the antecedent and its necessary connection with
the consequent, until it finally sees them all as a cohesive
whole.

In attending to these similarities between deduction
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and the perception of a melody, we might take note that in
both cases a synthetic operation condenses the moments.

We

are familiar with what Descartes has to say about deduction
(cf. ftn. #61).

Here is the passage from the Compendium

in which Descartes speaks about the proportion of time in
sound:
Or cette proportion est souvent gardee avec tant d'exactitude dans les membres d'une chanson qu'entendant
encore la fin d'un temps, nous nous ressouvenons par
son moyen du commencement et de la suite de la meme
chanson ••• car alors ayant entendu les deux premiers
membres, nous les concevons comme un seul; ayant entendu
le troisieme, nous le joignons avec les deux premieres,
en sorte que la proportion est triple: lorsque nous
entendons le quatrieme, nous le joignons au troisieme,
et de ces deux derniers nous n'en faisons qu'un; puis
joignant les deux premiers aux deux derniers, on
concevra ces quatre membres ensemble comme un seul,
et c'est ainsi que notre imagination se conduit
jusques a la fin; ou elle se represente toute la
chanson comme un corps entier compose de plusieurs
membres.92
At the same time that we are hearing one melodic
phrase, we are retaining what has preceded and are anticipating what is to follow so that we are continuously
integrating the phrases and thus perceiving the melody as
a whole.

If there was a rupture between our perception of

the melodic phrases, the proportion necessary for the hearing
of this particular melody would no longer be present.

Since

it is the time-values or the proportions in time that, in
part, determine how the melody is perceived, a continuous
movement of the imagination is required.

This movement is

the integration of the preceding and following phrases in
the present phrase now being perceived.

The preceding and
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following phrases are coalesced in the present melodic
phrase so that, in effect, no phrase that constitutes the
melody as a whole is ever past or future in the sense that
it no longer exists or does not yet exist.

As phrases of

a melody, like the months of a year, the phrases of a melody
exist simultaneously as a whole.

The phrases are not prior

in time but are perceived simultaneously with the melody.
It is the movement of the imagination that makes this possible as it continuously perceives 'as present' what has
preceded and what follows the present perception.

The

'presentification' of all of the melodic phrases makes it
possible to experience the pleasure that comes from hearing
the melody as a whole.
Analogously, as the understanding moves from one link
in the chain to another, it stretches itself out to include
what immediately precedes and what immediately follows.
Just as a rupture between the melodic phrases would degrade
the intended melodic effect, similarly in deduction any
interruption in the movement of the mind would threaten the
certitude since it would be possible to omit a necessary
link in the chain.

In the hearing of a melody there must be

a field qf perception that can make "comme present" the
'before' and 'after' so that the melody is perceived as an
undivided unity from beginning to end.

This is also true

of the mental field of consciousness necessary in deduction.
The amplitude of that "field of presence" must be wide
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enough to attend, at the same time, to both the antecedent
and the consequent as it moves along.

Through the repeti-

tion of the movement the chain of successive links becomes
shorter and shorter until the whole series is condensed
into the present intuition wherein the separate links no
longer are viewed as discrete parts related to each in an
order of 'before' and 'after'.

The u,ltimate intuition of the

whole is an event in which the parts exist simultaneously
as an undivided unity.
In the reduction of the succession to simultaneity,
the temporal aim of deduction is accomplished.

The 'before'

and 'after' as past and future become integrated into the
present where all of the parts co-exist at the same time.
That temporal effect is made possible because the duration
of the thinking substance, although successive in nature,
.
1.s
con t '1.nuous. 93

While the continuous duration is poten-

tially divisble into moments of 'before' and 'after',
actually it is an unbroken unity in which the past and
future are always integrated as present parts into the
present whole.

In light of Descartes' prescribed rules for

deduction, it would seem logically false to assert that
time, for Descartes, is discontinuous.

For it is only

through "un mouvement de pensee continu et ininterrompu"
that we can eventually have an intuition of the whole "a la
fois."
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C. The Permanent Self as Durational
Deduction manifests the epistemic power of the thinking
substance as an organizing consciousness whose actions take
place in time.

The temporal duration of the thinking sub-

stance is projected as a multiplicity of. successive mental
events.

However, the unification of facts and the develop-

ment of science imply a ground of permanence that makes
possible the unity.

As the noetic foundation of Descartes'

science, the thinking substance must have ontological status
as a permanent substance whose substantial identity is
preserved in time.

Without that status science as a

developmental intellectual event becomes unthinkable.
The Cartesian doctrine of method ontologically suggests
that the life of the mind is a succession of epistemic
events.

Yet, there is a permanent self that transcends

the dispersion of the moments because it is that which
enjoins the intuitions and reduces them by deduction to a
single vision.

The soul remains ontologically the same

throughout its durational actions.

"Car encore que tous ses

accidents se changent, par example, qu'elle conceive de
certaines choses, qu'elle en veuille d'autres, qu'elle en
sente autres, &, c'est pourtant toujours la meme ame."
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While Descartes recognizes the de facto unity of mind
and body nevertheless, the body is essentially and radically
distinct from the soul, and the numerical unity of the
substance as a concrete person resides in "sa forme que est
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l'ame. 1195

Although the numerical unity of the substance

resides in the form of the soul, Descartes ascribes to that
soul no principle of auto-continuation by which it can
account for its own permanence:
Si j'avoir la puissance de me conserver moi meme
j'aurois aussi a plus sorte raison, ie pouvoir de me
donner toutes les perfections qui me manquent, car
ces perfections ne sont que des attributs de la substance, & moi je suis une substance. Mais je n'ai
pas la puissance de me donner toutes ces perfections;
car autrement je les possederois. Doncques je'n'ais
pas la puissance de me conserver moi meme.96
Since the substance lacks an intrinsic power of conservation
Descartes must appeal to a transcendental ground of unity.
It is a recognition of the substance's inability to account
for its continuance in existence that provides Descartes
with his second proof for the existence of God.

Utilizing

the infinite regress argument (which is fundamentally one of
vertical regression that seeks a cause of existence in each
moment), Descartes posits God as the cause which conserves
the substance in being:
Car, tout de meme que, bien que j'eusse ete de toute
eternite, et que par consequent il n'y eut rien eu
avant moi, neanmoins, parce que je vois que les parties
du temps peuvent etre separees les unes d'avec les
autres et qu'ainsi, de ce que je suis maintenant, il
ne s'ensuit pas que je doive etre encore apres, si,
pour ainsi parler je ne suis cree de nouveau a chaque
moment par quelque cause, je ferais point difficulte
d'appeler efficiente la cause qui me cree continuellement
en cette facon, c'est-a-dire me conserve.9
In the case of substances and their relation to God, it is
not only a question of their production, it is a question of
their conservation in existence as the same self.

Descartes
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demonstrates the relation between God and created substances
as analogous to the relation between the sun and the iight
which proceeds from it.

Drawing on that analogy, Descartes

proposes that
[L] 'architecture est la cause de la maison, et la pere
la cause de son fils, quanta la production seulement;
mais le soleil est la cause de la lumiere qui procede
de lui, et Dieu est la cause de toutes les choses
crees, non seulement en ce qui depend de leur production, mais meme in ce qui concerne leur conservation
ou leur duree dans l'etre. C'est pourquoi il doit
toujours agir sur son effet d'une meme facon pour le
conserver dans le premier etat gu'il lui a donne.91r
Descartes persists in the analogy:
Il est bien plus certain qu'aucune chose ne peut
exister sans le concours de Dieu, qu'il n'est certain
qu'aucune lumiere du soleil ne peut exister sans le
soleil. Et il n'est pas douteux que si Dieu arretait
son concours aussitot toutes les choses qu'il a crees
retourneraient au neant, parce que, avant qu'elles ne
fussent crees et qu'il ne leur pretat son concourse,
elles n'etaient rien.99
The analogy signals the radical finitude of the thinking substance.

Yet the analogy has a positive aspect to it.

God

is "la source de toute lumiere", and in creating and
conserving the thinking substance, God simultaneously creates
and conserves the "faculte de connaitre" that "nous appelons
lumiere naturelle".lOO

The Cartesian doctrine of method

shows how the thinking substance can "accroitre la lumiere
naturelle de sa raison, 11101 and thereby achieve the
certitude that is demanded in science.
The appreciation of knowledge is effected by a knower
in time.

Aware of the brevity of the duration of the

thinking substance, Descartes, nevertheless, believed that
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the thinking substance was endowed with a noetic faculty,
which, if used in accordance with the prescribed metho~,
could acquire some knowledge of nature.

102

Although the

progress achieved by the thinking substance is constituted
by a succession of mental events, the th~nking substance
as an agent of knowing retains its substantial identity
throughout the successive duration of its life.

That

permanence, albeit guaranteed by God, is the noetic
condition for science as an ongoing event.

For science

constitutes the ultimate goal of the thinking substance as
an agent of knowing and the agent's duration, like the
duration of all substances, is measured by time.
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CHAPTER V
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF TIME
The objective of this chapter is to provide a comparative analysis between the theory of time· of Descartes and
that of both Aristotle and St. Augustine.

These two latter

historical channels of thought appear to have influenced
Descartes as he formulated his theory of time.
Descartes' encounter with Aristotle began at La Fleche,
where part of his schooling consisted of three years of
philosophical study.

In the second year of this philosophy

curriculum, Descartes was obliged to read Books I, II and
XI of Aristotle's Metaphysics as well as Books I through
VIII of the Physics.

Book IV of the Physics contained

Aristotle's treatment of time.

1

jected Aristotle's metaphysics,
in their theories of time.

Although Descartes re2

there is a decided accord

This will become evident in

our analysis.
As far as Descartes' encounter with Augustine is concerned, we know that Descartes certainly had read the
City of God and the Confessions since he refers to passages
from both of these works.

3

Some historians contend that

the parallels between Descartes and Augustine make evident
Augustine's influence on Descartes.
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4

The extent of that
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influence is noted by Henri Marrou, who makes the striking
observation that not only was Descartes influenced by
Augustine but what also is true is that Augustine can be
understood in terms of Descartes:
Cartesianism was ranked by his first supporters for
its greater honor as an extension of·Augustianism.
On the other hand it must be emphasized that by an
inverse process the reading of Descartes comes to
influence profoundly and permanently men's understanding of Augustine ••• it is often through the
Cartesian prism that they learn to discover Augustinian thought.5
Marrou's point seems to be that Descartes and Augustine are
so similar that Descartes can be used as a means of access
to Augustine's thought.
Descartes never acknowledged any indebtedness to either
Aristotle or Augustine, yet he did make known that he was
grateful for the schooling he had received at La Fleche.
Writing to one of the Jesuits at La Fleche, Descartes expressed his gratitude:
[C]ar je serai ravie de retourner a La Fleche, ou j'ai
demeure 8 ou 9 ans de suite en ma jeunesse, et c'est
la que j'ai recu les premieres semences de tout ce
que j'ai jamais appris, de quoi j'a toute l'obligation
a votre Compagnie de Jesuites.6
Descartes never pretended to be original in all of his
thinking and ideas.

What he did claim was that he made the

truth, whatever its origin may be, to conform to the
exigencies of reason:
Et je ne me vante point aussi d'etre le premier inventeur d'aucunes, mais bien, que je ne les ai jarnais
receues, ny pource qu'elles avoient ete dites par
d'autres, ny pource qu'elles ne l'avoient point ete,
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mais seulement pource que la raison me les a
persuadees.7
What this admission suggests is that Descartes appropriated
the thoughts and ideas of others if they were true and useful for his own purposes.
Our comparative analysis will focus· on the areas where
there are essential and intrinsic similarities between
Descartes' theory of time and the theories of time of
Aristotle and Augustine.

What will become evident is that

the resemblance and parallel areas of thought between
Descartes and these two historical predecessors are so
apparent that it can hardly be doubted that both Aristotle
and Augustine exercised some influence on Descartes in the
latter's treatment of time.

Aside from accomplishing that

goal, a historical investigation of this nature will illuminate and cast more light on points that have already been
treated in this study.
A. Aristotle
1. Time as the Number of Movement
Unlike Descartes, who treated time in a dispersed and
coincidental manner, Aristotle considered time as a special
topic in itself confining his treatment to Book IV of the
Physics.

After working out some difficulties connected with

time, Aristotle arrives at a brief definition:

"It is clear,

then, that time is the number of movement in respect of the
'before' and 'after', and is continuous since it is an
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While Aristotle's thesis is that time is not independent
of motion, time is the number of movement by virtue of. the
fact that the motion is constituted by a succession of
changes ordered on to another as 'before and after'.
wherever we find things changing we find time.

Thus,

In essence,

time numbers not only local motion but anything that undergoes some change.

The following text verifies this:

But neither does time exist without change; for when
the state of our own minds does not change at all, or
we have not noticed its changing, we do not realize
that time has elapsed ••• If, then, the non-realization
of the existence of time happens to us when we do not
distinguish any change, but the soul seems to stay in
an indivisible state, and when we perceive and distinguish we say time has elapsed, evidently time is
not independent of movement and change.13
The text establishes three things:

First of all, time

is the number of movement only insofar as movement involves
change.

This suggests that wherever we find change of any

kind that change can be numbered by time.
include the changes found in the soui.

14

This would then
SecondlY,, when

Aristotle says that the soul only notices time when it
notices the changes in thought he also implies that like
physical things the soul has a successive duration and is in
time.

For only things which do not change and are "always"

are not in time (cf. ftn. #13).

Aristotle maintains that if

the soul does not perceive any change it "seems to stay in
an indivisible state (cf. ftn. #11).
is important.

This "seems to stay"

What it denotes is that the soul is not

actually in an indivisible state, that is, a state of
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"always", a state in which there is no change.

Rather,

although the soul does not perceive any change in its state
of mind and hence does not perceive that time has passed,
nevertheless the soul is changing.
things, the soul is in time.

Therefore, like physical

The third ~oint made in the

text is that it is the perception of change in our minds
that is the subjective index of our perception of time.
Here Aristotle wishes to emphasize the interdependency of
time and change and is not specifically concerned with change
insofar as it pertains to the soul.

Nevertheless, it is

clear that the soul's awareness of the succession in its
thought is the ground for the perception of time.
We find a similarity between Aristotle's and Descartes'
conception of the soul's relationship to time.

For both

Aristotle and Descartes, the soul's awareness of its own
change signals its temporality:
Jene connois pas autrement la duree successive des
choses qui sont mues, ou meme celle de leur mouvement
que je fais la duree des choses non mues; car le devant et l'apres de toutes les durees quelles qu'elles
saient, me parait par le devant et par l'apres de la
duree successive que je decouvre en ma pensee avec
laquelle les autres choses sont coexistantes.15
Here Descartes articulates what Aristotle has implied,
namely, that all things have a successive duration in which
there is found the 'before' and 'after'.

Both spiritual

and material substances have a successive duration, hence,
Descartes can easily adopt Aristotle's definition of time as
a number and apply it to both spiritual and material
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substances.
We have further clarification of what Aristotle means
when he calls time a "number of movement".

Any movement

must cover some distance in a period of time.

Magnitude is

continuous, and the movement goes with th~ magnitude.

There-

fore, the movement is continuous and, if the movement is

.
. t·ime. 16
con t inuous,
so is

There is, however, a discrete

aspect of time, the 'now':
[M]otion, as we said, goes with the magnitude, and time,
as we maintain, with motion. Similarly then, there
corresponds to the point the body which is carried
along and by which are are aware of the motion and of
the 'before' and 'after' in it ••• But the 'now' corresponds to the body carried along, as time corresponds
to the motion. For it is by means of the body that
is carried along that we become aware of the 'before'
and 'after' in the motion and if we regard them as
countable we get the 'now' •.• The 'now' corresponds to
the moving body and is like the unit of number.17
At this point of the discussion, Aristotle is concerned
with the function of the 'now' as a number for time.

Inso-

far as the phases of motion are perceived by the intellect,
they can be numbered.

Thus, we perceive the successive

phases of motion, that is, the 'before' and 'after', each
one being a 'now' as they are perceived.

These are countable

as units of one, two, three, etc., just as we count the
minutes on a clock.

No motion in the real order, however,

can be broken up into units of motion since movement and
time are existentially continuous.
Number is used in two senses:

that which is counted or

countable, and that by which one counts.

18

Insofar as the
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'before' and 'after' phases of motion are perceived as
discrete quantities, they can be regarded as countable.
When they are so, we get the 'now'.

When Aristotle comes

to describe the 'now' as a number in the sense of that which
is countable, the 'now' is not a part of time.

Just as the

point is not a part of the line, and the line is not composed of indivisible points, neither is time composed of

. d'1v1s1
. 'bl e , nows.
, 19
in

The 'now' as a number is the discrete

aspect of time and corresponds to the discrete aspect of
motion, namely, the 'before' and 'after' phases which can
be isolated only in thought.

The mind perceives the 'before'

and 'after' as indivisible phases of motion which exist in
a certain order and which can be numbered.

The 'now' as

discrete quantity is a construct of the intellect just as
a point on a line is imposed on the line by the intellect.
As a number, the 'now', like the point, functions
differently.

Aristotle tells us that the 'now' when used as

one is both a uniter and divider.

"Time, then, also is both

made continuous by the 'now' and divided by it. 020

The 'now'

as a link unites the past with the future as midnight joins
Monday to Tuesday.

The 'now' as divider divides the past

from the future as midnight divides Monday from Tuesday.
The intellect determines how the 'now' is to function, that
is, whether or not the 'now' is to be used as that which
unites the parts of time or as that which is a potential
divider of time.
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For the recognition of time there must be recognition
of the 'before' and 'after'.

In order for this to happen

the 'now' must function as two:
But we apprehend time only when we have marked motion,
marking it by 'before' and 'after'; and it is only when
we have perceived 'before' and 'after' in motion that we
say that time has elapsed. Now we mark them by judging
that A and Bare different, and that some third thing
is intermediate to them ••• For what is bounded by the
'now' is thought to be time.21
The 'now' as we see has a threefold function:

As one point,

the 'now' can serve as 1) a connector of time and 2) as a
potential divider of time.
third function:

The 'now' has an additional

Used as two points, the 'now' is considered

as the extremes that bound the motion.

Each of these ex-

tremes is a different 'now' to which the mind attends in its
perception of continuous motion.

Regardless of the function

of the 'now', the 'now' as a number is a mental construct.
Can motion be numbered without a numberer?

What

Aristotle says about the 'now' as a number presupposes that
unless there is a soul to number the 'before' and 'after'
in motion, there is no time.

While Aristotle glosses over

the psychological aspect of time he does not fail to see the
implications of his definition.

He raises the question,

Would there be time without a soul to actually number the
motion?
Whether if soul did not exist time would exist or not,
is a question that may fairly be asked; for if there
cannot be someone to count there cannot be anything
that can be counted, so that evidently there cannot
be number; for number is either what has been, or what
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can be counted. But if nothing but soul, or in soul
reason, is qualified to count, there would not be time
unless there were soul, but only that (movement) of
which time is an attribute, i.e., if movement can exist
without soul, and the before and after are attributes
of movement, and time is these qua numerable.22
We might say that what time is materially is found in motion,
namely, the 'before' and 'after', but time is formally
achieved only in the enumerating process of the soul.
While Aristotle defines time as the number of movement,
this definition implies that time is also a mode of thought.
Without the soul to number there would be no time, but only
that which can be numbered, the 'before' and 'after' found
in motion.

Therefore, when Vigier claims that Descartes'

concept of time as a mode of thought is a departure from
Aristotle's definition of time as the number of movement, he
fails to fully comprehend what is implicit in Aristotle's
definition.

The difference between Descartes' and

Aristotle's definitions of time is that Descartes wishes to
emphasize the psychological aspect, while Aristotle, in
keeping with his intent to treat time as would a natural
philosopher, chooses to exclude the psychological in his
definition.

However, as the above text indicates, the

psychological aspect of time is intrinsic to Aristotle's
definition of time as the number of movement.
We have seen Aristotle's treatment of the 'now' insofar
as it relates to the ordinal aspect of motion.

The 'before'

and 'after', indivisible phases, are perceived by the
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intellect and taken as countable.

Each of the 'nows', when

perceived as a discrete quantity, is like a unit and hence,
is numerable.

This last concept of the 'now' belongs to the

order of the intellect; for in the existential order motion
cannot be broken up into indivisible phases.

Movement

corresponds to the magnitude and time to the movement, and
all three are continuous.

23

2. Time as a Measure of Motion
When time functions as an attribute of continuous
motion, the motion in itself is not per se numbered.

It is

only measurable because the parts of the motion exist
simultaneously without any order of prior and posterior.
Motion as measured is analogous to an extended magnitude
that has no actual parts; for we measure a line of 10 ;inches
as an unbroken unit even though mentally it can be divided
into 10 parts or inches.

In considering motion as a con-

tinuum Aristotle describes another function of time.
. a measure o f motion.
.
1124
is

"Time

Duratibn ·is not Aristotle's

primary concern; yet, when time serves as a measure of motion, it measures what is perceived as continuous existence.
While time directly measures motion it indirectly
measures the existence of things:
If a thing is 'in time' it will be measured by time.
But time will measure what is moved and what is at
rest, the one qua moved, the other qua at rest ••• Hence
what is moved will not be measured by the time simply
insofar as it has quantity but insofar as its motion
has quantity.25

208
To be in time is to have one's being measured by time.

Al-

though Aristotle is treating time as would a natural
philosopher, nevertheless time also extends to the duration
of corruptible non-physical substances.

These substances

manifest some kind of change, namely, a c?ange in thought,
and hence time exists for them because of this change (cf.
ftn. #13).

The following text clearly indicates that time

serves as a measure of the duration of both physical and
non-physical substances since all things are subject to a
temporal duration:
[A] thing whose existence is measured by it [time]
will have its existence in rest or motion. Those
things therefore which are subject to perishing and
becoming - generally those which at one time exist
and at another do not - are necessarily in time. 2 6
We have earlier noted that Descartes adopted Aristotle's
definition of time as the number of movement.

Following

Aristotle, who describes time as a "measure of motion", we
find Descartes similarly calling time a "measure":
[I]l ya des choses encore plus simple & plus universelles, qui sont vraie et existantes .•• De que
genre de choses est la nature corporelle en general,
& son etendue; ensemble la figure de choses etendue,
leur quantite ou grandeur & leur nombre, .comme aussi
le lieu ou elles sont, le temps qui measure leur
duree & autre semblable.27
When Aristotle calls time a number of motion the phases of
motion are perceived as discrete quantitites.

When he

considers the durational aspect of motion he also refers to
time as a measure of motion.

In this last function time

measures motion insofar as the latter is perceived as
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continuous quantity which corresponds to the magnitude.

In

the same way, Descartes can call time a "measure" because
duration is the mode under which we conceive things insofar
as they continue to exist.

28

Since in his eyes the duration

of material and of thinking substances is the same, time
can serve to measure the duration of both kinds of substances.
While Aristotle as a natural philosopher emphasizes time as a
measure of motion, nevertheless, as we have seen, time also
measures the duration of all temporal things (cf. ftn. #26).
In describing time as a measure of motion there is
always the question of a standard of measurement.

Aristotle

proceeds in his discussion of time as a measure to tell us
that time not only measures the motion but the motion
.
29
measures t h e time.

He then goes on to indicate what motion

it is that serves as a measure of time.

The ideal chro-

nometer is the motion of the astronomical system:
Time is measured [by motion] as well as motion by
time ••• if then what is first is the measure of everything homogeneous with it, regular circular motion
is above all else the measure, because the number of
this is the best known.30
What Descartes has to say about a standard of measure
seems to be an adaptation of the above:
Mais, afin de comprendre la duree de toutes les choses
sous une meme mesure, nous nous ferons ordinairement
de la duree de certains mouvemens reguliers qui sont
les jours & les annees, & la nommons temps, apres
l'avoir rien, hors de la veritable duree des choses,
qu'une £aeon de penser.31
Descartes' points seem to be the same as Aristotle's, namely,
that time and motion are reciprocally measured and that
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circular motion, being the most uniform and regular, serves
as the optimum standard of measure.

In conjunction with the

motions of the heavens Descartes also recognizes that the
motion of the hands of a clock serve equally well as a means
.
.
32
o f measuring time.

While Descartes acknowledges time and motion as reciprocal measures, something more is involved.

Descartes'

preoccupation with mathematics adds a nuance to the issue.
From a mathematical perspective it is less a question of
the reciprocity of time and motion in their measuring as it
is a question of their intrinsic measurability.

Time can

only be conceived as a kind of measure if there is something
measurable, that is, a species of continuous quantity.

Des-

cartes' definition of dimension bears this out:
Par dimension nous n'entendons rien autre chose que le
mode et le rapport sous lequel un quelconque est juge
mesurable, en sorte que non seulement la longuerer,
la largeur, et la profondeur sont des dimensions ••.
la vitesse et ainsi d'une infinite d'autre choses de
cette sorte. Par la il est clair qu'il peut y avoir
dans un meme sujet une infinite de dimensions differentes, que celles-ci n'ajoutent absolument rien
aux choses mesurees, et qu'elles sont comprises de la
meme maniere, soit qu'elles aient un fondement reel
dans les sujets eux-memes, soit qu'elles aient ete
inventees par notre esprit. C'est en effet quelque
chose de reel ..• la division du siecle en annees et
en jours; mais ce n'est pas quelque chose de reel que
la division du jour en heures et en minutes, etc.
Et cependent toutes ces choses sont equivalentes, si
on les considere seulement sous le rapport de la
dimension.33
Fundamentally, there is no difference between the motion of
the astronomical system or the motion of the hands of a clock.
They are both species of measurable quantity which is per se
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continuous quantity analogous to spatial extension. 34

In

sum, Descartes adds a mathematical perspective to his
treatment of time--a matter which Aristotle does not consider in Book IV of the Physics.
However, the question of measurement per se is treated
by Aristotle in Book X of his Metaphysics and we can apply
what he says there to time.
number.

Any measuring process uses

Although Aristotle distinguishes time as the number

of movement from time as a measure of movement, nevertheless, time as a measure is still a number or it could not
measure quantity:
For measure is that by which quantity is known; and
quantity qua quantity is known either by a 'one' or
by a number, and all number is known by a 'one•.35
Time as a number functions to express the ordinal aspect of
motion.

The 'before' and 'after' phases.of movement are

perceived as discrete quantities which, like the unit, are
countable.

Since all measure uses number and since time is

a measure, time also is a number by which continuous motion
qua quantity is known.
Following Aristotle, Descartes defines time as the
number of movement.

In doing this, Descartes recognizes

that duration has an ordinal aspect to it, namely, the
'before' and 'after' and that time serves as a number to
express this order.

Moreover, like Aristotle, Descartes

describes time as a measure of duration and that duration

36
. continuous
.
.
is
an d ana 1 ogous to ex t ension.

As a measure
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of duration time is also a number.

This is so because, as

Descartes recognizes, there is a "double usage des nompres •••
les meme nombres expliquant tantot l'ordre et la mesure. 1137
In Aristotle's discussion of time as a number, the
'now' was projected as a construct of the intellect.

How-

ever, when Aristotle shifts from the abstract order to the
concrete order where changes take place in continuous time,
the 'now' must be perceived in terms of having actual
existence.

Thus we no longer find that the 'now' is not a

part of time (cf. ftn. #19).

As a part of continuous time

the 'now' has ontological status.

The move from the epis-

temic aspect of the 'now' to the existential aspect of the
'now' places the 'now' with the other moments in time,
so that since the 'nows' are in time, the 'before'
and 'after' will be in time too; for in that in which
38
the 'now' is,. the distance from the 'now' will also be.
Yet the 'now' as a part of continuous time is indivisible.
'Presently' or 'just' refers to the part of future time
which is near the indivisible present 'now' .

39

We might ask

how the 'now' can be indivisible and still be a part of
continuous time since "nothing that is continuous can be
composed of indivisibles 11 ?

40

In what sense does Aristotle

understand the 'now' to be indivisible?

The answer can be

found in Aristotle's Metaphysics, where he discusses the
concept of the 'one'.

We can think about something as being

one in itself and in this sense it is indivisible.
'[T]o be one' means to be indivisible; means being
essentially a 'this' and capable of being isolated
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either in place, or in form of thought; or perhaps to
be whole and indivisible.41
The line as a continuum is a whole in itself, yet it is
divisible into parts.

But that divisibility still remains

potential, so that the line perceived as an actual whole is
really indivisible.

Moreover, the line is indivisible in

the sense that it is one and not another.

It is distin-

guished as a unit itself apart from other extended wholes.
Analogously, the 'now' as a part of time is one in itself.
It is neither the past nor the future, in which case it may
be said to be indivisible in itself since it contains nothing
of the past or of the future.

The 'now' is that part of time

to which the other parts of time are related to as 'before'
and 'after':
But 'before' is used contrariwise with reference to
past and future time; for in the past we call 'before'
what is farther from the 'now', and 'after' what is
nearer, but in the future we call the nearer 'before' and
the farther 'after'. So that since the 'before' is in
time, and every movement involves a 'before' evidently
every change and every movement is in time.42
The 'now' as a part of time has duration, for at one time
the 'now' was a 'before' and later it will become an 'after'.
Thus just as the 'before' is always in time, so every 'now'
is in time.

The 'now' as the indivisible present is simply

the negation of the past and future.

Nevertheless, it is a

negation that is always referable to the soul since it is
the soul that isolates the 'now' in the form of thought and
separates it from the past and future.
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As Aristotle notes in the above passage, we call
'before' what is farther from the 'now' and 'after' what is
nearer.

The 'before' and 'after' have existence as parts

of time in the sense that every change and movement involves
a 'before' and 'after' phase; a body is here and then it
is there.

In the same way the 'now' is a part of time in

the sense that there is always a present phase of motion.
To this present phase the soul attends and calls it 'now';
to it the soul orders the other phases as 'before' and
'after', temporally known as the 'past' and 'future'.

Thus,

time which includes the past and future in addition to the
'now' can only be conceived in terms of the soul.

For the

latter perceives the phases of motion as occurring in a
succession in which there is always a 'before' and 'after'.
At the same time, the soul perceives the present phase
which the soul distinguishes from the 'before' and 'after'
phases.
Inevitably Aristotle cannot extricate himself from the
fact that time is a mode of thought and that it is the way
in which we think about the duration of things insofar as
that duration is constituted by successive numerable and
measurable change.

Time is the number of that change.

Consequently, Descartes' definition of time simply makes
explicit what is implicit in Aristotle's definition, namely,
that time is a mode of thought.

Aristotle alludes to the

fact that the existence of the soul is a condition for time,
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but he does not spell out the dynamics of that process.
the soul is necessary for time.

Yet

And while Descartes' theory

of time, as we have analyzed it, bears a striking resemblance to Aristotle's, Descartes, as a metaphysician, could
go further and introduce the psychologic~l aspect.

He does

this while utilizing Aristotle's definition which comes from
the standpoint of a natural philosopher.
3. Summary of Aristotle vs. Descartes
From different perspectives and for distinctly different purposes, Aristotle and Descartes both consider time
as the number of movement and measure of motion.

Their

respective concerns are not the same but there is a consensus on the basic elements that define time.

As a student

of nature, Aristotle's chief concern was the locomotion of
physical substances and he explored time in relation to that
concern.

Hence, his treatment of time was an integral part

of his Physics.

His metaphysical thoughts were subjects

treated in a separate work.

From a different vantage point

Descartes chose to incorporate time into his dualistic
metaphysics, yet in accordance with Aristotle he viewed time
as the number of movement.
v

1

He did this, however, with the

stipulation that such a definition is appropriate only if we
understand that it applies to both material and spiritual
substances.

For they both have a common successive duration

in which there is found a 'before' and 'after' that can be
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numbered by time.

For this reason, Descartes was inter-

ested in formulating a theory of time that would acconuµodate
his dualistic kind of metaphysics.

While that theory was

part and parcel of his physics, he never treated it as a
topic that fell under the category of physics.

Although the

goals of Aristotle and Descartes remain different, the difference is of no substantive consequence.
Aristotle proposed that time is a number of movement
insofar as the changes in movement can be perceived as
'before' and 'after'.

As such, they are countable units

that can be numbered.

Yet Aristotle also implies that time

as a number can apply to the changes that take place in the
soul since these changes take place in an order of 'before'
and 'after', by which we can regard them as countable.
Aristotle describes time as a measure of motion that indirectly measures the duration of all temporal things,
including the soul.

As we have seen, however, the durational

aspect of time and its relation to motion were of secondary
importance to Aristotle, and even less important to him was
the durational aspect of time as it relates to the soul.
For Descartes, on the other hand, time measures the
duration of both material and spiritual substances.

In

terms of the Cartesian physics, the ordinal aspect of time
predominates.

Movement, conceived as continuous quantity,

was of secondary importance, although Descartes recognized
the durational aspect of motion and admitted its measurability
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since it is a species of continuous quantity.

However, in

terms of Descartes' goals for a mathematical kind of physics,
the ordinal and discrete aspect of both motion and time
played a more important role insofar as it applies to
material substances.
Such is not the case when he considers time as it
relates to the soul.

While Aristotle was not interested in

developing with any amplitude a theory of time as it related
to the soul, Descartes' main objectives demanded that he
propose a theory of time which would focus on the duration
of the thinking substance.

For it is the "cogito ergo sum"

that constitutes the noetic foundation for Descartes'
science.

That truth serves as the primary truth from which

all others could be deduced, and it establishes the thinking
substance as an agent of knowing whose duration is a continuous movement toward an ever-increasing knowledge about
the mysteries of nature.

Because the soul plays such a

pivotal role in the Cartesian philosophy, it follows that
unlike Aristotle, Descartes does not hesitate to stress
the psychological aspect of time.
The comparative analysis between Aristotle and Descartes
reveals obvious similarities of terminology and parallels in
thought which provide strong reasons to surmise an Aristotelian influence on Descartes' view of time.

To what degree

Aristotle's theory of time was operative as a positive and
decisive influence cannot be assessed with an incontestable
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certitude.

Yet the correspondence of thought between

Descartes and his predecessor and the familiarity of D~scartes with Aristotle, are supportive evidence that Descartes
utilized Aristotle's theory of time for his own purposes.
This Descartes was able to do without alt~ring or undermining any of the intrinsic components of Aristotle's theory
of time.

What he found valid in Aristotle's theory he was

able to appropriate as his own because, by his own admittance, Descartes submitted all of his ideas to the test of
reason, regardless of their genetic origin (cf. ftn. #7).
While not diminishing the worth of Aristotle's theory
of time, J. Callahan makes a point that is well taken:
To perceive an order in the 'nows' and number motion
accordingly demands that there be some recollection
of the 'nows' that are no longer in existence. But the
process by which the mind does this does not belong to
natural philosophy. Aristotle passes over the psychological aspect of time, which was later to be stressed
by St. Augustine.43
Because the psychological aspect is vital to Descartes'
theory of time, we can look to Augustine for further insight into the role that the soul plays in relation to time.
B. St~ Augustine
~n Books Eleven and Twelve of the Confessions, St.
Augustine provides a concise and concentrated treatment of
time and eternity.

He looks at both the metaphysical and

psychological aspects of time.

From the metaphysical

perspective, time has objective reality.

Addressing God,
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st. Augustine says, "you are the maker of all times ••• the
eternal creator of all times, and [that] times are never
co-eternal with you. 1144
tinct from eternity.

As a created reality, time is ~is-

For time does not exist without some

change, while in eternity there is no change.

In eternity,

which applies only to God, we find that the whole is present
all at once.

In time we find creatures that undergo change,

the parts of which cannot be simultaneous, but succeed one
another.

45

In the Confessions, St. Augustine chooses not to
develop an elaborate treatment of the correlation between
time and change.

Elsewhere, however, he is explicit about

the fact that where we find change of any kind we find time:
God then, who lives in an unchangeable eternity, created
simultaneously all things from which the course of time
would run and space would be filled and the ages would
unfold by the movement of beings in time and space •••
He established the spiritual creation above the corporeal because the spiritual is changeable only in time
but the corporeal is changeable in time and place. For
example, a soul moves in time, remembering what it had
forgotten or learning what it did not know, or wishing
what it did not wish.46
Augustine has made two salient points.

First of all, time

is contrasted with eternity since in the former we find
successive change, and in the latter we find no change nor
do we find succession.
all at once.

In eternity, the whole is present

Secondly, Augustine has made the point that

incorporeal substances manifest cognitive change and therefore are timely; whereas corporeal creatures are changeable
both in time and in place.

Time is an intrinsic property of
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all creatures.

These points are reiterated by Descartes.

In discussing the duration of the thinking substance, ~e
categorically opposes that duration to that of God's duration, noting the successive duration of the thinking
substance that is revealed in the successive nature of
thought:
Et quand meme il n'y aurait pas de corps du tout, on ne
pourrait pas dire pourtant que la duree de l'esprit
humain fut tout a la fois tout entiere, comme la duree
de Dieu, parce que nous avons manifestement connaissance
de la succession dans nos pensees, tandis qu'aucune
succession ne peut etre admise dans les pensees
divines.47
From a metaphysical perspective, St. Augustine hypostasizes time and establishes that time is a created reality.
However, it is clear that if there were no creatures whose
duration admitted of successive changes, there would be no
time.

Time and successive duration are correlative concepts,

and St. Augustine never means to suggest that time would
exist in itself apart from created substances.

"If there

were no motions of either a spiritual or corporeal creature,
by which the future moving through the present would succeed
the past, there would be no time at all. 1148

Where we find

successive change we find time, and correlatively, where we
find time we find successive change.

Since all creatures are

created by God, it follows that, concomitant with creation,
time came into being.
What is time?

With that question Augustine offers a

descriptive analysis starting with a presentation of the
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difficulty.

We know time exists for we perceive and

measure it, yet what is it we measure?

For the past is no

longer, and the future is not yet, and the present is per-

49
.
t o b e and ten d'ing towar d non- b eing.
·
pe t ua 11 y ceasing
While the past and future are obvious parts of time that do
not exist, it remains to be seen whether the present exists
to be measured.

In an interesting analysis, St. Augustine

concentrates on the meaning of the 'present'.

What evolves

from his analysis is that what we call 'present', whether it
be the present hundred years, the present year, month, day,
or even the present moment, are not really 'present'.

For

we find that each of these parts of time can be divided into
past and future parts.

The present year, for example, con-

tains both the past months and the future months, so that
the present year is, in fact, not wholly present.

What

then can be called the 'present'?
If any part of time is conceived that can no longer be
divided into even the most minute parts of a moment,
that alone it is which may be called the present.
It
flies with such speed from the future into the past that
it cannot be extended by even a trifling amount. For
if it is extended it is divided into past and future.
The present has no space.SO
In commenting on the above passage, Gilson makes the
following observation:
It is the essence of time to have only a fragmentary
existence because the past of anything is no more at
the moment of duration, and its future has yet to be.
As for its present, it can only consist of an indivisible moment, because if it is extended in duration
ever so little, it falls into a past which is no more
and an immediate future which has yet to be. There is
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scarcely any need to point out that this conception
of time will also be that of Descartes.51
Gilson is correct on this point:

for both Augustine and

Descartes, time has only a fragmentary existence.

For

Augustine, time is fragmentary because it is an attribute
of fundamentally finite creatures whose·existence in time
depends on God.

For "if He [God] were, so to speak, to

withdraw from created things His creative power, they would
straightway relapse into the nothingness in which they were
before they were created."
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God, in creating timely

beings, created time and so, without the conserving power
of God, not only creatures but also time would cease to
exist.
Descartes' concept of time in substances parallels
Augustine's.
substances.

Time is an intrinsic property of all created
If time is fragmentary, it is solely because

it corresponds to the fragmentary duration of created
substances.

Such duration is constituted by a succession

of moments in which the past, no doubt, is irrevocably nonexistent.

Because the substance lacks a principle of auto-

continuation, any future existence is uncertain.
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More-

over, even the present moment carries within it the
tendency toward non-being.

If God withdraws his power of

conservation, the substance may "cesser d'etre dans chaque
moment de sa duree."

54

The parity in language between what

Augustine says (cf. ftn. #52) and what Descartes says in
one of his letters cannot be more obvious:
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Et il n'est pas douteux que si Dieu arretait son
concours, aussitot toutes les choses qu'il a crees
retourneraient au neant parce que, avant qu'elles.
ne fussent crees et qu'il ne leur pretat son concours, elles n'etaient rien.55
In analyzing Descartes' agreement with St. Augustine
on the concept of the 'present', it must be said that Gilson
incorrectly maintains that, for St. Augustine, the present
can only consist of an indivisible moment because, if it
is extended in duration ever so little, it falls into a
past which is no longer and an immediate future which has
yet to be.

St. Augustine does not say that the present is

not extended in duration.

What he says is that it cannot

be divided into past and future, and that the present has
no space (cf. ftn. #50).
cannot be dismissed.
indivisible.

The import of this last statement

Augustine conceives the present to be

The mathematical point as discrete quantity is

opposed to geometric extension under the category of continuous quantity.

As discrete quantity, the point is a

countable unit, but it cannot be measured or divided.
Analogously, the 'present' conceived as discrete quantity
has no extension and is, therefore, not measurable or
divisible into parts.

However, like the point, the 'present'

is discrete quantity and an indivisible unit in itself.
As a unit it can be distinguished from other units.

This

does not mean that it is absolutely indivisible in the
sense that it has no duration.

It means only that it is

one in itself and not another, namely, it is neither the
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past nor the future.
Moreover, the 'present' to which St. Augustine ~efers
in Gilson's quot~tion is not the concrete 'present' moment
that constitutes one of the parts of the duration of the
created substance.
abstract.

It is the 'present' ~onsidered in the

An analysis of the concept reveals that the

'present' could not be 'present' if it is divided into a
past and future.

Since it cannot be divided, it is (analo-

gously to the mathematical point) indivisible.
then, it is not extended (in space).

Obviously,

This abstract per-

spective says nothing at all about the 'present' as it
pertains to the existing creature.

If the 'present' is

quantitatively unextended (has no space) as an analysis
of the concept implies, this does not mean that the
'present' is unextended in the concrete order as it applies
to the duration of created things.

And nowhere in this

particular text (cf. ftn. #50) does St. Augustine ever say
that the present is without duration.

Hence, Gilson is

mistaken in his interpretation of this particular text,
and, as our own study demonstrated, Descartes never proposed
that the present was indivisible in the sense that it has
no duration.
As St. Augustine proceeds further into the inquiry
and focuses on the intervals of time, he asserts that while
the past and future are said not to exist, certainly, the
. t . 56
present d oes exis

Time is measured and what is measured
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must be perceived.

Now "nothing can be seen except what is

present", therefore, it is the 'present' that is perceived
and measured.

57

This 'present' that is measured must have

duration, for if it were absolutely indivisible and without
duration, it could not, in fact, be measµred.

We cannot

measure the past because it is gone and we cannot measure
the future because it has not yet come.
must be the 'present'.

What we measure

Since we measure the past as being

'long' or 'short' and the future as being 'long' or 'short'
they must in some sense be 'present'.
St. Augustine finally arrives at the insight that what
we perceive is not the 'past' itself but images of the past
which are present to the mind through memory.

And in the

future what exists is not the 'future' itself but those
signs or causes which are 'present' through premeditation
or expectation.

Thus, it is a misnomer to say that there

are three times, past, present, and future.

We might say

that there are three times only with qualification:
It is now plain and clear that neither past nor future
are existent, and that it is not properly stated that
there are three times, past, present, and future.
But
perhaps it might properly be said that there are three
times, the present of things past, the present of things
present, and the present of things future.
These three
are in the soul, but elsewhere I do not see them: the
present of things past is in memory; the present of
things present is in intuition; the present of things
future is in expectation.58
Even if the past and future are present, still that
present is not extended in space.

Thus what do we measure?
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Since time is what we measure, St. Augustine proposes the
possibility that the movements of the sun, moon and s~ars
constitute time.

He dismisses this as untenable.

For even

if the movement of the heavenly bodies would stop, one would
still have the movement of the potter's.wheel and there
would still be time.

59

St. Augustine finally arrives at

a definition of time by appealing to the psychic order.
"Time is nothing more than a distention: but of what thing
I know not, and the marvel is, if it is not of the mind
1' t se lf .

1160

As to the question of what I measure when I measure
time:

Augustine says that I measure tracts of time in my

soul.

The 'present' state is what I measure, not the things

which pass away nor the things that are yet to come.
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If

the 'present state' is what I measure, how can this yield
a measure since all measurement presumes a standard of
measure to which the measured can be compared?

Augustine

answers this by alluding to the fact that the mind experiences different states of consciousness and it can estimate
the duration of one state by comparing it with the duration
of another state:
How is it when we measure stretches of silence, and
say that this silence has lasted for as much time as
that discourse lasted: Do we not apply our thought to
measurement of the voice, just as though it were
sounding so that we may be able to report about the
intervals of silence in a given tract of time? Even
though both voice and mouth be silent in our thought
we run through all poems and verses, and any discourse,
and any other measurements of motion. We report about
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tracts of time how great this one may be in relation to that, in the same manner as if we said
them audibly.62
Even if there existed no objective standards of measure
outside the soul, the latter can still measure the 'present
state' as 'long' or 'short' by comparing or contrasting it
with another state of consciousness that has its own interval of time.
Augustine defines in a fuller way what he means by
the 'present state'.

"The impression that passing things

makes upon you [mind] remains, even after those things have
passed.

That present state is what I measure, not the

things which pass away so that it be made.

That is what I

measure when I measure tracts of time. 1163

Implicit in the

'present state' is the permanence of attention through which
the mind conserves the impressions of the past and anticipates the future.

The mind through its present intention-

ality stretches itself out so that the present state
includes the past and future 'as present':
If someone wished to utter a rather long sound and he
determined by previous reflection how long it would
be, he has in fact already silently gone through a
tract of time. After committing it to memory he has
begun to utter that sound and he voices it until he
has brought it to his proposed end. Yet, it has
sounded and it will sound. For the part of it that
is finished has surely sounded; what remains will
sound. So it is carried out, as long as his present
intention transfers the future into the past, with
the past increasing by a diminution of future, until
by the consumption of the future the whole is made
past.64
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The present attention of the mind acts as the permanent
element in the transition from the past to the future~
Through an act of intentionality the subject unifies the
moments:
But how is the future which as yet does not exist,
diminished or consumed, or how does ~he past, which no
longer exists, increase, unless there are three things
in the mind, which does all this? It looks forward,
it considers, it remembers, so that the reality to
which it looks forward passes through what it considers
into what it remembers ••• Yet attention abides, and
through it what shall be present proceeds to become
something absent.GS
The amplitude of the mental field of attention must be
wide enough to include past and future as present.

Augus-

tine provides an example of how the mind synthesizes the
moments into a cohesive whole:
I am about to recite a psalm that I know. Before I
begin, my expectation extends over the entire psalm.
Once I have begun, my memory extends over as much of it
as I shall separate off and assign to the past. The
life of this action of mine is distended into memory
by reason of the part I have spoken and into forethought
by reason of the part I am about to speak. But attention is actually present and that which was to be
is borne along by it so as to become past. The more
this is done and done again, so much the more is
memory lengthened by a shortening of expectation,
until the entire expectation is exhausted. When this
is done the whole action is completed and passes into
memory. What takes place in the whole psalm takes
place also in each of its parts and in each of its
syllables. The same thing holds for a longer action,
of which perhaps the psalm is a small part. The same
thing holds for a man's entire life, the parts of
which are all the man's actions.66
While the moments pass, attention abides and provides the
unity and continuity to the totality of the moments which
constitute the successive duration of the subject.
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We know that the mind performs three functions:
memory, expectation, and intuition (cf. ftn. #58).

Through

the medium of attention the past and future are held together and integrated into the present state.

Insofar as

attention is projected by Augustine as the activity by
which the past and future are synthesized into the present
attention, it serves to transpose the succession into a
quasi-simultaneity in which there is a co-incidence of the
past, present, and future.

From an epistemic standpoint,

that quasi-simultaneity appears as the 'present' in which
the mind has an integrative insight (praesens de praesentibus contuitus) of the cumulative whole (cf. ftn. #58).
Viewed from that perspective, the present (in which
the mind focuses its attention and has a direct perception
or intuition [contuitus] of things present to the mind)
resembles Augustine's description of eternity in which the
"whole is present" simultaneously (cf. ftn. #45).

Thought

is transitory although the things that are thought are not
transitory.

Yet attention abides for a while and by means

of it the soul turns the "mind's eye" to behold a vision
of "the intelligible things in an incorpreal light that
are so presen t t o th e gaze Of the ml.'nd."67
The epistemic aspect of Augustine's theory of time
that we noted calls to mind Descartes' doctrine of method
for attaining truth in the sciences.

In the context of

that method we find an affinity between certain elements
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descriptive of both Augustine's and Descartes' theories of
time.

There is, for Descartes, as there is for Augus~ine,

a synthetic activity of the mind that conjoins the past and
future with the present to form a whole in which there are
no distinguishable parts.

From an epistemic standpoint,

that synthesis culminates in a present intuition in which
the mind has an immediate and simultaneous perception of the
whole.

The synthetic operation that Augustine describes in

the recitation of a psalm has a correlate in the synthetic
operation found in the enumeration method, the goal of
which is to have an integrative intuition of the total
series of intuitions.
In Rule XI Descartes explains how intuition and
enumeration aid and complete each other.

Enumeration pre-

supposes that all of the steps in the deductive process
have been intuited by single intuitions.

Descartes wishes

to prescribe the manner in which the mind should function
in order to keep all of the links within its present range
of attention.

As he says, "nous cherchons plutot tout ce

qui peu aider a retenir !'attention de notre pensee."
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When the deductive process includes many complex facts
enumeration is used to coalesce the single intuitions.

In

brief, we can see how the two processes work together:
(C]es deux operations s'aident et se completent
mutuellement, au point de paraitre se confondre et
en une seule, par uncertain mouvement de la pensee,
qui voit chaque chose en meme temps par une intuition
attentive et qui passe aux autres.69
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At the very moment that the mind has a vision-like knowledge of one fact, it passes at the same time to another.
As the text indicates, the consequent must be included in
the present range of attention.

However, the enumeration

process is constituted by a chain of pr~positions that are
ordered one to another as antecedent and consequent.

The

purpose of enumeration is to strengthen and renew the power
of the mind so that it can extend its present range of
attention to include both the antecedent and consequent.
In a more detailed manner, Descartes spells out the dynamics
of the enumeration process:
Apres que nous avons eu !'intuition de quelques
propositions simples, si nous en deduisons quelques
autre, il est utile de les parcourir toutes d'un
mouvement de pensee continu et ininterrompu, reflechir a leurs relations mutuelles, et, autant que
cela est possible, de concevoir distinctement plusieurs choses a la fois; car c'est ainsi que notre
connaissance acquiert beaucoup plus de certitude
et la puissance de notre esprit une plus grande
etendue.70
In every moment the mind attentively reflects on both
the antecedent and consequent.

The reflection is necessary

to insure that no link is left out in the long chain of
reasoning, for without the inclusion of every link the
' d e o f t h e cone 1 usion
.
'
.
d'ize.
d ?l
certitu
is
Jeopar

Moreover,

the other condition for certitude is the uninterrupted
movement of the mind which insures a cohesiveness between
the diverse mental acts.

If the enumeration process is

effected as prescribed, attention abides long enough to
focus on both the immediate antecedent and consequent so
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that the mind can simultaneously see their binding relationship as well as their distinctions.

This is poss~ble

only if the antecedent and consequent are included in the
present intuition.

The antecedents and consequents as

original single mental operations were at one time future
and another time past.

However, in the process of enumera-

tion they are "as present" in the moment of attention.
Descartes then has the instrument by which he can enjoy
Augustine's three 'presents' as Augustine does in the
contuitus.
For Augustine, memory plays a pivotal role in the
synth~tic process.

It must be noted that when he gives us

an example of the recitation of the psalm he states that it
is a psalm that we already know.

Thus, before we begin

we have a preview of the whole psalm.

This presumes that

we have the psalm committed to memory and that during the
recitation of the psalm the memory extends itself to a
certain portion which is about to be uttered.

The due order

of words are uttered in succession because we are able to
foresee in thought what comes next.

It is our memory of

what comes next that enables us to foresee the proper order
of what follows.

Hence, contrary as it may sound, anticipa-

tion presumes memory.

Memory preserves the order of the

syllables about to be uttered, and it is that retention of
the order that insures the goal of the recitation, which is
to perceive the psalm as a unified whole.
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Like Augustine, Descartes recognizes an equally
important and similar role for memory in the synthetic.
process.

In enumeration, as a repeated process of review-

ing previously perceived truths, the function of memory
cannot be conceived apart from anticipati?n·

Intrinsic to

the process is the uninterrupted movement of thought which
preserves the correct order of the steps that constitute the
series.

If the intended result is achieved, it presumes

that what has been retained by the memory is continuously
being anticipated in the inferential movement from antecedent to consequent.

The mind must continuously anticipate

the next step (previously perceived and at present retained
by memory) so that no link is missing, the latter condition
being vital for the certitude of the conclusion.

While

memory and anticipation can be distinguished by analysis,
in the enumeration process they are essentially united.
The reciprocity of anticipation and memory is demonstrated
in the following rule:
[P]lusieurs choses sont connues avec certitude, bien
qu'elles ne soient pas elles-memes evidentes, pourvu
seulement qu'elles soient deduites a partir de
principes vrais et connus, par un mouvement continu
et ininterrompu de la pensee qui a une intuition
claire de chaque chose. C'est ainsi que nous savons
que le dernier anneau d'une longue chaine est relie
au premier, meme si nous n'embrassons pas d'un seul
et meme coup d'oeil tousles intermediares dont
depend ce lien, pourvu que nous avons parcouru ceuxci successivement, et que nous nous souvenions que
du premier au dernier chacun tient a ceux qui sont
proches •••• [deduction] elle recoit en un sens sa
certitude de la memoire.72
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We must guard the memory of the order of antecedents and
consequents to insure that the conclusion drawn is incontestable.

Paradoxically, the memory of the order always

implies a memory of the future, those steps in the inferential process that follow one another in .succession.

While

memory (and its implied anticipation of the future) plays
a decisive role in the enumeration process, it only finds
its import in terms of the broader synthetic activity of
the mind.
For both Augustine and Descartes, that activity is
fundamental not only in terms of particular given instances
such as the recitation of a psalm or in the enumeration
process; the synthetic activity of the mind has broader
ramifications in the explication of Augustine's and Descartes' theories of time.

That cognitive activity provides

a compelling case for the continuity of time as well as the
continuous duration of the soul.

The import of the synthe-

tic activity justifies further consideration and clarification.
In the De Musica, Augustine provides a clear example
of the dynamics of the synthetic operation by which the soul
integrates the past and future into the present.

For

Augustine, music is the science of moving well, for whatever
moves and keeps harmoniously the measuring of times and
intervals can already be said to move well.
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Besides

giving a definition of music in Book One, Augustine also
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discusses the species and proportions of time-laden movements, matters which belong to the consideration of this
discipline.

Hence, we are given a mathematical theory of

music which discusses sound and its harmony in terms of
movements collated in a certain order.
movement is order.

The essence of

The time values have a "bond of order"

and we derive pleasure if "the first are harmoniously bound
with middle and middle with the last 11 •
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There are areas of correspondence between Descartes'
Compendium Musicae and Augustine's De Musica.

Considering

music to be a form of applied mathematics, Descartes, like
Augustine, presents a mathematical theory of music.

At the

outset, Descartes establishes that the basis of music is
sound and one of the attributes of sound is the difference
of duration or time.
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Following Augustine, Descartes

discusses music in terms of time-values, that is, proportions and types of mensuration used in music.

One of the

main points Descartes treats is the pleasure that the melody
produces.

Such pleasure is contingent on the correct order

of the musical tones that constitute the consonances.

The

proper sequence of notes must be followed throughout the
entire time-intervals of the melody if the intended sound
is to be heard.
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While Descartes confines his discussion of timemensurations as they occur in the science of music, St.
Augustine extends his consideration of time-values to the
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movements of sound in general.

In the context of that broad

category we find a correspondence between Augustine's.
treatment of time in Book XI of the Confessions and Book
Six of the De Musica, where we see how the soul is distended and how it synthesizes the parts .into a cohesive
whole.

Even in the recitation of a syllable there must be

a mental field of attention that includes the past and
future:
For any syllable, no matter how short, since it begins
and stops, has its beginning at one time and its ending at another. Then it is stretched over some little
interval of time and stretches from its beginning
through its middle to an end. So reason finds spatial
as well as temporal intervals which have an infinite
division and so no syllable's end is heard with its
beginning. And so, even in hearing the shortest
syllable, unless memory helps us have in the soul
that motion made when the beginning sounded, at the
very moment when no longer the beginning but the
end of the syllable is sounding, then we cannot say
we have heard anything.77
There are three points regarding this passage of
which special mention should be made.

First of all, there

must be a synthesis of the antecedent and consequent parts
'·

in order for the syllable to be heard as a unit in itself.
The soul must be able to retain the beginning of the sounded
syllable while it is uttering the end of the syllable.
Secondly, there corresponds to the movement of speech
uttered in a time interval, a motion in the soul that must
take place in the same time interval.

Thirdly, the motion

in the soul must be continuous so that the attention is
always fixed on what has immediately preceded and what
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immediately follows.

Otherwise, as St. Augustine tells us,

we will be unaware that a sound has been heard.

If the

motion of the soul were interrupted, then there would be
no synthesis which is the condition for the perception of
the syllable as a whole.
It is only by virtue of a continuous synthesis that
the elements that compose a whole are not lost.

Since each

and every element within the whole is essential to that
whole, then the soul, through its synthetic operation, must
carry along all of the preceding parts as it hears the
present sound.

What is true of the perception of a syllable

is true in the case of a poem:
And in a poem, if syllables should live and perceive
only so long as they sound, the harmony and beauty of
the connected work would in no way please them. For
they could not see or approve the whole, since it would
be fashioned and perfected by the very passing away of
these singulars.78
Let us compare what Augustine says in the above two
passages with a passage from Descartes' Compendium Musicae.
Discussing the parts of a composition and the proportions
which must prevail therein Descartes writes:
Or cette proportion est souvent gardee avec tant d'
exactitude dans les membres d'une chanson, qu'entendant
encore la fin d'un temps, nous nous ressouvens par
son moyen du commencement et de la suite de la meme
chanson; ce qui arrive ordinairement si toute la
chanson est composee de 8, 16, 32 ou 64 membres et
davantage, pourvu que toutes les divisions augmentent
en proportion double; car alors ayant entendu les
deux premiers membres, nous les concevons comme un
seul; ayant entendu le troisieme, nous le joignons
avec les deux premiers, en sorte que la proportion
est triple; lorsque nous entendons la quatrieme,
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nous le joignons au troisieme, et de ces deux derniers
nous n'en faisons qu'un; puis, joignant les deux
premiers aux deux derniers, on concevra ces quatre
membres ensemble comme un seul, et c'est ainsi que
notre imagination se conduit jusques a la fin, ou
elle se represente toute la chanson comme un corps
entier compose de plusieurs membres.79
Here is an echo of what we found in the passage from St.
Augustine.

In the above text of Descartes we note that a

synthesis of the antecedent and consequent must be taking
place in each time interval when the latter constitutes
the present range of attention.

That synthesis binds the

antecedent to the consequent in a necessary relationship
while it simultaneously distinguishes the two.

Secondly,

the movement must be continuous and uninterrupted so that no
element is missing from the work.

Thirdly, the mind must

be able to retain its attention long enough so that the
present can include the antecedent and consequent "as
present".

The synthetic operation illustrates the manner

in which the soul moves in time, a clear indication and
reflection of the fundamental successive, yet continuous,
nature of the soul's duration.
Going back to St. Augustine's De Musica, we find him
alluding to the fact that time is in the soul and that time
is projected as a species of continuous quantity analogous
to extension:
Why in rests isn't our sense offended by a deficiency,
if not because what is due that same law of equality,
although not in sound, is yet made up in a spread of
time? Why, too, is a short syllable taken for a long
one when followed by a rest--and not by convention,
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but by natural consideration directing the ears--if not
because by the same law of equality we are prevented,
in a longer time-span, from forcing the sound into a
shorter time? And so the nature of hearing and passing
over in silence allows the lengthening of a syllable
beyond two times; so what is also filled with rest can
be filled with sound.so
Commenting on the first part of this passage, R. Taliaferro
makes the following observation:

"The rest, the absence of

a sensible motion, is itself the object of the time-count and
plays its role on the same level as a sensible sound.
absence is counted by the 'spread of time'
poralis).

Its

(spatium tem-

This is the forereunner of the distentio animi

of the Confessions. 1181

What is also worth noting in the

text is that the spread of time can be occupied by either
rest or sound.

This demonstrates that the duration of the

soul is both successive and continuous since there occur
in the soul changes in thought that are spread over periods
of time.

The awareness of the absence of sound, i.e., the

awareness of rest, follows the awareness of the sound itself.
And these changes continue to transpire over the course of
the perception of the syllables being sounded.
Moreover, the awareness of the 'before' and 'after'
parts of the verse is primarily an awareness of the changes
of thought that occur in the time intervals which are
ordered one to another as 'before' and 'after'.

If the soul

were only aware of sound, i.e., sensible motion, then
perhaps time may well be, as Aristotle maintains, the number
of motion as it applies to the physical order.

However, as
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Augustine notes, we measure not only the motion of a body
but also its rest by means of time.
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In the case of the

soul, the awareness of rest corresponds to some part of the
distention of the soul's duration and that duration has its
own time.

The soul can measure the time of its awareness

of rest and contrast it with the time of the awareness of
sound, calling one "longer" and the other "shorter".

The

consciousness of rest must be conceived as a species of
motion.

If nothing else, it is a change in thought that

involves a movement from the 'before' to the 'after'.

For

what preceded it, the awareness of sound now becomes an
awareness of something different, the awareness of the
absence of sound.

That change in thought is accompanied by

a change in time.

For where we find change, we find time,

and this time, like the duration of the soul, is successive.
In the Compendium Musicae Descartes introduces the
concept of 'rest' as a positive factor in the perception of
a musical composition.

Variety in all things is most

pleasing, and it is necessary for the enjoyment of the
composition.
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"Rest" is "nothing in itself".

Yet it

introduces novelty and variety and lends pleasure to the ear
in the perception of the composition as an entire work.

84

The awareness of 'rest' has its own time and that awareness
when contrasted with an awareness of sound, which has its
own time, provides a variant that enhances the perception of
the composition.

Descartes recognizes time, in itself, to
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be an intrinsic positive feature in music.

In music, time

has such power that it alone can be pleasurable by itself
since the ear has nothing to attract its attention but the
time.
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Hence, the intrinsic variety that 'rest' lends to

the composition is the temporal variatio~ by which the time
of rest can be contrasted with the time of sound.

The two

modes of rest (silence) and movement (sound) which constitute the composition are intermingled throughout the entire
composition.

Since rest is nothing in itself, that is, not

a mov~ment, the awareness of the time of rest is, for
Descartes, as it is for Augustine, a perception of the soul's
own duration that is spread over the time of rest.
It is apparent that the subjective aspect of time is
critical to Augustine's theory of time.

However, we have

seen that time has ontological status as a created reality
(cf. ftn. #44).

It is legitimate to ask the question how

Augustine's subjective view of time as existing in present
consciousness is consistent with his recognition of an
objective temporal order.

As we have seen in Book XI of the

Confessions, Augustine assumes a subjective perspective of
time, noting that "I measure tracts of time in the soul."
In Book XII, he makes a shift and assumes an objective
position.

While it remains true that the soul measures

tracts of time as it relates to consciousness, nevertheless,
there are corresponding tracts of time in the objective
order:
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Out of this unordered and invisible earth, out of
this formlessness, out of this almost-nothing you
made all things, of which this mutable world stands
firm, and yet does not stand firm, in which mutability
itself is apparent, in which tracts of time can be
perceived and numbered off. For tracts of time result
from the changes of things, according as the forms,
for which the aforesaid invisible earth is the matter,
are varied and turned about.86
Time cannot be without created being, and all things, including the soul, are in time insofar as they manifest
some change.

The soul exists simultaneously with time and

with all other creatures in time.

In order to measure time,

the soul compares the time required by one motion with the
time required by another motion, calling one 'longer' and
the other 'shorter•.
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Here, time is an activity of the soul, since what is
being measured is primarily the soul's own perception of
the external motion.

The perceptions, however, consist in

the representations and images of the successive motion.
The soul, as disentio animi, is extended through its sense
memories, present sensations and future projections.

In

this way the soul makes contact with the objective order.
We may quote Augustine to support this view, for he writes:
"Through its attention, it directs the senses outwardly
towards a body and unites with it in order to see it and
to fix its gaze upon it 11 • 88

The soul as an indivisible

unity is directly aware of the body's sensations that are
"directed to changeable and corporeal things" and the soul
"takes in the likenesses of realities through the senses."

89
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Since the' operations of the soul, including sensation
and cognition, can be performed simultaneously, the soul
can perceive the objective order and intellectually measure
the movement of corporeal creatures.
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The soul, like

things, is extended in time and therefore can be cognitively
aware of the movement of things that simultaneously exist
with the soul.

While what is being measured are tracts of

time in the soul, these are the spiritual couterparts of the
sensible phenomena in the objective temporal order.

Thus,

the soul as distentio animi cooperates with its extended
senses and by that means the soul realizes a unity with an
objective order in which the soul perceives and can measure
the movement of corporeal creatures.
Although it is the motion in the soul that gives rise
to the consciousness of time, nevertheless, that motion
coincides with the successive motion in the objective order.
One need only read Book VI of the De Musica to see that this
is the case.

For in the recitation of the syllable we find

that there is "in the soul that motion made when the beginning sounded".
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While the soul is independent of the laws

to which external motions are subject, nevertheless, the
soul is in time, and is subject to changes (spiritual
motions), and these occur in succession just as do the
changes in the physical order.
The consciousness of the movement of the body is itself a spiritual motion with its own duration.

That
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duration can be measured and its measurement can be applied
to the physical movement of the body.

The soul is aware

of when a body starts to move and of when it stops moving.
The length of the duration of the soul's awareness is the
measure which the soul applies to the physical movement
itself.
When a body is moved, I measure in time how long it is
moved, from when it begins to be moved until it ceases.
If I did not see when it began and if it continues to
be moved, so that I cannot see when it stops, I am
unable to measure it, except perhaps from the time I
begin to see it until I stop.
If I look at it for
long, I can merely report that it is a long time, but
not how long.92
The soul's awareness of the duration of things arises
from the soul's awareness of its own duration.

While time

may be a distention of the soul, and while time is, per~,
not the movement of a body, nevertheless it remains true
that the soul shares a common duration with corporeal
creatures.

The soul becomes the vehicle by which the

temporal movement of things outside the soul is perceived
and measured.

Thus, the soul, as distentio animi, makes

it possible to reconcile Augustine's subjective aspect of
time with an objective temporal order.
Spiritual creatures are superior to corporeal creatures and spiritual motions superior to physical motion.
Yet all motion is distended from the past through the present and into the future.

Where there is change there is

successive duration and where there is successive duration
there is time.

If there is time and it is measured, there
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must be a soul that does the measuring.

From the psycho-

logical perspective, Augustine sees time as an activity
of the soul.
Descartes endorses this Augustinian view of time.
Like Augustine, he recognizes that time is a fundamental
property of all created substances insofar as they have a
successive duration in which there is perpetual change.
While Descartes adopts Aristotle's definition of time as
a number and measure, he chooses to stress the psychological
aspect that is implicit in that description of time.
If time is a number and measure, there must be a
numberer and measurer and Descartes is not hesitant in
emphasizing the subjective aspect of time, calling it a
'mode of thought'.

The soul clearly plays a pivotal role

in the context of that definition.

From the features that

spiritual substances share with corporeal substances such as
existence, unity, number and duration, 93 derive the clear
and distinct ideas about corporeal substance which the soul
first possesses about itself.

These ideas can be transferred

to any object outside the soul; duration is one of these
i'd eas.
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In the order of discovery the soul through changes

in itself (e.g., in thought), becomes aware of its own
successive duration prior to any awareness of the successive
duration of things outside itself.

That discovery initiates

the recognition that the things outside the soul, with which
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the soul coexists, share a common duration with the soul:
Jene connois pas autrement la duree successive des
choses qui sont mues, ou meme celle de leur mouvement
que je fais la duree des choses non mues; car le devant
et l'apres de toutes les durees quelles qu'elles saient,
me parait par le devant et par l'apres de la duree
successive que je decouvre en ma pensee avec laquelle
les autres choses sont coexistantes.95
The soul, intimately joined with its body, perceives
an objective order with which the soul coexists.

The common

duration of both spiritual and material substances brings
the soul into a relationship with the physical order and
gives the soul access to the movements of material substances.

That mutual coexistence means that the soul can

intellectually accompany the movement of things and that
it "puis assigner a chacun de ces mouvemens toutes sortes
de durees."
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Descartes concurs with Augustine that time is not,
per se, the movement of a body.

Even if there were no

bodies in the world, the duration of the thinking substance
would still be successive (cf. ftn. #48).
existed, there would still be time.

And if no bodies

Insofar as the thinking

substance is aware of the changes in its own consciousness,
it is aware of its own duration and that duration could be
measured.

And if no physical movements existed outside,

the soul could still measure its inner duration by contrasting the duration of one state of consciousness with
another, noting the one to be 'longer' or 'shorter' than
another.

It is accurate to say, then, that the soul

measures tracts of time in the soul.

For Descartes, time

is the number of movement and a measure of duration.

That

numbering and measuring must be referred to the soul.

In

this sense, time is clearly a 'mode of thought'.
1. Summary of Augustine vs. Descartes
The psychological aspect of time provided by St.
Augustine prevails as one of his most innovative theories
and the convergence of thought between Descartes' theory of
time and Augustine's theory gives weight to the thesis
that Augustine had an influence on Descartes' theory of
time.

No doubt there are dissimilarities between Augustine

and Descartes regarding time.

But these are not substan-

tive differences, they are, rather, perspectival differences.
The context in which Augustine gives expression to
time is one quite removed from that of Descartes.

Augus-

tine's theory of time finds its meaning within the context
of his spiritual life.

The soul, in time, finds itself

subject to the dispersion of temporal existence even as
it discovers the eternal in the contrast with time.

Life

is a distention, that is, a distraction that keeps the
soul from rising to a higher life of grace and ultimately
to a contemplation of God.
But since "your mercy is better than lives," I behold,
my life is a distention, or distraction. But "your
right hand has upheld me" in my Lord, the Son of man,
mediator between you, the One, and us, the many, who
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are dissipated in many ways upon many things; so that
by him "I may apprehend, in whom I have been apprehended," and may be gathered together again from my
former days, to follow the One; "forgetting the things
that are behind" and not distended but extended, not
to things that shall be and shall pass away, but "to
those things which are before"; not purposelessly but
purposively, "I follow on for the prize of supernal
vocation," where "I may hear the vo~ce of your praise,"
and "contemplate your delights," which neither come
nor go.97
While Augustine approaches time as a wayfarer on a
journey taking him to God, Descartes approaches time as a
"savant" on a journey leading him to a contemplation of the
truths of nature.

For Augustine the soul as distentio animi

suffers from the distractions that keep the soul from
achieving a greater unity with God.

For Descartes the soul

can only be quasi-attentive for any one moment.

Hence, the

soul immersed in a world of change can be distracted and
turn its attention away from the very evidence that the soul
must assent to in order to see the truth.

The method for

attaining truth in the sciences is fundamentally Descartes'
attempt to show how the soul can surmount the dispersion
of thought and fix its attention on the cumulative elements
that constitute the ultimate intuition in which the whole
is seen "a la fois".
For both Augustine and Descartes the soul moves in
time.

For Augustine that movement has spiritual conse-

quences.

It is a movement to the "Light which brings

light 11 , 98 a movement from the temporal to the eternal.
For Descartes, the soul's movement in time has epistemic
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consequences.

It is a movement to see the light whose

source is God as the creator of all truth. 99

It is a-move-

ment to see the incontestable, unchangeable truth that is
present to an attentive mind.

Ultimately, for both

Augustine and Descartes, the movement of the soul in time
is a drive towards eternity.

This drive partially over-

comes the soul's temporality which is marked by perpetual
change and by the distractions caused by change.
The extent of Augustine's influence on Descartes'
theory of time is open to debate.

Perhaps H. Marrou's

assessment is not far off when he makes the dramatic statement that "it is often through the Cartesian prism that
they [men] learn to discover Augustinian thought" (cf. ftn.
#5).

If this last statement is not true, nevertheless, as

the comparative analysis indicates, we can derive a clearer
understanding of Descartes' theory of time if we are
familiar with St. Allg~stine~sc:theeryi-
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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION:

A COHERENT THEORY OF TIME

This study has accomplished its four intended goals.
First of all, it has examined time as an integral part of
an entire philosophical system, a close network of interrelated themes and concepts.

For an understanding of time

this study has focused on Descartes' primary aim, namely,
to establish a universal science, essentially a mathematical
kind of physics.

That goal prompted him to formulate a

metaphysical foundation which polarized the finite order
into two radically heterogeneous kinds of substances.

Al-

though both material substances and thinking substances
share a common duration, their fundamental disparity affects
the manner in which their temporality is manifested in the
Cartesian system.

For that reason, we presented a dual

perspective approach to time.

This explicated the dynamic

ways in which the temporality of the two kinds of substances
functioned within Descartes' overall scientific concerns.
Secondly, this study discredited the classical thesis
that time, for Descartes, is discontinuous and that Descartes
endorsed the theory that time was constituted by absolutely
indivisible instants of no temporal duration.

An in-depth

look at the relevant texts testifies that such beliefs are
260
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not grounded on fact.
Thirdly, time is the number of movement and a measure
of duration.

For this reason we considered time from a

mathematical perspective in accordance with Descartes'
view that number expresses both order anq measure.

Because

the duration of all substances is successive, yet continuous,
it can be perceived as both discrete quantity and continuous
quantity, as such duration is both numerable and measurable.
And time is the number.

We have also, when applicable,

utilized graphic mathematical examples to illustrate certain
points.

This was appropriate in light of Descartes' belief

that the discovery of truth and resolution of problems
could be achieved by using the mathematical method.

As

evidenced by the Regles graphic illustrations were part of
that method.
Fourthly, the comparative analysis of Descartes' theory
of time with those of both Aristotle and Augustine has
demonstrated how Descartes utilized traditional historical
thought for his own purposes.

Unlike Aristotle and Augus-

tine, Descartes never treated time as a special issue in any
concentrated and systematic fashion.
he failed to have a theory of time.

Yet this does not mean
What Descartes did was

to make use of certain elements found in both Aristotle and
Augustine.

Descartes utilized Aristotle's description of

time as a number of movement and a measure of duration.

He

coupled that with Augustine's psychological perspective on
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time.

Descartes, countenancing Augustine's emphasis on the

role of the soul, called time a 'mode of thought'.
Descartes' lack of a totally original theory of time
suggests that Descartes was not so much concerned to offer
an elaborate and unique theory of time as he was to have a
theory that could be reconciled with other constitutive
elements of his philosophy.

What we may presume is that

Descartes was content to take what he needed from others who
had already given their concentrated efforts and consideration to the subject.

Having done this, Descartes was free

to focus his own mental energies on the greater task of
constructing a metaphysical foundation for his science.

As

the volume of Descartes' works and his own admission indicate, his ultimate concerns were scientific.

Time as a

number and measure, and time as also a mode of thought, fit
well within the framework of those concerns.
Does Descartes have a coherent theory of time?

Diver-

gent interpretations of his theory found in the commentaries
suggest that he did not provide a doctrine that was clear
and unambiguous.

There are two reasons that may occasion

this assessment.

The first reason is that, unlike Aristotle

and Augustine, Descartes never treated time as a special
topic.

Hence, what Descartes has to say about time is

dispersed throughout his works and is most often treated
incidentally as a subordinate issue within the immediate
context in which it appears, and, more importantly, within
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the broader context of Descartes' ultimate scientific
concerns.
There is a second reason for the divergence of opinion:

More fundamental problems endemic to Descartes'

metaphysical dualism.

Because of the incoherencies within

that metaphysics it would seem to follow that Descartes
cannot have a coherent theory of time.

However, an assess-

ment of Descartes' theory of time based solely on his metaphysics fails to result in an accurate interpretation and
judgment of his theory.

Descartes' metaphysics is simply

one component of a complex philosophical system and it is
in relationship to that system that his metaphysics derives
its meaning.
Throughout this study it has been our thesis that any
evaluation of Descartes' theory of time must take into
account Descartes' philosophical system as an integrated
whole.

The sole purpose of Descartes' metaphysics was to

provide a foundation for a mathematical kind of physics that
would be characterized by its certitude and self-evident
knowledge.

To insure this, Descartes polarized the finite

order into two disparate substances.

Epistemic considera-

tions prompted Descartes to attribute one essential attribute to the material world.

That attribute was extension.

As extended, the physical universe could be treated mathematically, since it would operate in accordance with the
principles and laws of mathematics.

Given the mathematical
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structure of the world, it was theoretically possible to
arrive at some moral certitude about the phenomena in ~ature.
The thinking substance, in the world but not of the world,
was so endowed that by virtue of its sole essential attribute, thought, the thinking substance cou~d attain increasing
knowledge about the manner in which the universe operated.
This vision of nature required him to use a method that was
employed in the mathematical sciences for the attainment of
truth.
It is within the context of that overall project to
construct a mathematical physics that we must evaluate
Descartes' theory of time.
be:

Hence, the question should not

Does Descartes have a coherent theory of time?

the question should be:

Rather,

Does Descartes' theory of time

accommodate the metaphysical dualism which constitutes the
foundation for his mathematical physics?

I believe it does.

A comprehensive analysis of Descartes' theory of time
has been provided.

That analysis considered time as a

fundamental property of two heterogeneous kinds of substances.
For that reason, we could not treat time as a univocal concept applicable to all substances.

Although both kinds of

substances share a common successive duration, the temporality of both kinds of substances is manifested in distinct
ways.

As our dual perspective approach has demonstrated,

time is an analogical concept in the philosophy of Descartes.
Examined as such, Descartes' theory of time appears to be
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neither paradoxical nor incoherent.

On the contrary, time

constitutes a neatly woven strand within the tapestry .of
Descartes' total philosophy and serves to complete the
intended design.

Our summary will place this statement into

perspective.
A. Summary of Descartes' Theory of Time
Time is real.

It is a property of the existing sub-

stance insofar as that substance endures.
time for Descartes?

But what else is

Accepting Aristotle's definition,

Descartes describes "le temps" as "le nombre du mouvement". 1
He couples this with the psychological perspective of
Augustine by also calling time "une certain facon dont nous
pensons" about the duration of all things.

2

Fundamentally,

that duration, shared by both material and thinking substances, is successive.

Because duration is successive,

there is a numerable aspect to it insofar as it is constituted by parts ordered one to another as 'before' and 'after'.
Since one of the functions of number is to express
order, it is possible to number the parts of duration perceived as 'before' and 'after'.
quantities they are countable.

Insofar as they are discrete
The ordinal aspect of dura-

tion means that time can number the successive 'before' and
'after' parts of duration as the first moment, second moment,
third moment, etc.

These parts can then be transposed into

countable units so that the first, second, and third become
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one moment, two moments, three moments, etc.

Time can

number duration because duration is a species of quant_i ty.
As successive, duration falls under the category of discrete
quantity and is numerable.
However, if time is to truly function as a number, it
must also serve to number continuous quantity.

While the

fundamental mode of duration is successive, nevertheless,
Descartes recognizes another aspect of duration, its
measurable aspect; for "la duree est un mode ou une facon
dont nous considerons cette chose en tant qu'elle continue
d'etre", and that duration "est etendue et divisible 11 • 3
Analogous to extension, duration is continuous in the same
way that a magnitude is continuous.

The magnitude is

measured in the same way that we measure the length of a
spear as an undivided whole.

Because duration is continuous

and hence measurable, time can be a number for measuring
duration.

With due consistency, we find Descartes referring

to this function of time, "le temps qui mesure leur duree. 114
Thus, when we conceive of the duration as a continuous whole,
it is measured as a unit of length, and time is the number
that expresses that measure.

We are here conceiving dura-

tion as an unbroken whole whose parts exist simultaneously.
Thus, continuity of existence is measured by time, such as
ten minutes.
We see, then, how time functions as a number to express
both the ordinal and measurable aspects of duration.

But
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time remains a mode of thought.

For what is numberable and

measurable can only be numbered and measured if there -is a
soul to number.

Nevertheless, the soul qua numberer and

measurer is not absolute in the sense that it needs no
objective standard of measure.

Adhering.to the Aristotelian

theory that time itself is measured by some movement, Descartes acknowledges the movements of the astronomical system
to be the most general and ordinary standards of measure.
The clock, as an artifice of man, can serve to measure
smaller intervals of time.

It is the soul, however, that

determines which unit of measure to apply.
All movement has some measurable duration, and the rate
of speed of the movement of the body, that is, the movement
between two points, can be measured by using a reciprocal
measure of motion, namely time.

The standard of measure is

a selective process, since the duration of a movement of a
body can conceivably be measured in terms of one hour or
sixty minutes with equal validity.

Suppose that the soul

wishes to focus its attention on a very brief phase of the
movement, a phase less than a minute.
a standard of measure?

What is to be used as

Would it be possible to say the

motion was a short as the twinkling of an eye, or a flash of
lightning, or instantaneous?

The point is that it is the

soul that applies to the movement a measure which conforms
to the purpose of the soul in measuring the duration.
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Time is a mode of thought, a way in which we think
about the duration of things.

It is that definition o~ time

which resolves the paradox of how the instant can be indivisible and still constitute a part of continuous duration.
To explain the point we need only recall that one of the
primary characteristics of mathematics is its concern with
order.

Thus, to conceive of movement in terms of instan-

taneous phases is to view movement from a mathematical
perspective.

It is analogous to dividing a line by the im-

position of points.

A line without points is an actual

measurable continuum without any actual parts.
On the other hand, a line on which points are imposed
is, by virtue of these points, no longer an extended magnitude whose parts exist simultaneously.

With the imposition

of points the line is divided into parts ordered one to
another as prior and posterior.

The prior and posterior

parts are numerable, and their number is determined by the
position of each of the parts in relation to the other
parts.

Thus, the segment posterior to the first is numbered

second, and the segment posterior to the second is third,
and what follows that is fourth, etc.

The significance of

this is that the number of the segment in a successive series
is determined by its relation to the other segments to which
it is ordered.
If we transpose this geometric operation to Descartes'
concept of movement, we find somewhat of an analogy.

Movement,
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like an extended magnitude, is actually continuous. As a continuum the movement has no separate phases.

However, it is

possible to mentally divide the movement, to freeze a segment for inspection and to consider its relation to the
other phases.

When this is done, the mo~ement is not con-

sidered as a measurable whole whose parts exist simultaneously.

Rather, the movement is conceived as being

constituted by phases ordered one to another as 'before' and
'after'.

In terms of Descartes' physics, this means that we

can talk about the movement of a body in one instant and its
relationship to the movement of a body in the next instant.
No doubt the ordinal aspect of duration prevails in
the Cartesian physics.

Moreover, that ordinal aspect is

expressed in terms of the temporal 'instant' which measures
the elementary phases of motion.

When the soul considers

the instantaneous phases of movement, the latter are considered as indivisible.

Each phase is isolated in thought

and is divided from the instant before and the instant after.
They are not, however, indivisible in the sense that they
are without duration.

Movement takes place in an instant

and all movement has some duration, "car il est impossible
de concevoir .•. le mouvement prive de toute duree.

115

As to

the duration of "l'instant", Descartes always conceived it
to have some measurable quantity.

It is an "espace de temps",

albeit a "peu de temps", "le plus court 11 •

6

The 'instant' with its mathematical implications is
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well accommodated to Descartes' mathematical physics.

It

cannot, however, be adopted as the way in which we think
about the duration of the thinking substance.

The duration

of the thinking substance is manifested in terms of cognitive
events that take place in the 'present'.
can be viewed in two ways.

That part of time

The 'present' is conceived as

discrete quantity ordered to the other parts of time, or it
is conceived as continuous quantity, the parts of which exist
simultaneously.

Descartes considers the 'present' in both

ways.
In terms of his doctrine of method, Descartes stresses
the self-evidency and immediacy of truth and conditions
intuition on a 'present' in which the mind clearly and distinctly sees the truth of the evidence present to the understanding.

This 'present', which is integral to the method of

intuition, is ordered to the other parts of time.

It is op-

posed to the past which is no longer, and the future which is
not yet.

Both of these parts of time have slipped out of

present consciousness and are for that reason imbued with incertitude.

In terms of intuition, the 'present' is a species

of discrete quantity ordered to the other parts of time.

In-

sofar as the 'present' is so conceived, the event of intuition
reveals the manner in which the ordinal aspect of time functions as a feature of the duration of the thinking substance.
However, while the ordinal aspect of time comes into
play, it does not predominate.

As far as Descartes' doctrine
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of method is concerned, deduction prevails as the method
most utilized in the acquisition of truth.

Deduction is

really a series of intuitions; nevertheless, the intuitions
are not discrete when they are part of the deductive process.

While there is an order in the thought process such

that the consequent necessarily follows from the immediate
antecedent, the order is not projected as a series of
discrete thoughts.

The past and future are not separate

units ordered to the present.

On the contrary, the mind

moves in a continuous and uninterrupted manner so that
there is always a perpetual synthesis and convergence of
past, present, and future.

The 'present', which includes

the past and future, has no determined duration.

It must

be long enough for the mind to hold both the antecedent
and consequent in its present field of attention.

The

'present' with its inclusive past and future endures for
as long as attention abides.
As the deductive method clearly illustrates, there
are no time gaps.
uous.7

Time is successive, but it is contin-

Like time, the duration of the thinking substance

is continuous.

That continuous duration means that the

substance perdures as the same substance throughout all of
the moments in which it exists.

It is that continuous

substantial permanence as a subject of cognitive actions
which constitutes the noetic condition for the Cartesian
physics inasmuch as the latter demands not only a knowable
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object, but an agent of knowing.

Descartes' doctrine of

method prescribes the manner in which the thinking substance,
endowed with an intrinsic faculty of knowing, can move in
time towards an ever-increasing, though not exhaustive,
knowledge about the universe.
Viewed from another dimension, the continuity of the
duration of the thinking substance is the condition for the
measurement of the duration of movement.

A body moving

between two points traverses an indefinite number of points;
this movement can be measured only if it is perceived as a
continuum corresponding to the magnitude which the body
traverses.

In order to measure the motion, the successive

phases of the movement must be synthesized into a cohesive
whole that is perceived as a continuum.

In that case, the

movement falls under the category of continuous quantity and
is measurable.

The measurement of the movement presupposes

a corresponding measurable motion in the understanding mind
which does the measuring.

The interior continuous motion

of the mind allows the latter to participate in the flux of
external motion, and thus [I] "puis assigner a chacun de
ces mouvemens toutes sortes de durees."

8

As material sub-

stances move from place to place, so, too, does the thinking
substance move along in thought.

For both substances co-

exist and share a common duration that is continuous.
Descartes' definition of time as the number of movement
adapts itself not only to material substances insofar as they
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undergo perpetual movement, it serves equally well to·
measure the duration of thinking substances.

Descartes

unequivocally maintains that, even if no bodies existed in
the world, the duration of the thinking substance would be
successive.

Still, he draws attention to the continuous

aspect of that duration, noting it "sa dureee ••• est etendue
et divisible".

9

The soul always thinks and thinking is a species of
movement contained under the broader category of fundamentally successive change.

Because it is successive, the

'before' and 'after' phases can be perceived as discrete
quantity ordered one to another.
number to express that order.

Time can function as a

Insofar as thought is con-

tinuous, it can be measured and time is that which measures
it.

Time as a number serves to express both order and

measure.

Just as with material substances, the thinking

substance has both an ordinal and continuous aspect to its
duration.

These aspects can be adapted to the definition

of time as a number of movement.
Duration is numerable because it can be perceived from
its ordinal aspect (successive duration).

Duration is

measurable because it can be perceived from its continuous
aspect.

When we wish to think about those aspects we think

about them in terms of time which expresses both order and
measure.

Time and duration (which time numbers and measures)

fall under the category of mathematics.

Thus, questions
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regarding duration and time (as the number applicable to
duration) are, in essence, questions about order and m~asure.
Our procedure is, perhaps, an example of what Descartes had
in mind when he proposed his universal mathematics:
Et si l'on y reflechit plus attentivement, on remarque
enfin que seules toutes les choses ou l'on etudie
l'ordre et la mesure se rattachent a la mathematique,
sans qu'il importe que cette mesure soit cherchee dans
des nombres, des figures, des astres, des sons, ou
quelqu'autre objet; on remarque ainsi qu'il doit y
avoir quelque science generale expliquant tout ce qu'on
peut chercher touchant l'ordre et la mesure sans
application a une matiere particuliere, et que cette
science est appelee, non pas d'un nom etranger, mais
d'un nom deja ancien et recu par l'usage mathematique
universelle, parce qu'elle renferme tout ce pourquoi
les autres sciences sont dites des parties de la
mathematique.10
Descartes was not unmindful of the implications of his
definition of time as a number.

For if duration is number-

able and time is the number, there must be a numberer.

Des-

cartes' insight prompted him to include as a part of his
definition of time the psychological aspect of time.
is a mode of thought.

Time

Although Descartes polarized the

world into two distinct kinds of substances, there is always
an implicit unity between the two.

From an epistemic stand-

point, material substances are related to the thinking
substance as knowable objects.

Correlatively, the thinking

substance is related to material substances as the subject
who can and does perceive the physical universe as a mathematical model which, Descartes believed, "agit en tout
mathematique. 1111

Because material substances and thinking

substances share a common duration, the thinking substance
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can apprehend the events in the physical order and, through
reflection, come to have intellectual vision of the patterns
according to which these events occur.
In spite of the radical heterogeneity between material
substances and thinking substances, there is a metaphysical
unity.

Both substances exist, and to exist is to endure,

and that duration is measured by time.

As a consummate

metaphysician with an extended and committed vision of a
mathematical physics, Descartes formulated a coherent theory
of time that served his purposes well.
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NOTES - CHAPTER VI
1

Prin. I, 57, A.T. IX, pp. 49-50.
numberofmovement ..• "
2

1 •
Ib'd

,

" ... the time ... the

" ••• a certain way of thinki~g."

3

Prin. I, 55, A.T. IX, p. 49. H.R. I, p. 241.
" •.• the
durationof each thing is a mode under which we shall consider this thing insofar as it continues to exist."
4

I Med. A.T. IX, p. 15.
their duration."

" ••. the time which measures

5

Regle XII, Pleiade, p. 83.
" •.• for it is impossible
to conceive ••• movement deprived of all duration."
6

Prin. II, 33, A.T. IX, p. 82.
" ••• space of time".
Prin. III, 63, A.T. IX, p. 135.
" .•• little bit of time".
AHyperaspistes, Aug. 1641, Pleiade, p. 1133.
" ••. the
briefest [instant]." Perhaps a duration equal to what we
now know as a 'millisecond'?
7

since Descartes stresses the necessity of the uninterrupted movement of the mind in the process of deduction, it
(deduction) provides a more apparent indication than does
intuition that time is continuous. However, as we have
argued in Chapter IV, even intuition implies the continuity
of time since each of the intuitions is contingent on
previous known truths that provide the evidence for the
present intuitions.
Intuition has a discursive aspect to it,
but it is not stressed by Descartes because he wishes to
focus on the self-evidence and immediacy of intuition. Hence,
he conditions intuition on a 'present' that excludes the no
longer existing past. Descartes does not, however, exclude
the immediate past that is retained by and is part of present
consciousness. Cf. Chapter IV, pp. 161-164.
8

V Med. A.T. IX, p. 50.
" •.• [I] can assign to each of
these movements all sorts of durations."
9A Arnauld, 4, June, 1648, A, M, VIII, p. 47. Ent.
avec Burman, Pleiade, p. 1358.
" ••• its duration ..• is extended and divisible."
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lORegle IV, Pleiade, pp. 50-51. H.R. I, p. 13.
"But
as I considered the matter carefully, it gradually came to
light that all those matters only were referred to Mathematics in which order and measurement are investigated, and
that it makes no difference whether it be in numbers,
figures, stars, sounds or any other object that the question
of measurement arises.
I saw consequently that there must
be some general science to explain that element as a whole
which gives rise to problems about order.and measurement,
restricted as these are to no special subject matter. This
I perceived, was called 'Universal Mathematics', not a farfetched designation, but one of long standing which has
passed into current use, because in this science is contained
everything on account of which the others are called parts
of Mathematics."
11
A Mersenne, 11, March, 1640, A.T. III, p. 37.
acts totally mathematically."

"
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